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ABSTRACT 
 In recent years, adversaries of the United States have become increasingly more 
adept at operating in the gray zone, which sits above normal statecraft and below armed 
conflict. In 2016, Russia used cyber-espionage and covert influence operations to sow 
discord among the American population and interfere in the democratic process of the 
U.S. presidential election. This attempt was but one part of a broader Russian gray zone 
strategy in which it uses non-military means to achieve its national objectives and gain 
influence while avoiding a powerful response from either the United States or NATO. In 
this sphere, non-democratic adversaries of the United States are at an advantage as they 
are often more agile and expeditious at integrating all elements of state power, especially 
economic power and informational warfare. This thesis draws on interviews with subject 
matter experts to explore how the United States can best deter these gray zone actions 
and strategies in the future. In doing so, it provides a strategic assessment of Russia as a 
state actor, U.S.–Russian relations, and Russia’s use of the gray zone. Additionally, it 
analyzes the transposition of deterrence to the sub-conventional level. Finally, it 
illustrates ways in which the United States can deter parts of Russia’s gray zone strategy. 
Overall, this research finds that it is difficult but possible to deter Russian gray zone 
conflict. 
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How can the United States deter Russian gray zone conflict—conflict that exists at 
a level below general war? The 2017 United States National Security Strategy designates 
China and Russia as principal priorities, and the 2018 National Military Strategy places 
new emphasis on diffusion and competition, shifting priorities away from counterterrorism 
and onto great power competition.1 These strategic shifts demand an examination of the 
way the United States and Russia interact in competition to achieve their political aims, 
including deterrence of gray zone conflict. To understand this context, it is critical also to 
understand the relationship between the United States and Russia and how that relationship 
influences both states’ policy and strategy. Western analysts have focused primarily on 
Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” strategy. However, they have failed to adequately 
address the full scope of Russia’s strategic posture and ability to engage in operations 
below the threshold of conflict, which scholars divergently describe in several ways: as 
hybrid warfare, a short-of-war strategy, new-generation warfare, or gray zone conflict. 
Russia recognizes that multiple levels of conflict exist before reaching a threshold 
beyond which they are outmatched politically and militarily by the United States and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2 Russian strategy and operations, therefore, 
integrate conventional and non-military means to achieve their strategic objectives while 
pulling back from actions that would initiate a strategic or conventional military response 
from the United States. Russian strategic objectives include weakening the cohesion of the 
NATO alliance to diminish U.S. involvement and gain leverage in Europe.3  
 
1 Donald Trump, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, December 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Description of the National Military Strategy 2018 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 3, 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_
Strategy_Description.pdf. 
2 Dave Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear 
Thresholds, Livermore Papers on Global Security, no. 3 (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, February 2018), https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-
v3-7.pdf. 
3 Elbridge Colby and Jonathan Solomon, “Facing Russia: Conventional Defence and Deterrence in 
Europe,” Survival 57, no. 6 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1116146. 
2 
The scholarship on how to deter gray zone conflict is limited in scope and emergent, 
which introduces critical discussions into the literature without anchoring those ideas to 
the practicality of transposing deterrence theory to the sub-conventional level. The 
literature also fails to agree on terminology for Russia’s aggressive actions below the 
threshold of general war, which has the potential to cause misinterpretation and a failed 
analysis.4  
For this research, a series of interviews was conducted with the leading subject 
matter experts in deterrence, U.S. and NATO strategy, and Russian strategy. The 
interviewees were as follows: retired U.S. Army general and former director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), David Petraeus; former secretary of defense, White House 
chief of staff, and director of the CIA, Leon Panetta; director of the Center for Global 
Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and former deputy assistant 
secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, Dr. Brad Roberts; director of 
the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses, Mr. Michael Kofman; 
nonresident senior fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the 
Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, Mr. Steven Pifer; the 
Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), Mr. Anthony Cordesman; senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Dr. 
Michael Mazarr; retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and former ambassador and United 
States permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, Dr. Douglas Lute; and 
senior fellow emeritus at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute of International 
Studies, Dr. David Holloway.  
Each subject matter expert was interviewed on the subjects of Russian strategic 
analysis, U.S.–Russian relations, their understanding of the gray zone and how it is defined, 
the best and worst strategies to deter gray zone activities, extended deterrence, and 
additional insight as they saw fit. The Naval Postgraduate School provided a unique 
opportunity to conduct interviews with these subject matter experts by capitalizing on 
 
4 Andrew Radin and Raphael S. Cohen, “Russia’s Soft Strategy to Hostile Measures in Europe,” War 
on the Rocks, February 26, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/russias-soft-strategy-to-hostile-
measures-in-europe/. 
3 
access to resources, personnel, and locations, such as Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory and Middlebury Institute, which no other institution could provide. Overall, 
this research provides a clear understanding of the current political environment between 
the United States and Russia, a comprehensive strategic assessment of Russia, an analysis 
of the ability to transpose deterrence to the sub-conventional level, and deterrence strategy 
recommendations—ultimately providing a renewed perspective on the way forward for 
U.S. and deterrence strategy. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH IN TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT  
Since its inception in 1949 and through the Cold War, the collective international 
security demonstrated by the United States and NATO has been a stabilizing force in world 
politics and a significant factor in U.S. extended deterrence credibility.5 Recently, the 
Ukrainian crisis has raised questions about the ability of the United States to deter Russia 
and prevent escalation in the region that would threaten NATO states and U.S. national 
interests. A credible U.S. deterrence at the sub-conventional level is essential to the 
maintenance of the international security establishment, U.S. strategic interests, and the 
strength of the NATO alliance.  
After the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, both the United States and 
NATO de-emphasized deterrence as the threats to NATO weakened, and the United States 
prioritized terrorism over great power competition. Today, the threat environment has 
shifted back to great power competition with threats on multiple fronts and levels of 
conflict. The current security environment is more complex than that of the Cold War era, 
and thus, the United States can no longer rely on the ideas of mutually assured destruction 
or strategic nuclear parity. Today’s strategic environment is characterized by conflict 
below the level of conventional armed conflict, and the U.S. deterrent policy should 
address each level of warfare from nuclear, to conventional, to sub-conventional if the 
United States hopes to compete.  
 
5 “Why Was NATO Founded?,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed February 18, 2020, 
https://www.nato.int/wearenato/why-was-nato-founded.html. 
4 
Not only has the need for a credible deterrent to our adversaries and allies 
resurfaced, but it has also evolved past deterring strategic nuclear strikes and massive 
conventional warfare. Denial-of-services attacks in Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, and meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
demonstrate this new security environment and the threat Russia poses to the stability and 
credibility of U.S. deterrence.6 It has become critical to deter conflict short of general war, 
in multiple domains, at lower levels of conflict, simultaneously against multiple adversaries 
with varying capabilities and intentions.  
Many worry that authoritarian competitors such as Russia are “seeking regional 
hegemony and the means to project power globally [by] . . . pursuing determined military 
buildups aimed at neutralizing U.S. strengths through gray-zone aggression—intimidation 
and coercion in the space between war and peace.”7 These trends have created a crisis for 
U.S. national security that leaders have addressed with policies such as the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These documents detail U.S. 
strategy and policy for the deterrence of such trends, but still, “across Eurasia, gray zone 
aggression is steadily undermining the security of U.S. allies and partners and eroding 
American influence.”8  
The United States has recognized the need for complex, flexible, and tailored 
deterrence in the most recent strategies. The question of whether the United States can 
deter Russian gray zone conflict that takes place at the sub-conventional level is crucial to 
U.S. decision-making and response in a time of potential crisis. The United States cannot 
simply rest on the declared policy and recognition that new deterrence capabilities are 
required; it is necessary to examine what portions of Russian gray zone activity need to be 
 
6 Steven Pifer, “Five Years after Crimea’s Illegal Annexation, the Issue Is No Closer to Resolution,” 
Brookings Institution, March 18, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/18/five-
years-after-crimeas-illegal-annexation-the-issue-is-no-closer-to-resolution/; Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “The 
Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Threshold,” War on the Rocks, September 22, 2017, https://waronthe
rocks.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-russias-lowered-nuclear-threshold/. 
7 National Defense Strategy Commission, Providing for the Common Defense (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute for Peace, 2018), v, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-
the-common-defense.pdf. 
8 National Defense Strategy Commission, v. 
5 
deterred, what elements of deterrence can be adapted to the sub-conventional level, how 
Russia is strategically assessed, and what particular components of state power are 
necessary for a successful deterrence strategy at a level short of war. Failure to do so risks 
the misunderstanding of not only U.S. capabilities for deterrence but also the capabilities 
and will of our adversaries, creating the potential for unnecessary escalation, tactical 
nuclear use, and great power war. Evaluating the capabilities of the United States and 
NATO to support their declared strategy enables policymakers to allocate funding, 
resources, and attention to the identified gaps, further bolstering the credibility and strength 
of their deterrence.  
B. RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE 
A solid understanding of the Russian gray zone—and what it does and does not 
include—is required to assess how Russia uses gray zone strategy and how the United 
States can deter it. The literature and interviews of subject matter expert establish that 
Russia’s perspective and relative standing influence its use of the gray zone as it aims to 
achieve national objectives from a position of weakness outside its regional “near abroad.” 
This section relies heavily on interviews as the author asked each interviewee to define 
gray zone conflict as well as describe what it does and does not include. These responses 
were compared to existing definitions of the gray zone in the literature to shape a working 
definition. 
Generally accepted examples of Russian gray zone conflict include events in 
Crimea and eastern Ukraine, cyberattacks and the invasion of Georgia, Russian proxy 
forces in Syria, cyber-meddling in democratic elections, and disinformation campaigns. 
However, agreeing on these examples does not in itself provide a clear and concise 
definition of the term. Walker Conner says, “The meaning of a word is defined by its limits, 
by knowing what does not belong under it as clearly as what does. Any word that could 
include everything and anything has no place in science (even social science).”9 So, what 
 
9 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 92, Google Books.  
6 
exactly does gray zone conflict in the Russian context mean, and what do those specific 
words define and encompass?  
Even though the term gray zone is considered emergent, the concept is not new. 
George Kennan’s description of political warfare in 1948—“the employment of all the 
means at a nation’s command, short of war”—essentially describes today’s concept of gray 
zone conflict.10 This definition is accurate; however, a new distinction between Kennan’s 
form of political warfare and today’s gray zone conflict is needed. Nevertheless, his 
definition is a blunt reminder that that gray zone conflict is not a new occurrence. Writing 
in 1948, though, Kennan could never have imagined all the advancements in technology, 
access to information, social media platforms, and other factors that boost the effectiveness 
of political warfare or gray zone tactics today.  
Multiple scholars have attempted to capture the essence of Kennan’s concept in a 
definition that reflects today’s complex environment. Michael Mazarr, for example, 
defines the gray zone as “employing sequences of gradual steps to secure strategic 
leverage. The efforts remain below thresholds that would generate a powerful U.S. or 
international response, but are forceful and deliberate, calculated to gain measurable 
traction over time.”11 The gray zone has also been characterized by “intense political, 
economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal 
steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war.”12 Others, such as David Barno and 
Nora Bensahel, have described gray zone conflicts as “involving some aggression or use 
 
10 George F. Kennan, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare [Redacted Version]” (official 
memorandum, Washington, DC: National Security Council, April 30, 1948), 1, https://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/114320.pdf?v=941dc9ee5c6e51333ea9ebbbc9104e8c.  
11 Michael Mazarr, Mastering the Gray zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), 1–2, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2015/ssi_
mazarr_151202.pdf. 
12 Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges,” 
Prism 7, no. 4 (2018): 35–36, https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism7_4/181204_
Hoffman_PDF.pdf?ver=2018-12-04-161237-307. See also Joseph L. Votel, “Statement before the House 
Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” House of 
Representatives, March 18, 2015, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20150318/103157/HMTG-
114-AS26-Wstate-VotelUSAJ-20150318.pdf; Philip Kapusta, The Gray Zone (Washington, DC: Special 
Operations Command, September 9, 2015), https://www.soc.mil/swcs/ProjectGray/Gray%20Zones%20-
%20USSOCOM%20White%20Paper%209%20Sep%202015.pdf. 
7 
of force, but in many aspects, their defining characteristic is ambiguity—about the ultimate 
objectives, the participants, whether international treaties and norms have been violated, 
and the role that military forces should play in response.”13 When interviewed, Michael J. 
Mazarr, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, reiterated that gray zone 
operations are not new; however, the differences today stem from changes in the political 
environment and technological advantages:  
A combination of escalatory risks, nuclear and otherwise, economic 
interdependencies, and the existence of an international community that is 
built around certain kinds of norms that even Russia does not want to 
dramatically depart from creates an environment in which great powers 
have a significant, and even unprecedented appetite to achieve their goals 
short of large-scale war. In some cases, countries [Russia] develop entire 
doctrines and concepts around this and then design campaigns in which they 
assemble a number of these [gray zone] tools to achieve its goals.14  
When asked, almost every subject matter expert noted that the gray zone includes 
cyber, information operation campaigns, and election meddling and is almost always 
shrouded in ambiguity, giving Russia plausible deniability for its actions. Fewer, but still 
a significant number of participants, referenced actions such as proxy forces, clandestine 
forces and operations, democratic interference or degradation, and energy intimidation.15 
Based on the thematic consensus among the current literature and interviewees, for this 
thesis, Russian gray zone conflict is defined as follows: 
Any actions above the level of normal statecraft that remain below the 
threshold of state-sponsored armed conflict, focus on gaining strategic 
leverage, and are characterized by ambiguity, intense political, economic, 
and informational competition that could involve aggression, the use of 
ambiguous force, or the incitement of violence. 
Dr. Douglas Lute, retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and former ambassador and United 
States permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, describes this strategy as 
 
13 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Fighting and Winning in the ‘Gray Zone,’” War on the Rocks, 
May 19, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-and-winning-in-the-gray-zone/. 
14 Mr. Anthony Cordesman (the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies), interview with author, November 7, 2019; Dr. Michael Mazarr (senior political 
scientist at the RAND Corporation), interview with author, December 17, 2019. 
15 See Appendix A. 
8 
“sub–Article 5 warfare” in reference to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which 
authorizes the full weight of NATO and all of its nations to respond to an armed attack 
against one of its members.16 The sub–Article 5 strategy is designed to obscure and 
obfuscate Russian activities to slow NATO decision-making and create facts on the ground 
advantageous to Russia.17 This strategy furthers Russia’s national security priorities 
without triggering NATO’s Article 5 or other dramatic and costly responses from the 
United States.  
Actions on the high and low ends of the conflict spectrum are not part of the gray 
zone. The interviews conducted for this research contributed an unprecedented discussion 
about what falls outside the gray zone, which affords a better understanding of the space 
and how to deter such actions. Mazarr described actions at the high end of the spectrum 
not included in the gray zone as the use of large-scale military force or large-scale conflict, 
even if it is limited war.18 On the low end of the spectrum, Mazarr described actions such 
as sustaining relations with partners and allies, general diplomacy, and standard 
maintenance of economic relations as actions not included in the gray zone.19 Mazarr also 
acknowledged that gray zone parameters are still a matter of opinion and difficult to detail, 
but suggested that actions such a classic geopolitical maneuvering and intervening in local 
conflicts for relative advantage are related to but separate from gray zone campaigns. 
Overall, Mazarr summarized the gray zone spectrum as any actions above statecraft and 
below open conflict that are focused on direct competition with peer or near-peer 
competitors.20  
Lute expounded on these examples by detailing uniformed armed forces, nuclear 
threats, overt military operations, overt military exercises, and military campaigns and 
 
16 Dr. Douglas Lute (retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and former ambassador and United States 
permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council), interview with author, November 26, 2019. 
17 Lute, interview with author. 
18 Mazarr, interview with author, December 17, 2019. 
19 Mazarr, interview with author. 
20 Mazarr, interview with author. 
9 
maneuvers as outside the gray zone.21 Overall, the consensus among the interviewees can 
be summarized by General David Petraeus’s description of “conventional force 
employment” and Steven Pifer’s “attributable kinetic activity” as the overarching attributes 
that mark actions outside the gray zone.22  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review surveys and assesses the state of the existing body of 
literature on the theory of deterrence, the significance of the U.S.–Russian relationship on 
deterrence, the ability to transpose deterrence to the sub-conventional level, Russian 
strategy, and current deterrence strategy at the sub-conventional level. The literature is 
thinner and less developed on the U.S. ability to enact deterrence strategies as well as 
threats to adversaries at the sub-conventional level where gray zone conflict exists. In fact, 
the literature on Russian aggression, behavior, and policy suggests that Russia is looking 
to take advantage of a potentially weakened deterrence commitment by NATO to extend 
its influence further into Eurasia, not to mention a weak U.S. deterrence strategy at the sub-
conventional level.23  
Much debate remains regarding the credibility of the deterrence strategies of the 
United States at the lower levels of conflict, and scholars disagree on how to deter Russian 
aggression and, further, what means are available to do so. There also seems to be a lack 
of consensus on Russia’s current strategy. Critically, these knowledge gaps suggest 
deterrence weakness even when Russian actions directly threaten NATO member states 
and U.S. interests. Scholar Kristin Ven Bruusgaard asserts, “NATO’s inability to defend 
 
21 Lute, interview with author, November 26, 2019. 
22 David Petraeus (retired U.S. Army general and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency), 
interview with author, October 31, 2019; Mr. Steven Pifer (nonresident senior fellow in the Arms Control 
and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings 
Institution), interview with author, October 25, 2019. 
23 Katarzyna Zysk, “Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy,” Royal United 
Services Institute Journal 163, no. 2 (2018): 7, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1469267; Hans 
Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 3 
(2018): 186–190, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912; Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a 
Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-Escalation,’” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014, https://the
bulletin.org/2014/03/why-russia-calls-a-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation/. 
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the Baltics along with Russia’s improved military capabilities provide a tempting 
opportunity to attempt nuclear blackmail against the alliance.”24 Further, Alexey Arbatov 
et al. point to entanglement and doctrinal developments by Russia and the United States as 
“giving rise to the risk that a non-nuclear conflict—even a local one—might escalate 
rapidly and unintentionally into a global nuclear war.”25 
Scholars and analysts have only minimally addressed the gap in applying deterrence 
strategy to the gray zone; however they have noted that “the short-of-war strategy 
employed by Russia is undermining the deterrence of U.S. adversaries and the confidence 
of American allies, thus increasing the likelihood of military conflict.”26 Deterrence is a 
critical and enduring U.S. national objective. The U.S. National Defense Strategy 
prioritizes deterrence of all types of attack and the assurance of U.S. allies and partners.27 
Given these priorities, it was imperative that this thesis explored the ability of the United 
States to deter adversarial actions, specifically Russian actions, at the sub-conventional 
level.  
1. Deterrence  
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, “The highest U.S. nuclear policy and 
strategy priority is to deter potential adversaries from nuclear attack of any scale.”28 Given 
the diverse threats posed by a Russian strategy that integrates tactical nuclear weapons at 
some of the lowest levels of war, U.S. deterrent strategy will play a critical role in national 
security.29 To understand this critical role and properly assess how the United States and 
 
24 Ven Bruusgaard, “The Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Threshold.” 
25 Alexey Arbatov et al. Entanglement: Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons 
and Nuclear Risks, ed. James M. Acton (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2017), 1, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Entanglement_interior_FNL.pdf.  
26 National Defense Strategy Commission; Providing for the Common Defense, v.  
27 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf; 
National Defense Strategy Commission, Providing for the Common Defense. 
28 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 
VII, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-
FINAL-REPORT.PDF. 
29 Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities. 
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NATO will deter Russian aggression, a foundational understanding of deterrence is 
required. Many respected authors, such as Thomas Schelling, Scott Sagan, Richard Betts, 
Bernard Brodie, and Glenn Snyder, provide an extensive theoretical framework of 
deterrence necessary for this research.30 Particularly relevant to the issue is the literature 
focused on extended deterrence, which considers the will and credibility of deterrence 
threats that Russian actions have called into question. Other authors, including Brad 
Roberts, Alexey Arbatov, Robert Powell, Francis Gavin, and Keir Lieber, provide an 
assessment of deterrence throughout history and today, providing context to the theoretical 
understanding of deterrence theory.31 
2. The United States and NATO  
The majority of the literature written on the current U.S. and NATO deterrence 
strategy is descriptive, detailing the specifics of the document in factual language devoid 
of any analytical assessment. These pieces of literature, including the National Security 
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and NATO charter, and 
articles by authors such as Adam Mount and Anna Péczeli are fundamental to the 
understanding of the change in strategy; however, they provide little in the way of how to 
adapt deterrence to the sub-conventional level.32 The national security documents detail 
the new strategies and highlight the threat of great power competition, including Russia, 
 
30 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Richard 
Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987); Bernard 
Brodie, The Atomic Bomb and American Security (New Haven, CT: Yale Institute of International Studies, 
1945); Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961). 
31 Brad Roberts, The Case for Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2016); Alexey Arbatov, “Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee or Threat to Strategic Stability?,” 
Carnegie Moscow Center, March 22, 2019, https://carnegie.ru/2019/03/22/nuclear-deterrence-guarantee-or-
threat-to-strategic-stability-pub-78663; Kier Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Nuclear 
Weapons, Deterrence and Conflict,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 1 (Spring 2013), https://www.jstor.
org/stable/26270573?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 
32 Anna Péczeli, “The Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review: Back to Great Power 
Competition,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 2 (2018): 238–255, https://doi.org/
10.1080/25751654.2018.1530741; Adam Mount, “Trump’s Troubling Nuclear Plan: How It Hastens the 
Rise of a More Dangerous World,” Foreign Affairs, February 2, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/2018-02-02/trumps-troubling-nuclear-plan. 
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while Anna Péczeli argues that the Nuclear Posture Review hastens the rise toward a more 
dangerous world of nuclear competition by failing to lay out a plan for the new strategies.  
The experts that do offer analytical assessments address the need to adapt 
deterrence strategies to a changing security environment, evaluate the needed level of 
deterrence, share perspectives on strategic deterrence continuity, explain domestic and 
foreign reactions to the new strategy, and identify implications for the nuclear enterprise.33 
This pool of literature also highlights that the diverging “perceptions of Russia as a military 
threat following the Ukrainian crisis differ sharply across Europe and appear to be heavily 
influenced by geographical proximity to Russia.”34 This variation is particularly relevant 
in discussing deterrence as a whole as it challenges the implementation of a deterrence 
strategy against Russia if the United States and its partners cannot agree on what is a threat 
that needs to be deterred. What this body of work does not address is the ability, or lack 
thereof, to successfully adapt deterrence and apply it at the sub-conventional level.  
Another category of literature that discusses the need for the United States to deter 
aggression short of general war is limited and fails to address how a deterrent strategy 
would be implemented. Literature such as NATO’s Return to Europe edited by Rebecca 
Moore and Damon Coletta, the report by the National Defense Strategy Commission, and 
the annotated bibliography by Jacek Durkalec et al. are examples of seminal works in this 
space.35 The National Defense Strategy Commission’s report assesses the national strategy 
and recognizes that “America’s military superiority—the hard-power backbone of its 
global influence and national security—has eroded to a dangerous degree. Rivals and 
 
33 Karen Miller et al., “Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century: Understanding the New U.S. Policy 
Context” (presentation, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Washington, DC, March 17, 2018), https://cgsr.
llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/SW21_2018_Report.pdf; Jacek Durkalec et al., “‘Compete, Deter, and Win’ in 
a Trans-Regional Perspective: On Meeting the New Challenges of Extended Deterrence” (Livermore, CA: 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2019), https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/ED_
Bibliography_FEB2019_Final.pdf.  
34 Stephanie Pezard et al., European Relations with Russia: Threat Perceptions, Responses, and 
Strategies in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), X,  
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1579.html.  
35 Rebecca Moore and Damon Coletta, ed., NATO’s Return to Europe (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2017); National Defense Strategy Commission, Providing for the Common Defense; 
Durkalec et al., “‘Compete, Deter, and Win’”; Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey Larsen, “NATO 
Responses to Hybrid Threats,” NDC, Dec 2014.  
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adversaries are challenging the United States on many fronts and in many domains. 
America’s ability to defend its allies, its partners, and its vital interests is increasingly in 
doubt.”36 The report goes on to claim that “if the nation does not act promptly to remedy 
these circumstances, the consequences will be grave and lasting.”37 The report is a 
sobering call for change, but it does not explain how to implement such change 
successfully.  
The pool of literature that does address how to implement the current deterrence 
strategy against a threat like Russia’s short-of-war strategy is limited and sometimes vague. 
Authors like Rebecca Moore, Stephen Cimbala, Steven Pifer, Jacek Durkalec, Oleksandr 
Shykov, Guillaume Lasconjarias, Jeffrey Larsen, and Brad Roberts identify challenges to 
U.S. deterrence, the need to strengthen alliances and extended deterrence based on the new 
environment of strategic competition and modern war, attitudes of ambivalence toward 
extended deterrence, and the potential hesitancy of NATO members to use force to defend 
their allies.38 This literature also examines deterrence through a regional perspective 
through the lens of executing the current U.S. strategy of “compete, deter, and win” laid out 
in the National Defense Strategy.39 The challenges to U.S. deterrence along with Russia’s 
increasing attempts to push the limits of the gray zone demand further research into the 
U.S. ability to deter Russian aggression squarely in the center of national security rhetoric. 
This literature builds an understanding of the policy, strategy, strategic environment, and 
challenges to U.S. deterrence and offers a launching point into literature that juxtaposes 
U.S. deterrence strategy against Russia’s short-of-war strategy and the challenges it 
creates.  
 
36 National Defense Strategy Commission, Providing for the Common Defense. 
37 National Defense Strategy Commission. 
38 Schuyle Foerster, “NATO’s Return: Implications for Extended Deterrence,” in NATO’s Return to 
Europe, ed. Rebecca Moore and Damon Coletta (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 
45–70; David Trachtenberg, “US Extended Deterrence How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little?” Strategic 
Studies Quarterly 6, no. 2 (Summer 2012), https://www.jstor.org/stable/26270524. 
39 Durkalec et al., “‘Compete, Deter, and Win.’”  
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3. Russian Strategy  
The literature written on Russian strategy is disjointed and on occasion fails to 
consider how the Russian approach to strategy has evolved considerably over the last 
decade, including the ways of defining war, conflict, and escalation. This lack of cohesive 
terminology from both Western assessments and Russian doctrine creates a disconnect 
among sources, which compounds the perplexity. Scholars have identified within Russian 
doctrine tension between the strategic aim of avoiding general war and the strategic aim to 
overturn the post–Cold War order through coercion and gray zone tactics.40 This tension 
is only exacerbated by the perpetual blurring of lines that separate a posture of peace and 
a state of war.41 Russian strategy simultaneously “threatens and exercises limited nuclear 
first use” while attempting to achieve national objectives without direct military conflict.42 
This desire to avoid direct military conflict at the conventional level leads Russia to operate 
at the sub-conventional level of the gray zone.  
Although there are multiple sources on Russian doctrine, this research utilized Dave 
Johnson’s white paper, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional 
Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds, in conjunction with original Russian doctrine, speeches, 
and articles published by President Vladimir Putin or his administration, and the interviews 
of subject matter experts as a framework to discuss Russian strategy.43 Johnson asserts that 
the Russian strategy defines war as “an armed struggle” and further categorizes it 
depending on the scale and intensity, including large, regional, and local scale at the level 
of low, medium, and high intensity.44 These classification levels allow Russia to prepare 
its forces accordingly; for example, the annexation of Crimea is a low-intensity operation, 
 
40 Nikolai N. Sokov, “The Role of Nuclear and Advanced Conventional Weapons in Russian 
Containment Strategy” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 2019). 
41 Sokov, “The Role of Nuclear and Advanced Conventional Weapons”; Johnson, Russia’s 
Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities. 
42 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, 30. 
43 Russia Insight, “Putin on Russia-US Relations Deteriorating: It All Started with NATO Bombing of 
Serbia/Yugoslavia,” October 29, 2016, YouTube, video, 3:10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C_
TXZXtKU_k; Vladimir Putin, “Russia and the Changing World,” Embassy of the Russian Federation to the 
United Kingdom, press release, February 27, 2012, https://rusemb.org.uk/press/612. 
44 Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, 14. 
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and until Russian-designated military entered the state, it was at the sub-conventional level 
below armed conflict.45 Russian strategy also delineates three different types of conflict: 
local, regional, and strategic.46 Russia extends its nuclear capabilities down to the regional 
conflict level, causing issues of inadvertent escalation to a greater level of war.47 Current 
Russian doctrine does not see the use of tactical nuclear weapons at the level of local or 
regional conflict as crossing the nuclear threshold or breaking the nuclear taboo. Rather, it 
views these low-yield tactical nuclear weapons as just another tool in the arsenal and freely 
integrates them into lower levels of conflict.48 Russia assesses war with NATO and its 
allies short of general war as a regional conflict, which includes the possibility of limited 
tactical nuclear use.49 Western analysts have used such labels as escalate-to-deescalate, 
escalation dominance, short of war, and hybrid warfare for Russian strategy,50 but Russian 
officials have labeled it “new forms of armed conflict” or “non-military means.”51 
Increasingly, the term gray zone aggression or gray zone conflict appears in the literature, 
which is the term this research uses.  
According to the Department of Defense, effective U.S. deterrence requires that the 
adversary sees “no possible benefits from non-nuclear aggression.”52 As such, interviews 
with subject matter experts in Russian strategy assisted in identifying Russian strategy, 
antagonism, and strategic thought as a state actor on which U.S. deterrence strategy at the 




47 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Limited Nuclear Conflict and Escalation Control in Russian Military Strategy” 
(presentation, Naval Postgraduate School, September 16, 2018), 26. 
48 Zysk, “Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy”; Sokov, “Why Russia Calls 
a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-Escalation.’” 
49 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (2018). 
50 Bruce McClintock and Andrew Radin, “Russia in Action, Short of War” RAND Blog, May 9 2017, 
https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/russia-in-action-short-of-war.html. 
51 Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, 21. 
52 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (2018), VII. 
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D. POTENTIAL HYPOTHESES AND EXPLANATIONS 
Based on the literature review and interviews with subject matter experts, no 
comprehensive hypothesis for how the United States and NATO can deter Russian 
aggression short of war exists in the current literature. What have emerged are three 
overarching themes. First is the shift in the threat environment away from terrorism and 
toward great power competition, requiring reimagined deterrent strategies tailored for 
specific threats. Second is the suggestion that the deterrence credibility of the United States 
and NATO has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War. The research shows that this is 
a concern, but U.S. extended deterrence has been assessed as credible and effective as of 
today. Third is that Russia is utilizing a strategy short of general war that complicates the 
U.S. deterrence strategy. The literature also reveals ideas for the United States and NATO 
to improve deterrence overall and possibly assist in deterring Russian aggression. These 
explanations include bolstering deterrence through reinforced and reinvigorated 
conventional capabilities in both the United States and NATO, improving communication 
and diplomatic relations with Russia, and improving U.S. resilience and information 
operations. Overall, the literature recognizes that U.S. and NATO policy correctly 
identifies the challenges of deterring Russian aggression short of general war. 
Nevertheless, the literature falls short of sufficiently answering how to meet this challenge. 
An assessment of how to implement a deterrent strategy at the sub-conventional level 
against a nuclear-armed great power adversary like Russia is still necessary—this is the 
space in which this research exists. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This research strategically assessed Russia as a state actor, the effect of the U.S.–
Russian relationship on U.S. deterrence, the means of transposing deterrence to the sub-
conventional level, and the best strategy for deterring Russian gray zone conflict. This 
research began with a survey of the literature, which assisted in the development of the 
interview content for subject matter experts. The interviews were designed to fill a gap in 
the literature, expound on ideas in the literature, or weigh in on competing points of view 
in the literature. From the baseline research, a certain amount of time and effort went into 
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thinking about and explaining the history of Russian antagonism and the U.S.–Russian 
relationship. This foundational understanding was used to assist in the assessment of Russia 
as a state actor and comprehend its motivations for strategy and distrust with the West. 
Additionally, a significant amount of time was devoted to describing the core precepts of 
deterrence, which enabled the systematic assessment of how deterrence could be 
transposed or adapted to the lower levels of warfare. Finally, after developing the building 
block assessments and generating a holistic picture of how the United States and Russia 
are situated in the current strategic environment, and layering the adapted deterrence 
framework, this research led to an informed and thorough recommendation for a successful 
deterrent strategy against Russian gray zone conflict.  
The sources utilized for this research were exclusively derived from open-source, 
non-classified information, and subject-matter expert interviews. Although classified 
sources could have offered further clarity and a different perspective on the research, 
unclassified data was utilized for two main reasons. First, many policymakers consistently 
rely on unclassified data and assessments to inform their policy decisions, and maintaining 
the research at the unclassified level would allow for the widest dissemination and use. 
Secondly, the intent of this research was to bring together the brightest subject matter 
experts to complement the literature on a current, emerging issue in U.S. national security 
to produce an assessment accessible to everyone—from academics, to government 
officials, to U.S. allies and partners—and the only way to achieve this was through the use 
of unclassified and open-source data.  
Specifically, this research drew from primary sources, such as U.S. policy and 
declared strategy, Russian strategy documents, the NATO charter, and official statements, 
to provide a solid understanding of the past and current security environment in which sub-
conventional deterrence strategy will be employed. Secondary sources, such as academic 
literature, provide an assessment of the current deterrent strategies and issues with 
contextual analysis. Secondary sources also provide analysis and consolidation of sources 
found only in the Russian language. Third, and possibly most important, secondary sources 
provide competing views, conflicting hypotheses, and alternative analyses on the subject 
that assisted in identifying the pertinent interview questions for the research.  
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To scope the research to the time allotted, sources and reviews concentrated on the 
timeline from the end of the Cold War until present, with the knowledge that deterrence 
theory existed well before the Cold War. Historical analysis, in comparison with current 
deterrent strategy, and the modern geopolitical strategic environment of great power 
competition and sub-conventional conflict provide a baseline of understanding on which 
the subject-matter expert interviews were predicated and compared.  
The conclusions extrapolated from this research provide policymakers with an 
improved understanding of Russian strategy and decision calculus as well as U.S. 
deterrence capabilities and gaps from which to maintain or alter current U.S. policies. 
Additionally, this research has consolidated subject matter expertise to identify and fill 
gaps in the knowledge, eliminate misinterpretations between scholars, and provide an 




II. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT AND USE OF THE 
GRAY ZONE 
Putin’s Russia is an adversary of the United States; the Kremlin needs to 
have an external enemy to distract the Russian people from the problems 
plaguing their country. 
 —Alina Polyakova53  
This chapter’s depiction of the U.S.–Russian strategic relationship, strategic 
assessment of Russia, and analysis of Russia’s gray zone strategy lays the groundwork for 
understanding how the United States can deter Russian gray zone conflict. The chapter’s 
first task is to explore the recent historical relationship between the United States and 
Russia and how that relationship has shaped Russia’s antagonism toward the United States 
and the West. Second, the chapter provides an assessment of Russian strategy and national 
objectives with respect to the United States and NATO, from the strategic nuclear level 
down to the sub-conventional level. The third task is to propose that the United States and 
Russia are woven into a stability–instability paradox at the nuclear and conventional level, 
leading the two states to carry out their conflicts at the sub-conventional level, or gray zone. 
Finally, the chapter analyzes Russia’s gray zone activity and shows how the state pushes 
the boundaries of sub-conventional conflict to make progress toward achieving its national 
objectives.  
A. U.S.–RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
The end of the Cold War brought about a sense of hope for peace between nations; 
however, the relationship between the United States and Russia has systematically declined 
from optimism to distrust and, today, has landed squarely in adversarial territory. While 
Russia’s distrust and resentment of the West reflects its perception of Western interference, 
bad faith actions, and NATO enlargement, these are only one dimension of the contentious 
relationship. Russia’s rejection of Western diplomatic overtures is also driven by its 
 
53 Alina Polyakova, “Are U.S. and Russia in a New Cold War?,” Brookings Institution, January 20, 
2019, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/are-u-s-and-russia-in-a-new-cold-war/. 
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overinflated sense of global importance, historical entitlement to territorial and influential 
expansion, and its need to inflate external threats to secure domestic support for the regime. 
To that end, this section provides a greater understanding of the sources of Russian 
antagonism toward the West through analysis of key historical events. This analysis 
provides vital insights into how Russia could perceive and react to potential strategies and 
greatly increases the prospect of success in identifying the most appropriate strategies for 
deterring Russian gray zone conflict, which is discussed in subsequent chapters.  
Although it is unclear what percentage of a role each antagonistic factor plays, it is 
ultimately the actions of the United States and NATO—and the enlargement of NATO 
throughout history—that Russia cites as the main component to its antipathy and distrust 
of the West. This Russian viewpoint is not the consensus view of the scholarly literature 
or subject matter experts, although they do not dismiss NATO’s enlargement and Western 
actions as a factor; however, if we are to understand how to successfully deter Russian gray 
zone actions, it is imperative to recognize the Russian perspective. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States, in partnership with its 
European allies, structured the European security environment with little input from a weak 
Russia, touting few allies and an economic crisis because of the former Soviet Union’s 
unsustainable overreach and unproductive economy. The new environment gave 
independence to formerly oppressed Soviet Union states, ousted communist regimes across 
Europe with free elections, and left Russia with the loss of territory and a complex hand of 
motivations toward its present desire for expansion.  
During this time, the United States and its European allies extended diplomacy to 
Russia in the interest of security cooperation as the end of the Cold War brought about a 
sense of hope for peace between nations. From 1993 to 2001, President Bill Clinton 
cultivated a relationship with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and sought to integrate 
Russia into international institutions. In 1994, at the NATO summit in Brussels, a U.S. 
initiative, the Partnership for Peace, was established. The program was designed to create 
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trust between European and former Soviet Union states and currently has 21 members.54 
President Clinton stated that the program was a “track that [would] lead to NATO 
membership” and highlighted that it did not “draw another line dividing Europe a few 
hundred miles to the east.”55 Additionally, suffering a massive economic burden in 1997, 
Russia was added to the G7, which was then known as the G8, an inter-governmental 
political forum established in 1975 by France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.56 The addition of Russia was meant to forward diplomatic relations 
and security cooperation between the states. Diplomatic efforts toward Russia continued 
in 1997 with the NATO–Russian Founding Act, which intended “to overcome the vestiges 
of past confrontation and competition and to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation.”57 
The act also defined “the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-
making and joint action that . . . constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO 
and Russia.”58 The act also established the joint council between NATO and Russia, which 
attempted to strengthen diplomatic relations between Europe, the United States, and Russia 
even further. 
Diplomatic efforts toward cooperation were undercut, however, by opposing U.S. 
policies that continued NATO enlargement and Russian opposition.59 From March to June 
1999, U.S.–Russian relations were dealt a devastating blow amid NATO’s operations in 
Kosovo and Yugoslavia, which were undertaken without a United Nations Security 
Council resolution and against stark Russian objections, thus shaping Russia’s threat 
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perception and worldview.60 Recall Henry Kissinger’s warning in 1999: “The 
transformation of the NATO alliance from a defensive military grouping to an institution 
prepared to impose its values by force undercut repeated American and allied assurances 
that Russia had nothing to fear from NATO expansion.”61 The bombing marked the first 
time NATO had utilized military force without the authorization of the United Nations 
Security Council.  
From the Russian perspective, President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly called the 
bombing a turning point in U.S.–Russian relations and linked it to NATO’s eastward 
expansion.62 During the late 1990s, there was continued tension amid debate between the 
United States, NATO, and Russia concerning NATO’s enlargement eastward, and in 1999, 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the organization amid a flurry of Russian 
opposition.63 Putin claimed that the West would not only fail to respect Russian interests 
through NATO expansion but also encircle Russia and its military. The bombing in Kosovo 
has been cited and used throughout Russia’s history, including a press release in 2012 and 
a propaganda campaign in 2014, when Russia aired a television special on the bombings 
as part of an overall information campaign supporting the annexation.64 In the press 
release, President Putin labeled NATO “an organization that has been assuming an attitude 
that is inconsistent with a ‘defensive alliance.’”65 Putin continues to reference the NATO 
bombing of Kosovo by expressing that “states that have fallen victim to ‘humanitarian’ 
operations and the export of ‘missile-and-bomb democracy’ appealed for respect for legal 
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standards and common human decency. But their cries were in vain—their appeals went 
unheard.”66 This tactic—which uses actions taken by the West that go against Russian 
interests as a rallying point for President Putin’s domestic population against an outside 
threat—is one that he employs often and subsequently continues to add friction to efforts 
toward cooperation. Alina Polyakova from the Brookings Institute writes that “Putin’s 
Russia is an adversary of the United States; the Kremlin needs to have an external enemy 
to distract the Russian people from the problems plaguing their country.”67  
Tensions continued to rise as NATO expanded eastward, adding seven Central and 
Eastern European countries, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia, in 2004. From the European perspective, NATO’s enlargement 
was at the behest of potential member states who had been striving for NATO membership 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. NATO membership meant protection for their 
newfound sovereignty and an extended security guarantee to those states struggling for 
stability or perilously located close to an anti-democratic aggressor such as Russia. The 
entrance of these former Soviet bloc states into NATO also meant a stronger and more 
secure Europe through the shared values and processes of democracy. 
From the Russian perspective, NATO’s enlargement confirmed to President Putin 
his thoughts that the United States and NATO were once again trying to expand democracy 
and encircle Russia, thus fueling this source of antagonism.68 Furthermore, the continued 
enlargement of NATO served to reduce the physical territory and political influence space 
that Russia had available for future expansion. NATO’s enlargement was seen as a way for 
the West not only to expand democracy but also to continue its strategy of containment and 
disrespect toward Russia.  
In 2008, Russia continued to pursue its strategic goals of halting the enlargement 
of NATO and expansion by invading Georgia, a former Soviet bloc state with previous 
aspirations of joining NATO. Tensions between Russia and Georgia escalated after the 
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latter transitioned to a pro-Western regime and culminated in Russia’s violating the 
sovereign territorial integrity of Georgia by launching a ground attack, information warfare 
campaign, naval blockade of the Georgian coast, and an air bombing campaign. The 
conflict ended with the signing of a ceasefire agreement. After the ceasefire, Russian forces 
continued to occupy parts of Georgia in the south and utilized Russian-backed para-
military forces for ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in South Ossetia.69 This invasion 
of a sovereign state, coupled with the humanitarian atrocities at the hands Russia, and 
Russian-backed forces signaled the end of positive diplomatic relations and an era marked 
by a Russian adversarial view of the West. In response to the invasion, NATO suspended 
all formal meetings of the NATO–Russia Council as well as cooperation in other areas.70  
A short reprieve from the adversarial tension and a rejuvenated hope for diplomatic 
relations came with the signature of the ceasefire in the Russian–Georgian War. U.S. 
President Barack Obama endeavored for a reset in U.S.–Russian relations with newly 
elected moderate Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.71 During this time, Albania and 
Croatia quietly joined NATO in 2009.72 The reset of relations between the two states 
ultimately failed, however, when Russian President Vladimir Putin once again took office 
in 2012 and redefined the relationship with the United States as adversarial. In a press 
release, President Putin stated,  
Some aspects of U.S. and NATO conduct . . . contradict the logic of modern 
development, relying instead on the stereotypes of a block-based mentality. 
Everyone understands what I am referring to—an expansion of NATO that 
includes the deployment of new military infrastructure with its U.S.-drafted 
plans to establish a missile defense system in Europe. I would not touch on 
this issue if these plans were not conducted in close proximity to Russian 
 
69 James Hider, “Russian-Backed Paramilitaries ‘Ethnically Cleansing Villages,’” Times (London), 
August 27, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20080827212200/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/europe/article4621592.ece; Amnesty International, Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia–Russia 
Conflict (London: Amnesty International, 2008), https://web.archive.org/web/20081212205224/
http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR04/005/2008/en/d9908665-ab55-11dd-a4cd-bfa0fdea9647/
eur040052008eng.pdf. 
70 “Relations with Russia,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, August 5, 2019, https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm.  
71 Darya Korsunskaya, “Putin Says Russia Must Prevent ‘Color Revolution,’” Reuters, November 20, 
2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-security-idUSKCN0J41J620141120.  
72 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Enlargement.”  
25 
borders, if they did not undermine our security and global stability in 
general.73 
President Putin, with his background as a KGB officer skeptical of the West, was and still 
is convinced that the United States attempted to interfere in an already contentious period 
in Russian politics by inciting and fueling the mass protests in Moscow from 2011 to 2012. 
The protests came on the heels of a wave of toppled autocratic governments during the 
Arab Spring, which started in 2010.74 President Putin voiced concerns that the United 
States had a hand in the Arab Spring uprising and had been trying to subjugate Russia by 
sowing unrest among the Russian population through stoking protests against him.75 This 
genuine, but incorrect, belief that the United States was involved only stood to further the 
distrust and adversarial relationship with the West. President Putin capitalized on the 
opportunity to inflate the threat the United States posed to Russia to his gain support from 
his domestic base.76  
The need for Russia to arrest the expansion of Western influence, in combination 
with its desire to expand its own influence into the former Soviet bloc states, ultimately led 
to one of the most punctuating events in U.S.–Russian relations, causing a dramatic 
increase in antagonism between the states. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed 
the Crimean Peninsula, violating the signed NATO–Russia Founding Act, which pledged 
to uphold “respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and 
their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their security.”77 The annexation 
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followed failed attempt by Russia to disrupt the growing relationship between Ukraine and 
the West by preventing Ukraine from signing the Ukraine–European Union Association 
Agreement. Russia pressured the Ukrainian leadership, through trade obstructions and 
leverage as a prominent trade partner, to sign an alternative agreement with the Customs 
Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which it did.78 Russia’s victory was short lived 
as the move sparked outrage in the Ukrainian domestic base, which wanted to turn toward 
the West through the European Union (EU) agreement. The dissatisfaction led to a revolt, 
including violent confrontations and casualties, ending in the ousting of pro-Russian 
President Yanukovych, who remains in exile today in Russia.79  
Shortly thereafter, on June 27, 2014, new Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko 
signed the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement and was quoted as saying that 
it was Ukraine’s “first but most decisive step” toward EU membership.80 The agreement 
established a political and economic association between the parties by committing them 
to cooperation on topics including the convergence of economic policy, legislation, 
information exchange, worker’s rights, modernization of energy infrastructure, and 
increased regulation.81 The agreement also committed Ukraine to make reforms damaging 
to Russian influence in the region, such as converging its policies, legislation, and 
standards to conform to the EU in exchange for support through financial assistance, 
knowledge sharing, and access to EU markets. Seeing its influence contract, Russia pushed 
back on Ukrainian westernization using gray zone tactics that supported rebel fighters and 
sowed discourse and violence in Donbas, which ultimately triggered an international crisis, 
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giving Russia a thin veil of reasoning for the annexation of Crimea that followed—on the 
auspices of defending the oppressed Russian people.  
The annexation of Crimea was economically and diplomatically costly to Russia, 
and the relationship between Russia and the United States and NATO; however, it might 
still be perceived as a Russian victory. Chapter One of the NATO membership action plan 
states that aspirant nations must be able to “settle ethnic disputes or external territorial 
disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means 
in accordance with OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] 
principles and to pursue good unneighborly relations.”82 By fomenting a territorial 
conflict, Russia effectively denied Crimea NATO membership candidacy.83 The United 
States and Europe responded to the invasion by sanctioning Russian oligarchs and 
businesses, providing support to Ukraine and publicly condemning Russian actions.84 In 
response, the G8 suspended Russia. The EU discontinued regular summits with Russia, 
suspended diplomatic progress on issues regarding visas and a new bilateral agreement, 
and imposed gradual sanctions on Russia.85 Additionally, after the downing of flight 
MH17 on June 17, 2014, over territory controlled by Russian-supported rebels in Ukraine, 
the EU significantly expanded its sanctions and stopped Russia’s accession to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the International Energy 
Agency.86 The events of Crimea and the diplomatic aftermath played well into the source 
of antagonism, whereby Russia perceived the West as an enemy of the Kremlin; however, 
the events were also damaging to Russia’s image as a great power in the international 
community, which concerned the Kremlin.  
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Just two years later, in 2016, Russia attempted to interfere in the U.S. presidential 
election by gaining access to the Democratic National Committee, leaking its documents 
to the media, and executing an information operations influence campaign to sway 
American voters.87 The interference was a milestone in U.S.–Russian relations as it 
highlighted the lengths to which Russia was willing to expand its influence into the West 
and assert itself as a great power able to rival the capabilities and will of the West. Russia 
denied any involvement; however, British and U.S. intelligence agencies expressed “high 
confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign designed 
to interfere in the 2016 U.S. elections and undermine confidence in the U.S. democratic 
process.”88 In response, former President Barack Obama expelled 35 Russian diplomats 
from the United States, increased sanctions on a broader set of Russian businesses and 
individuals, and once again, publicly condemned Russian actions to the international 
community.89  
In 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump took office with the hopes of improving 
relations with Russia; however, despite his intentions, U.S.–Russian relations have 
continued to deteriorate alongside relations between Russia and other Western powers.90 
At the beginning of 2018, in Salisbury, England, Russia attempted to assassinate Sergei 
Skripal, a Russian double agent working for the United Kingdom’s intelligence services, 
and his daughter Yulia Skripal by poisoning them with a Novichok nerve agent. In a 
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collective response and outcry against the use of banned chemical weapons, numerous 
countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and NATO expelled more than 
150 Russian diplomats, approved additional sanctions against Russia, denied accreditation 
to Russian diplomatic positions at NATO, reduced the size of Russian consulates, and 
boycotted the 2018 FIFA world cup held in Russia.91 Russia responded similarly by 
expelling 23 British diplomats and closing both the British Council’s office and the British 
Consulate in St. Petersburg, further reducing the diplomatic touchpoints and avenues for 
cooperation between Russia and the West.92  
Causing even more consternation was Russia’s continued attempts to reduce 
Western expansion and expand its influence by interfering in European elections and 
backing Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela, all 
running counter to U.S. interests and values.93 In response, NATO suspended practical 
cooperation with Russia including projects in Afghanistan for counterterrorism and 
scientific collaboration. 
Russia’s desire to “ensure a new world order,” secure spheres of influence, and 
reverse what it portrays as 30 years of Western oppression and expansion into Russian 
territory has outweighed the mutual interest of arms control that the United States and 
Russia have shared since the Cold War.94 Despite fluctuations in tensions and sources of 
hostility between the two countries, one constant in U.S.–Russian relations has always been 
arms control.95 As Brad Roberts explains, 
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With varying degrees of consistency over presidential administrations of both 
parties since the end of the Cold War, U.S. strategic policy has been built on four 
core premises. The first and central premise was that the end of Cold War 
confrontation provided a significant opportunity to put the strategic military 
relationship with Russia on a new footing of cooperation and reassurance. U.S. 
policy makers have therefore consistently pursued arms control with Russia, 
believing that improvements to the nuclear relationship would help to improve the 
broader political relationship.96  
Unfortunately, in recent years, this area of relative stability and diplomatic cooperation has 
also declined with the overall relationship. Russia believes that it has built up enough state 
power to do something about the unfair, oppressive environment built after the Cold War, 
which includes disengaging from relic arms control agreements that stifle Russian military 
growth. 
In practice, despite historical consistency, nuclear arms agreements have already 
begun to disintegrate with the potential for more to fall apart in the future. In October 2018, 
after a summit between the United States and Russia attempting to save the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty failed, the United States declared its intention to pull 
out of the treaty. The INF Treaty had been a landmark achievement in 1988 and had 
prompted cooperation toward the end of the Cold War.97 The United States cited Russia’s 
breach of the treaty through deployment of INF-violating ground-launched cruise missiles 
as the leading cause for pulling out of the treaty; however, the United States also 
acknowledged the need to counter China’s arms build-up in the South China Sea as another 
factor in the withdrawal decision.98 In February 2019, the United States suspended 
compliance with the treaty and formally withdrew in August 2019. A day later, Russia also 
suspended compliance with the treaty, ending a 31-year arms agreement, which had 
verifiably eliminated an entire class of U.S. and Russian weapons in Europe and created 
avenues for transparency and communication through mutual onsite inspections to prove 
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compliance.99 Mikhail Gorbachev commented after the nuclear treaty withdrawal that “a 
new arms race has been announced.”100 Another U.S.–Russian arms control treaty, the 
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), will expire in February 2021 
although it can be extended for another five years with mutual agreement by the two parties. 
If it expires, it will constitute the end of the last major arms control agreement between the 
United States and Russia and a transition to an uncertain new period in U.S.–Russian 
relations without restrictions on strategic weapons.101  
The relationship between the United States and Russia is at an impasse. The U.S. 
diplomatic climate recognizes Russia as an aggressive, toxic adversary, which leaves very 
few occasions to recognize the opportunities for cooperation within the mutually shared 
interests that do exist. Meanwhile, Russia maintains its historical expansionist beliefs not 
only in territory but also in political influence, and President Putin relies on emboldening 
the message that the West represents an existential threat to the Russian state to gain the 
domestic support he needs to stay in power.102 These two sources of antagonism combined 
with Russia’s view of NATO’s enlargement as aggressive, the learned distrust between 
Russia and the West, and the sheer lack of communication show how the relationship 
arrived at the adversarial position it is in today.  
Understanding the sources of Russian antagonism and how the relationship became 
adversarial provides the United States an opportunity to leverage that comprehension 
toward developing a successful gray zone deterrent strategy—to effectively deter Russia 
using any manner of diplomatic relations, consistent communication, and strategic 
touchpoints between the states. Currently, there are very few such opportunities, and the 
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remaining consistent avenue of communication is between military leaders, including the 
Russian chairman of the military committee, General Petr Pavel; the Russian chief of 
defence, General Valery Gerasimov; and U.S. military leaders, such as the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and supreme allied commander of Europe, General Curtis 
Scaparrotti.103  
B. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT  
Having established the historical events that shaped the relationship between Russia 
and the West since the end of the Cold War, this section provides an in-depth analysis and 
assessment of Russia as a state actor today. The assessment includes Russia’s threat 
perceptions, view of the current security environment, view of itself, view of the West, 
strategic priorities, and threshold for risk tolerance. Overall, the assessment shows that 
Russia is a complicated state actor with layered objectives, threat perceptions, and risk 
tolerance, and it is crucial to carefully consider each when developing a deterrence strategy 
against Russian gray zone activity, which is discussed in a subsequent chapter.  
The subject matter experts interviewed for this research generally support the 
consensus of the current literature—that Russia is an opportunistic revisionist state in slow 
decline with adversarial views of the West including the United States and NATO.104 
Russia is also eager to be seen as a great power on the international stage to the extent that 
it is consulted on, and even deferred to, for issues in its geographical region. Additionally, 
President Putin shows great concern over the possibility of the West’s inciting a color 
revolution to undermine Russia’s domestic stability. Russia’s main strategic objectives 
include regime survival; geopolitical dominance, including recognition as a great power; a 
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renegotiation of the European security order; the weakening of the West, including U.S. 
influence; and cohesion of the NATO alliance.  
The experts interviewed for this research also concur with the current literature in 
assessing Russia as risk-averse to open conflict with the United States and NATO but risk-
acceptant to lower levels of conflict, such as action in the gray zone, if it forwards Russia’s 
national objectives.105 Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky from the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace effectively summarize this position: “Russian leaders 
see their country as a great power in charge of its destiny. They do not accept American 
primacy and want to accelerate the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world; they 
believe they are entitled to a sphere of influence and will resist perceived U.S. 
intrusions.”106  
Interviews with subject matter experts for this research identified Russia’s 
vulnerabilities, and further research suggests that those vulnerabilities have contributed to 
Russia’s decline. This understanding provides context to Russia’s view of its internal and 
external threats. Russia’s vulnerabilities includes its political structure, a declining oil-
based economy, poor international standing, limited allies (only Kazakhstan and Belarus), 
and a population frustrated with the lack of rule of law, quality of life, political say, and 
limited disposable income.107 The frustrations from Russian citizens are only rising as the 
energy prices once again begin to decline, the United States enforces broad economic 
sanctions, and the Russian government has limited ability to provide a reprieve or solution 
to its citizens.108 Douglas Lute, retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and former 
ambassador and United States permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, 
states that Russia is “weak economically, weak internationally, and has no conventional 
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measure of state power to assess that they are doing well.”109 He also notes that Russia 
today is weaker compared to the Soviet Union overall, as the latter had allies and were 
internally stable while the former does not.110 
Russia perceives the international environment and future world development as 
competitive, under tension, in rivalry over values, politically and economically unstable, 
and generally complicated in all foreign relations.111 This view is the lens through which 
Russia evaluates its threats, weighs heavily on the prospect of future cooperation and 
diplomatic strategies, and is the means by which Russia will achieve its strategic goals in 
the future. Russia’s internal threat perception reflects a tendency “towards shifting the 
military risks and military threats to the information space and the internal sphere of the 
Russian Federation.”112 In much of its own doctrine, Russia acknowledges its concern 
over color revolutions led by the United States and targeted at the internal Russian 
population. As mentioned previously, Russia blames the United States for the Arab Spring 
and civil unrest in Russia after the 2011 Russian elections. Russia recognizes its own 
internal instability and economic deterioration as a potential opportunity for an adversary 
to gain control and influence in Russia.113 To protect from this, Russia uses a gray zone 
strategy of non-military means, such as information campaigns directed at ethnic Russian 
populations in near-abroad states and Western populations in an attempt to sow discord 
and gain influence. Russia also utilizes the information domain to solidify the support of 
its domestic base through camaraderie over a common enemy in the West.  
While Russia states that it believes a large-scale war is less likely, it sees risks in 
other areas increasing.114 The main external risks that Russia identifies in its 2014 national 
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security strategy include the build-up of NATO’s power and the subsequent expansion of 
the alliance, the build-up of military contingents in waters adjacent to Russia, the 
establishment of regimes that threaten Russian interests, and the demonstration of force 
through military exercises. Russia also recognizes the changing character of conflict 
includes the utilization of sub-conventional means and the “integrated employment of 
military force and political, economic, informational or other non-military measures 
implemented with a wide use of the protest potential of the population and of special 
operations forces.”115 Russia’s perception of the international environment as competitive 
and hostile, its desire for revision, and the recognition of the increased use of sub-
conventional strategies drive Russia’s strategic ends and its use of the gray zone strategies 
to achieve those ends.116  
John Mearsheimer writes, “When nations are dissatisfied with the status quo, the 
prospects for deterrence are not promising.”117 He posits, “Anytime a state is unhappy 
with the status quo, it is going to search hard for ways to change it.”118 As stated in its 
2014 “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Russia seeks revision to the 
international order—the status quo—because its believes that the “existing international 
security architecture (system) does not ensure equal security for all states.”119 That 
statement gives a more openly acceptable reason for Russia to seek the revision of the 
European security order; however, Russia does not believe that all states are equal or 
equally entitled to sovereignty or security.120 Russia believes that great powers (such as it 
considers itself to be) should have a greater say in how the smaller or weaker states in their 
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region operate.121 The Russian sentiment that the current international security system 
“does not ensure equal security for all”122 is just another way of saying that the system 
does not recognize Russia as the great power for which it would like to be recognized. 
Many observers are concerned that Russia is “seeking regional hegemony and the means 
to project power globally . . . [by] pursuing determined military buildups aimed at 
neutralizing U.S. strengths . . . [through] gray-zone aggression—intimidation and coercion 
in the space between war and peace.”123  
Russia is a revisionist and an expansionist state but not to the point that it will 
expand its territory to incite a powerful response from either the United States or NATO. 
Many of the interviewees noted that Russia seeks to regain the territory it sees as “lost” by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Interviewees also recognized Russia’s desire to stop the 
expansion of NATO any further to the east. Since the beginning of NATO’s enlargement 
strategy, Russia feared that NATO would be unrestricted despite the affirmation of the 
United States and NATO to the contrary, which is why it drew a red line for the expansion 
into Georgia and Ukraine.124 Despite recognizing the importance of territory to Russia, 
several scholars interviewed for this study, including the director of the Russia Studies 
Program at the Center for Naval Analyses, Michael Kofman, were careful to note that the 
reassertion of power and collection of territory do not necessarily include the Baltic 
states.125 In the immediate abroad, Russia is amenable to Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, 
and Moldova’s staying outside Russian control as long as they also remain out of NATO 
and “remain neutral in terms of security arrangements.”126 According to Nadezhda 
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Arbatova, “Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet space has been, and remains, the main factor 
shaping the development of its relations with the West.”127  
Throughout the interviews, four themes emerged surrounding Russian strategic 
objectives. A comparison of these conclusions to the analyses in current literature revealed 
a consensus on these themes. The Russian strategic objectives were assessed with high 
confidence and include the following: 
1. The protection of the regime and state, including Vladimir Putin staying in 
power  
2. Russia’s gaining geopolitical dominance of its near abroad including being 
consulted on decisions and policies in the region128  
3. Renegotiating the European security architecture including gaining what it 
sees as its rightful place at the table and being recognized as a great 
power. Russia intends to structure the security environment so that its vote 
counts as much as the votes of the United States and European countries, 
even when it is opposed to U.S. interests.  
4. Weakening the cohesion of the NATO alliance to diminish U.S. 
involvement and gain leverage in Europe129 
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Russia aims to achieve these objectives at the strategic level to forward the stature 
and strength of the state. These are Russia’s “ends,” as described by Brad Roberts, and our 
understanding of them is crucial to an overall deterrent strategy toward Russia. The strategy 
and state power that Russia uses to achieve these ends are the “means” and “ways” that fall 
mostly in the gray zone, which this research intends to deter. Subsequent chapters explore 
the deterrence of the gray zone through the ends, ways, and means construct; however, it 
is important first to understand how Russia is situated vis-à-vis its adversaries.  
C. A COMPARISON OF U.S. AND RUSSIAN STATE POWER  
A complete understanding of relative national strength is critical to understanding 
why Russia employs a gray zone strategy toward the United States. Interview data and 
current literature concur in the assessment that Russia is outmatched at the conventional 
military level beyond its near abroad and in a prolonged engagement. Further, Russia and 
the United States are situated in a stability–instability paradox where they are stable at the 
nuclear and conventional level, creating instability at the sub-conventional level where 
Russia prefers to operate in the gray zone. The dynamics of the relative strength of the 
United States and Russian exist in four categories of state power: diplomatic, information, 
military, and economic (DIME). This section touches on all the aspects but focuses heavily 
on the military dimension.  
Michael Kofman explains that Russia is outmatched by the United States in 
economic and diplomatic means, but Russia does well diplomatically with the resources it 
has, given its limited relative influence in the world.130 In informational means, including 
cyber, propaganda, and information operations, superiority conveys few advantages; 
however, the current literature and many of the research participants agree that Russia is at 
an advantage in the information realm.131 This advantage gives Russia the incentive to 
operate from a position of relative strength in this category by keeping the conflict with the 
United States at the sub-conventional level in the gray zone.  
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Concerning military means that lead to the stability at the nuclear and conventional 
level, the United States and Russia are equally matched in strategic nuclear forces, which 
is extremely important when assessing Russia’s threat perception and risk calculus. Russia 
is superior in the category of non-strategic weapons as the United States is outmatched due 
to its compliance with the INF Treaty from 1987 to 2019.132 In conventional military 
means, Russia holds superiority on its borders and in its near abroad but is outmatched 
beyond that geographic region. As described by Kofman, “Russian thought is that what 
matters is who is superior during the decisive initial period of war because Russia does not 
plan to fight past two to three weeks.”133 If the war were fought near Russian borders in 
Eastern Europe, it would have the advantage. Russia is conventionally dominant within the 
first days to weeks of a conventional conflict near its border. Russia is at an advantage 
locally because it can mass forces and employ them quickly in the region. The United 
States, in particular, and NATO, to a lesser extent, face the challenge of projecting power 
into the region from a distance.134 Russia sees this context and timeline as optimal to 
impose its will on its adversary by damaging critically important targets and maintaining 
the ability to defend critically important objects to its economy and political system.135  
Beyond the decisive initial period of war, or beyond Russia’s near abroad, experts 
recognize that Russia is outmatched by the United States and NATO. Part of the overmatch 
comes in the form of military spending and capability as, currently, the United States 
spends nearly 10 times more than Russia on national defense, including operating 10 
aircraft carriers to Russia’s one.136 The United States also holds a broad and sweeping 
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technological advantage and a “vastly superior” ability to project military, economic, and 
political power across the globe.137  
While U.S.–Russian nuclear stability is based on parity, conventional stability in 
this relationship is more complex. Because the United States and NATO maintain 
conventional superiority in most contexts, Russia has increasingly brandished nuclear 
escalation threats to keep that conventional advantage checked, eroding the “firewall” 
between these two levels. More importantly, and ironically, Russia’s strategy of avoiding 
any actions that might trigger conventional conflict aims to bolster a parallel firewall 
between conventional warfare and gray zone conflict. NATO, up to now, has effectively 
obliged this Russian strategy by not even brandishing threats of conventional escalation in 
response to Russian gray zone aggression, let alone undertaking conventional responses. 
As much as Russia seeks to avoid escalation to conventional warfare it could not win, it is 
also learning how averse NATO is to threaten such escalation. These respective Russian 
and NATO postures enhance conventional stability but at the cost of fueling instability at 
the gray zone level, reflecting a form of the stability–instability paradox familiar in nuclear 
strategies. How these conditions affect prospects for improving deterrence of Russian gray 
zone aggression is a focus of the research in this thesis. 
The relative match-up of nuclear and conventional forces between Russia and the 
United States is a major driving factor in Russia’s use of the gray zone as its preferred 
strategy. The subject matter experts agreed that the line-up between the United States and 
Russia creates a form of relative stability at the nuclear and conventional level; however, 
modern wars are no longer fought as force-on-force conventional fights. In today’s 
multipolar global security environment, geography, politics, terrain, technology, and the 
desire to avoid escalating conflict to the potentially devastating conventional or nuclear 
realm create instability at the sub-conventional level of warfare—particularly in areas in 
proximity to Russian territory, where Russia prefers to operate in the gray zone.  
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D. CLARIFYING CONFLICT OR COMPETITION 
To further assess Russian strategy, it is important to question the assumptions on 
which the assessments are based. One such assumption is that the United States and Russia 
view themselves as currently in conflict. If we hope to understand why Russia is using the 
gray zone like it is and how the United States can deter those activities, it is crucial to 
understand whether the countries are in a state of peace or a state of conflict. The nature of 
the relationship between the states can affect deterrent variables and strategy such as the 
ability of states to communicate or shape capabilities through arms control agreements.  
There is unanimous agreement among the participants interviewed for this research 
that the United States and Russia are currently in a state of conflict—although some 
participants preferred the term “intense competition,” categorized above traditional 
statecraft. For example, General David Petraeus states that “though the U.S. and Russia 
have some common interests, there are also diametrically opposed interests, and Russia is 
engaged in a variety of activities that are distinctly unfriendly.”138 Leon Panetta, former 
secretary of defense and CIA director, echoes this view: “It’s a fundamental conflict that 
we have with Russia. During my tenure as the director of the CIA, there was no question 
that U.S. and Russian relations go beyond competition and into the realm of conflict as we 
both try to assert ourselves to take advantage of the other.”139  
Michael Mazarr, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, states, “The 
gray zone creates a perception of a degree of conflict that goes beyond the gradual, long-
term moderated rivalry of great powers, but in reality, the U.S. and Russia are in an intense 
competition and not conflict.”140 Mazarr also judges that the areas where U.S. and Russian 
interests conflict are actually quite narrow, and the amount of overall national power that 
Russia has to undermine these U.S. interests is very modest, leading to his evaluation of a 
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competitive rather than conflictual relationship.141 Steven Pifer, former ambassador to 
Ukraine, also prefers the term competition but believes that the U.S.–Russian relationship 
is adversarial and not balanced with cooperation as it used to be.142 Anthony Cordesman, 
the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at CSIS, recognizes that the United States and Russia 
are in conflict but believes the difference between competition and conflict is more of a 
semantic exercise than an operational distinction. He says, “Yes, we are in conflict, 
although it varies in intensity and the willingness to use military force to compete in the 
gray zone.”143  
This divergence among the experts and even the literature over the term competition 
or conflict could, as Anthony Cordesman puts it, be a semantic exercise with little 
consequence in most venues; however, it matters when discussing the development of 
strategy toward Russian activity such as the gray zone.144 The development of strategy 
must be based on a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the two 
states. This question deserves more time, resources, and analytical thought in the future, 
but for this research, the relationship between the United States and Russia is one 
considered adversarial, in low-level conflict, and categorized by increased tension, rivalry, 
and distrust above the level of normal statecraft between two regionally dominant or great 
power states. This categorization of the relationship most accurately reflects the views of 
much of the literature and all the subject matter experts interviewed for this research. It 
also promotes a clear understanding of a decades-long relationship with multiple nuances 
and provides the opportunity for strategy and policy recommendations.  
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E. RUSSIA’S GRAY ZONE STRATEGY IN CONTEXT  
As established, Russia’s perspective and relative standing influence its use of the 
gray zone as it aims to achieve national objectives from a position of weakness outside its 
regional near abroad. As Alina Polyakova explains, 
Putin is no fool—he understands the limits of Russian capacities and ability 
to project power. Russia is no match to the United States economically, 
militarily, or in terms of its appeal to others. This is why the Kremlin has 
launched a strategy of political warfare against the West in the form of 
disinformation campaigns, support for far-right political parties in Europe, 
cyberattacks, money laundering, and other tools of influence that allow 
Moscow to undermine its perceived adversaries at very little cost. After all, 
it’s cheaper to open an internet troll farm than to build tanks and invest in 
sustainable economic growth.145 
This section provides some detailed examples of Russia’s use of the gray zone to gain 
leverage against the United States and NATO and forward its national objectives while 
avoiding a powerful U.S. or NATO response. Although a wide variety of gray zone tactics 
are described, many of them generally relate to the information space including influence 
campaigns among ethnic Russian populations, disinformation campaigns, election 
meddling, and economic sabotage.  
In the previous quote, Polyakova is describing the political warfare or information 
operations portion of Russia’s gray zone strategy. The chief of the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces of Russia, General Valery Gerasimov, envisions the future operational 
environment as follows:  
Less large-scale warfare; increased use of networked command-and-control 
systems, robotics, and high-precision weaponry; greater importance placed 
on interagency cooperation; more operations in urban terrain; a melding of 
offense and defense; and a general decrease in the differences between 
military activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.146  
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This description shows just how complex and intertwined the current security and political 
environments have become, which has necessitated states like Russia to use gray zone 
tactics while operating from a position of relative weakness.  
Russia’s use of non-military means is expansive and includes seeking to influence 
ethnic Russian populations, which the Russian government describes as sootechestvenniki, 
or “compatriots.”147 Vera Zakem, Paul Saunders, and Daniel Antoun from the Center for 
Naval Analyses explain that “Russia’s government defines the term compatriots broadly to 
incorporate not only ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, but also their families as well 
as others who may have cultural or other connections to the Russian Federation—including 
its non-Russian ethnic groups—directly or through relatives.”148 Russia has mobilized 
these groups in a variety of countries in its near abroad including Ukraine, Estonia, 
Georgia.149 Russia uses a compatriot influence strategy to further its larger political goals 
and leverages information operations, disinformation strategies, and corrupt relationships 
as critical assets in influencing and molding compatriots.150 The existence of Russian 
ethnic populations in other states gives strength and legitimacy to its claim to great power 
status by showing that the Russian world and influence expands beyond Russian territorial 
borders. Russian compatriots also act as an amplifying force to Russia’s political influence 
in its near abroad by aligning with Russian culture and ideals. Russia can also use its 
compatriots to sow unrest in their host state governments such as they did when Russia 
supported eastern Ukrainian separatists. Russia can also use its compatriots as a rallying 
point for its domestic and international audience by asserting that it must protect the 
Russian people wherever they may live. Lastly, Russia can use its compatriots to provide 
military, political, and economic intelligence and situational awareness.  
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The Russian government also makes efficient use of the information space as a non-
military means to achieve its objectives. Russia’s ability to generate extensive information 
campaigns designed to spread dezinformatsiya (disinformation) is supported by Russian 
state media, including Sputnik and Russia Today, not to mention private media and social 
media around the world, and cyberattacks.151 A few examples of Russia’s use of these 
tactics include its use of social media to gain influence in Eastern Europe, the use of 
propaganda to sway compatriots in its near abroad, cyber campaigns against its adversaries, 
and the spreading of disinformation to “sow dissent against host and neighboring 
governments, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European 
Union.”152 A report on Russia’s use of non-military means from the RAND Corporation 
details how Russia has used cyberattacks on Estonian banks, government entities, and 
media outlets in 2000, and propaganda and disinformation to support its 2008 invasion of 
Georgia by creating facts on the ground and justifying its actions with alternative 
narratives.153 
The RAND report also shows that Russia’s use of information campaigns and cyber 
tactics dramatically increased in 2011 after President Vladimir Putin accused the West of 
sowing discord and unrest in Russia by instigating protests in Moscow. This outward 
accusation led Putin to declare that he wanted to “break the Anglo-Saxon monopoly on the 
global information streams.”154 Following this declaration, in 2014, Russia annexed 
Crimea and sowed unrest in Georgia and Estonia, causing domestic political issues for the 
states. These operations were enabled by an extensive disinformation campaign that 
clouded the facts on the ground and created ambiguity surrounding Russia’s intentions. 
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Russia used social media to undermine the trust in the Ukrainian government, mobilize the 
people, and spread disinformation to demoralize the Ukrainian troops and discredit 
leadership. In the same RAND report, Helmus et al. explain, “Given the wide presence of 
Russia in Ukrainian media space and popularity of Russian social networks, Russia was 
able to actively use social media to mobilize support, spread disinformation and hatred, 
and try to destabilize the situation in Ukraine.”155 Other tactics used during the annexation 
of Crimea included direct messaging to Ukrainian soldiers’ cell phones.156  
Often, Russia employs multiple disparate gray zone tactics that complement each 
other and provide a greater chance of success. Some examples include using non-military 
means such as trojan malware that automatically drives traffic to pro-Russian propaganda 
on social media, publishing fake pro-Russian foreign policy books by Western authors in 
Russia, using automated bots to generate complaints against anti-Russian or pro-Western 
Twitter users, and inventing news stories that are picked up by other states and agencies 
and run as factual reports.157 Other operations range from “disinformation spread by social 
media trolls and bots, to fake-news sites backed by spurious polls, to forged documents, to 
online harassment campaigns of investigative journalists and public figures that stand 
opposed to Russia.”158 Additional tactics include online “honeypot” accounts, which 
involve a system designed to entice its targets to interact with it to exploit or compromise 
American citizens or national security officials in the hope they will provide useful 
 
155 Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence, 16. 
156 Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, “Electronic Warfare by Drone and SMS: How 
Russia-Backed Separatists Use ‘Pinpoint Propaganda’ in the Donbas,” Medium, May 18, 2017, 
https://medium.com/dfrlab/electronic-warfare-by-drone-and-sms-7fec6aa7d696. 
157 Rami Kogan, “Bedep Trojan Malware Spread by the Angler Exploit Kit Gets Political,” 
SpiderLabs Blog, April 29, 2015, https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Bedep-trojan-
malware-spread-by-the-Angler-exploit-kit-gets-political/; Edward Lucas, “Russia Turned Me into 
Propaganda,” Daily Beast, August 20, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/20/ russia-
turned-me-into-propaganda.html; Keir Giles, “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity 
and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power,” Chatham House, March 21, 2016, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-03-21-russias-new-
tools-giles.pdf. 
158 Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence, 17. 
47 
intelligence.159 Andrew Weisburd, Clint Watts, and J. M. Berger explain, “All three 
elements were working together: the trolls to sow doubt, the honeypots to win trust, and 
the hackers (we believe) to exploit clicks on the dubious links sent out by the first two.”160 
In 2016, Russia used non-military means to interfere in the democratic process of 
the U.S. presidential election. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence conducted 
an in-depth review of the Intelligence Community Assessment produced by the CIA, 
National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in January 2017 on 
Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and published its initial findings. 
Those findings show that Russia utilized “cyber-espionage and cyber-driven covert 
influence operations, conducted as part of a broader ‘active measures’ campaign that 
included overt messaging through Russian-controlled propaganda platforms.”161 Those 
platforms included “Russia’s state-run propaganda machine—comprised of its domestic 
media apparatus, outlets targeting global audiences such as RT [Russia Today] and 
Sputnik, and a network of quasi-governmental trolls contributing to the influence campaign 
by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international 
audiences.”162 This campaign was an extensive effort by Russian information operations 
to sow discord in the American population and interfere in the democratic process of the 
presidential elections. This campaign aimed not only to interfere in the elections for an 
outcome seen as favorable to Russia but also to undermine the trust of the American people 
in the security and validity of the democratic process.  
More recently, Russia has utilized its cyber capabilities for economic sabotage. In 
2017, the Russian government utilized a virus known as NotPetya to disable Maersk, the 
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world’s largest container-shipping company. This company is a key node in global 
shipping as it traffics 80 percent of the world’s trade.163 The virus was subsequently used 
to disable several other international companies key to the global economy including “an 
international snack company Mondelez, the U.S. pharmaceutical firm Merck and French, 
and a construction giant Saint-Gobain.”164 The effects of the virus caused chaos and 
widespread financial loss to the tune of approximately $10 billion.165  
While this is not a comprehensive account of every gray zone tactic Russia has 
used, it creates an impression of the breadth and complexity of the gray zone strategy that 
the United States must consider when deterring actions at the sub-conventional level.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Nadia Schadlow writes that “by failing to understand that the space between war 
and peace is not an empty one—but a landscape churning with political, economic, and 
security competitions that require constant attention—American foreign policy risks being 
reduced to a reactive and tactical emphasis on the military instrument by default.”166 
Russia has shown determination in weakening the cohesion of the NATO alliance, 
diminishing U.S. involvement, gaining leverage in Europe, and achieving its strategic goals 
through use of the gray zone. Russia’s deep commitment to its strategic objectives, coupled 
with its regional balance-of-power advantage and lack of communication and trust with the 
West, makes it difficult for the United States to deter actions in the gray zone where 
aggression is difficult to attribute, and actions are short of war. Difficult, but not 
impossible.  
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Deterrence depends on altering the adversary’s decision calculus by 
assessing what they value and holding it at risk.  
 —Retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Douglas Lute 
This chapter details deterrence theory and its evolution since the Cold War to 
today’s complex threat environment. This review of well-established events and analysis 
is important to ascertain how deterrence concepts are used and understood in the remainder 
of the chapters, which assess how deterrence can be mapped onto lower levels of conflict 
characterized by less severe costs. The chapter continues by adapting the most relevant 
concepts of deterrence to meet the new demands of sub-conventional warfare by exploring 
how the stability–instability paradox can explain the application of deterrence theory to the 
sub-conventional level. Lastly, sub-conventional deterrence strategy is analyzed in a 
contemporary context, applied to Russian gray zone conflict.  
A. CORE DETERRENCE CONCEPTS 
Bernard Brodie recognizes that deterrence is not a new concept: “The threat of war, 
open or implied, has always been an instrument of diplomacy by which one state deterred 
another from doing something of a military or political nature which the former did not 
wish the latter to do.”167 This message still rings true today in the sense that deterrence is 
about influencing another actor not to undertake an undesirable behavior. However, the 
context and environment in which deterrence theory is applied has altered dramatically in 
recent years. This shift mandates that, at the sub-conventional level, U.S. views on 
deterrence success need to evolve from zero tolerance of failure to a “cumulative 
deterrence” notion—that occasional low-level deterrence failure provides an opportunity 
for response, which in turn enhances the ability to more easily deter similar threats in the 
future.  
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Deterrence is often described in dichotomous terms such as “to persuade a potential 
adversary that the risks and costs of his proposed action far outweigh any gains that he 
might hope to achieve”168 or the “threat of heavy punishment for an act by the enemy in 
order to persuade him to desist from that act.”169 Deterrence, in essence, is the power to 
dissuade, and even though deterrence is often talked about in a military context, it 
encompasses all aspects of a state’s power. Deterrence is also a function of an opponent’s 
total cost–benefit analysis. This is to say that the opponent weighs the cost of the action 
against the overall benefit, considering its overall objectives, capabilities, and risks, as well 
as those of its opponent. If an opponent can achieve its objective but in doing so risks a 
larger cost than one is willing to accept, it can be deterred. Conversely, if an opponent 
believes that it can achieve its goal with minimal or acceptable costs and risks, it will be 
difficult to deter that action. This risk calculus is based on the deterring state’s ability either 
to deny its opponents the ability to achieve their objectives or to punish its opponents for 
taking the action.  
It is important to emphasize that deterrence does not exist only in the theoretical 
arena; it is an art conducted between individuals, or between organizations led by 
individuals. As such, any successful deterrence strategy must consider the individuals or 
organizations that one is aiming to deter. What are their motivations? What do they hold 
dear? How can the United States use that to its advantage? The Department of Defense 
defines deterrence as “the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence 
is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable 
counteraction.”170 This definition highlights that a key aspect of deterrence is a state of 
mind that drives a particular decision, not an arbitrary prescription of certain actions that 
can be expected to deter any opponent. The art of deterrence focuses on the decision-
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making of at least two living, breathing, thinking individuals, usually national leaders, with 
their own unique and potentially fluid interests and psychologies.  
Deterrence also relies on communication not only between individuals but also 
within the administration and state governmental system. This is an important 
consideration in this thesis as much of deterrence theory focuses on organization-level 
decision-making and challenges of bounded rationality. If the individual or the 
organizational system of the state perceives or processes a threat incorrectly, deterrence 
can fail. It is important to consider that motivated biases play a part in communication and 
can lead an adversary to interpret a state’s communication differently from what it 
intended. Communication relies on understanding the adversary well enough to know its 
biases. Elaine Bunn explains, “The clarity and credibility of American messages in the 
mind of the deterree are critical to tailoring deterrence threats. U.S. policymakers need 
mechanisms to assess how their words and actions are perceived, how they affect each 
adversary’s deterrence calculations, and how they might mitigate misperceptions that 
undermine deterrence.”171 Russia for example, is extremely hesitant to fully trust what the 
United States says, so even if Washington communicates a credible threat and has the 
necessary resolve to follow through on it, Russia is likely to discount either U.S. 
capabilities or resolve. Russia’s tendency to exaggerate its capability and resolve might 
indicate that it is prejudiced to believe that all states exaggerate when communicating.  
Audience costs, as described by James Fearon, can be used to bolster the credibility 
of a threat when communicating to an adversary if it is made clear that failure to follow 
through on the threat will undermine the political standing of a leader. This is especially 
true for democracies in which maintaining a positive public opinion is essential to 
maintaining power. Fearon finds, “Regardless of the initial conditions, the state more 
sensitive to audience costs is always less likely to back down in disputes that become public 
contests.”172 This inability to back down from a threat without suffering severe audience 
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costs bolsters the credibility of the threat and therefor deterrence. Douglas Lute, retired 
U.S. Army lieutenant general and former United States permanent representative to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, observes that deterrence depends on altering the 
adversary’s decision calculus by assessing what it values and holding it at risk.173 Michael 
Kofman, director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses echoes 
this theme by expressing that even though deterrence can be difficult in particular 
situations, it is always possible because deterrence, at its root, is a psychological interaction 
with another person.174  
B. THE COMPONENTS OF DETERRENCE 
Deterrence comprises three essential components: capability, resolve, and 
communication.175 These elements are interdependent, as all three must be present for 
deterrence to be successful. It is important to understand each component individually and 
how all three work together slightly differently at each level of warfare including a zero-
tolerance nuclear environment and an alternative sub-conventional environment. First, 
Snyder writes that deterrence depends on “any form of control which one has over 
opponents present prospective ‘value inventory.”176 This capability includes holding 
political or military leverage over an opponent’s material assets, political influence and 
standing, and anything that the state considers valuable to its survival and prosperity. In 
modern deterrence theory, this has been labeled the capability requirement of deterrence.  
Second, Snyder argues that deterrence depends on “the opponent’s degree of 
confidence that one intends to fulfill the threat or promise.”177 The intention to fulfill a 
threat is known as “resolve,” and it is evaluated from the opponent’s view of the state’s 
will to use the capability and make good on the deterrent threat. Thomas Schelling notes 
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that “there are threats that a state would rather not fulfill, and weakness in deterrence can 
emerge when an aggressor believes the defender will ultimately prove unwilling to carry 
out its threats.”178 Schelling notes that maintaining resolve is difficult because it is based 
on the adversary’s view of a state’s willingness to follow through with a threat. Even if the 
defending state is fully prepared to execute the threat, it still must convince the aggressor 
of its resolve.  
Discussing the third element of deterrence, Snyder argues that deterrence can only 
be achieved if an actor is able to effectively communicate “a credible threat or promise to 
decrease or increase the value inventory.”179 A state’s ability and resolve to use its 
capabilities to follow through with a deterrent threat or demonstrate the ability to deny an 
adversary’s intended goal are effectively useless if the state cannot communicate that to its 
adversary. Communication is more than just stated red lines; it must reflect the adversary’s 
biases and the prospect that the adversary will understand the communication as intended. 
Bunn explains, “Deterrence requires detailed knowledge of the society and leadership that 
we seek to influence. U.S. decisionmakers will need a continuing set of comprehensive 
country or group deterrence assessments, drawing on expertise in and out of government, 
in order to tailor deterrence to specific actors and specific situations.”180 Communication 
should be viewed from the adversary’s perspective, which requires knowing the 
adversary’s preconceptions, history, and tendencies to trust or distrust the actor wishing to 
deter. A state can also communicate through action including military exercises, 
demonstrations of capabilities, actions that reinforce a state’s commitment, declaratory 
policy, punitive actions for undesirable behavior, and the lifting of punishment for 
compliance. Communication is the cornerstone of deterrence; without it, capabilities are 
just hardware with no intent, and a nation’s resolve is not credible.  
An aspect of deterrence that can assist in affecting an adversary’s view of a state’s 
resolve is brinksmanship. Brinksmanship is an “aspect of foreign policy practice in which 
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one or both parties force the interaction between them to the threshold of confrontation in 
order to gain an advantageous negotiation position over the other.”181 This aspect of 
deterrence assists in generating credibility of the threat—not whether the state has the 
capability but rather the political and moral will to use the capability. Thomas Schelling 
describes this as “the threat that leaves something to chance.”182 The ambiguity and risk 
of escalation that brinkmanship provides can assign credibility to an otherwise unlikely 
threat. The United States and Russia have both proven their willingness to use this strategy 
despite the risks as seen during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both the United States and Russia 
issued threats of nuclear use with increased force and risk without qualifying their resolve 
to act on the threats.  
A complementary and essential piece of deterrence is a negative security assurance 
which requires a state to show restraint to shape an adversary’s decision calculus. Thomas 
Schelling explains that “the pain and suffering have to appear contingent on behavior; it is 
not alone the threat that is effective, the threat of pain or loss if he fails to comply, but the 
corresponding assurance, possibly an implicit one, that he can avoid the pain or loss if he 
does comply.”183 For example, in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of 
Defense expresses negative security assurances by stating that the United States “will not 
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to 
the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations,” maintaining a feature introduced in the preceding 2010 Nuclear 
Posture Review.184 The success or failure of negative security assurance rests on the 
communication component of deterrence. If a state cannot effectively communicate its 
resolve to both the threat and the guarantee of relief from punishment, the adversary has 
no reason to cease the behavior or alter its decision calculus. Only with successful 
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communication of a credible resolve both to punish and assure security will deterrence 
succeed.  
When applying deterrence, an actor must consider both its own and its adversary’s 
vital interests. In another publication, the Department of Defense suggests that deterrence 
may “convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten U.S. vital interests by means of 
decisive influence over their decision-making.”185 Bernard Brodie identifies U.S. vital 
interests as being linked to the standing of the United States as a status quo power. Brodie 
explains that the United States is determined to keep the territory and influence that it holds 
and maintain a world order in which “half [of the world] or more is friendly or at least not 
sharply and perennially hostile.”186 This analysis shows that U.S. vital interests center 
around the necessity to maintain not only U.S. national security but also the national 
security of allies and partners that go toward making up the current advantageous world 
order, particularly in Western Europe.187 The United States protects its vital interests by 
“asserting decisive influence through credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose 
costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an 
acceptable outcome.”188  
C. DETERRENCE APPROACHES 
Classic literature on deterrence further defines the theory by dividing approaches 
into two categories: deterrence by denial and deterrence by the threat of punishment. It is 
critical to understand the distinction between the two approaches and that a Cold War 
model of zero tolerance tends to rely too heavily on deterrence by threat of punishment, 
when today’s dynamic environment demands the flexibility of a balanced approach. Robert 
Jervis argues, “We must maintain the conceptual clarity provided by the distinctions 
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between deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment.”189 This distinction gives 
deterrent strategy at the sub-conventional level the flexibility and layering required to 
successfully deter low-level conflict where the threat of nuclear use is not credible. Liddell 
Hart explains, “There is an urgent need of a better kind of deterrent that does not impale us 
on the horns of the dilemma ‘Suicide or Surrender.’ It must be a more workable kind of 
deterrent—one that could be put into operation as a defence, against anything less than all-
out attack. The better it is as a defence, in a non-suicidal way, the surer it promises to be 
as a deterrent.”190 
Deterrence by denial is executed when an “actor elects not to undertake an action 
due to its belief a second party has taken, or will take, steps to ensure this action will fail 
to achieve its desired result.”191 Michael Mazarr explains, “Deterrence by denial strategies 
seek to deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a 
potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives.”192 Deterrence by denial is the 
act of defending an actor’s value inventory with the capabilities that it has, which in turn 
prevents the aggressor from reaching its intended goal or creates enough doubt about the 
prospect of success that the aggressor declines to attempt an action altogether. Patrick 
Morgan explains, “Deterrence and defense are analytically distinct but thoroughly 
interrelated in practice.”193 Deterrence by denial can be achieved through military 
capabilities or other forms of state power that create a favorable balance-of-forces equation 
in a region; however, it is not the only way to achieve deterrence by denial. A favorable 
balance of forces acts as a deterrent through denial in the sense that it physically prevents 
an adversary from achieving its objective, but even if the balance of force is not 
overwhelming, deterrence can be achieved by altering the adversary’s decision calculus to 
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believe that the chances of success are limited or reduced, making the action undesirable 
or not worth the effort.  
Deterrence by punishment occurs when “a geopolitical actor elects not to undertake 
a particular action due to its fear the action will trigger a response from a second party 
capable of imposing unacceptable costs against it.”194 The goal of deterrence by 
punishment is to alter the opponent’s decision calculus so that it believes the cost for the 
action is not worth the potential reward—even if it achieves its first objective. Deterrence 
by punishment aims not to defend value assets or deny an action but to raise the cost of a 
potential adversarial action. Mazarr explains that deterrence by punishment can extend to 
include a nuanced use of all elements of state power while denial strategies tend to threaten 
“severe penalties, such as nuclear escalation or severe economic sanctions, if an attack 
occurs.”195 It is the fear of the cost of an action, in any category of DIME, that can change 
an adversary’s cost–benefit analysis depending on what it values. If an actor can ascertain 
what its opponent values and hold it at risk of punishment, the actor has a strong basis for 
deterrence. Bunn explains, “The capabilities needed for tailored deterrence go beyond 
nuclear weapons and the strategic capabilities of the so-called New Triad, to the full range 
of military capabilities, presence, and cooperation, as well as diplomatic, informational, 
and economic instruments.”196  
D. RESIDUAL COLD WAR INFLUENCE 
All prominent theories of deterrence depend heavily on the Cold War model of 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in which both sides understood 
that any deterrence failure was unacceptable.197 This model of zero tolerance of deterrence 
failure is appropriate when the aim is to deter the use of such highly destructive forces as 
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nuclear weapons. A single failure of deterrence at this strategic level would be costly for 
the aggressor, the recipient, and the international security architecture that operates on 
norms of behavior, and as such, the threshold for nuclear use must be kept very high—such 
as to ensure state survival.  
Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a classic zero-
tolerance model of deterrence has been expanded beyond the United States and Soviet 
Union to include seven additional states: the United Kingdom, France, China, India, 
Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel.198 It is important to recognize that of the additional 
states, only the United Kingdom, France, and China (in addition to the United States and 
Russia) are recognized as legal nuclear weapon states by the NPT. India, Pakistan and 
Israel never joined the NPT; North Korea signed the treaty but has never been in full 
compliance and has subsequently withdrawn. India, Pakistan, and North Korea all built 
nuclear weapons and deterrence publicly into their military postures after the NPT came 
into force.  
Though nuclear deterrence today enables these states to meet similar security needs, 
the deterrence relationship built and maintained by the United States and Russia sets the 
tone for the global nuclear deterrent architecture and norms, and lays the foundation for the 
global nonproliferation regime. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, in 2019, the world inventory of nuclear weapons totaled 13,865, with 3,750 
deployed as operational forces.199 More than 90 percent of that total is owned by the 
United States and Russia.200 The norm of nuclear non-use, or as Nina Tannenwald 
 
198 Most open-source reporting categorizes Israel as a nuclear weapon state. However, Israel 
maintains ambiguity about its program and has never publicly declared having nuclear weapons or tested a 
weapon. It is outside of the scope of this research to confirm or deny Israel as a nuclear weapon state. 
Nevertheless, because Israel’s neighbors believe it is a nuclear weapons state, nuclear deterrence dynamics 
are equivalently present in its security relationships. 
199 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2019: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
2019), 10, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/yb19_summary_eng_1.pdf.  
200 Kelsey Reichmann, “Here’s How Many Nuclear Warheads Exist, and Which Countries Own 
Them,” Defense News, June 16, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/global/2019/06/16/heres-how-many-
nuclear-warheads-exist-and-which-countries-own-them/; “Global Nuclear Arsenal Declines, but Future 
Cuts Uncertain amid U.S.-Russia Tensions,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 17, 2019, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/nuclear-weapons-russia-start-inf-warheads/30003088.html. 
59 
describes it, the “nuclear taboo,” aids in explaining why classic deterrence has been 
effective since 1945.201 Tannenwald states, “A normative prohibition on nuclear use has 
developed in the global system, which, although not (yet) a fully robust norm, has 
stigmatized nuclear weapons as unacceptable weapons of mass destruction.”202 The threat 
of nuclear retaliation to nuclear use is largely considered reasonable, even credible, making 
deterrence of other nuclear states stable at the strategic nuclear level.  
E. THE EXTENSION OF DETERRENCE  
The current security environment has expanded beyond the dichotomy of the Cold 
War to a multipolar world including multiple nuclear weapons states and an alliance system 
that has fundamentally changed the structure of deterrence. As Bunn argues, “Deterrence, 
the hallmark of Cold War–era security, needs to be adapted to fit the more volatile security 
environment of the 21st century.”203 In the extension of deterrence beyond nuclear parity, 
there are three characteristic conditions of the post–Cold War era that require consideration 
and shape the challenges of creating a modern approach. Together, the taboo against 
nuclear use, the stability–instability paradox, and extended deterrence create complications 
that must be addressed.  
1. Nuclear Taboo 
Using classic deterrence theory, which relies on nuclear weapons to deter a threat 
at the conventional or sub-conventional level, is likely to fail due to a lack of credibility in 
the resolve to use such a disproportional and catastrophic weapon. History has shown that 
non-nuclear states are willing to attack a nuclear armed state in large part because the threat 
of nuclear retaliation for a conventional attack is not credible. Tannenwald provides 
examples of this: “China attacked U.S. forces in the Korean War, North Vietnam attacked 
U.S. forces in the Vietnam War, Argentina attacked Britain in the Falklands in 1982, and 
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Iraq attacked U.S. forces and Israel in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.”204 Nuclear retaliation 
against a non-nuclear aggressor is unacceptable to domestic or international populations. 
Tannenwald explains, “Knowledge of a widespread normative opprobrium against nuclear 
use may have strengthened expectations of non-nuclear states that nuclear weapons would 
not be used against them.”205 Furthermore this expectation is codified in both U.S. and 
Russian doctrine in which both states indicate “that they will not use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear weapon states that comply with the NPT.”206 This nuclear taboo along 
with the grave repercussions of using a nuclear weapon for anything less than state survival 
or nuclear retaliation prevents classic nuclear deterrence, which has a zero-failure model, 
from being effectively transposed to the lower levels of conflict such as the conventional 
and sub-conventional level of gray zone conflict. The norm of non-use is not present below 
the strategic nuclear level. Conventional and sub-conventional weapons and tactics are 
common practice and do not encounter the normative restrictions and ramifications that 
nuclear weapons do, which causes a zero-failure strategic level deterrence model to fail at 
lower levels of conflict, where the cost is lower and the use is acceptable.  
2. Stability–Instability Paradox 
Nuclear weapons do have a role, however, in affecting deterrence dynamics at 
lower level and even gray zone conflict. In 1954, B. H. Liddell Hart estimated that “to the 
extent that the H-bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibility 
of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression.”207 Glenn Snyder described the 
stability–instability paradox as follows: “the greater the stability of the ‘strategic’ balance 
of terror, the lower the stability of the overall balance at lower levels of violence.”208 When 
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applying this paradox to the United States and the Soviet Union, Snyder assesses that “the 
Soviets probably feel, considering the massive retaliation threat alone, that there is a range 
of minor ventures which they can undertake with impunity, despite the objective existence 
of some probability of retaliation.”209 Nuclear weapons and classic deterrence keep 
nuclear states stable in a mutually assured destruction framework. This dynamic stabilizes 
the states at the nuclear level and pushes aggression to the conventional level.  
This stability allows states to compete at the conventional level while having a 
moderating effect on the adversary’s decision calculus. When an adversary calculates 
decisions, nuclear weapons factor into a “whole war” or “total cost-gain” expectation.210 
An adversary does not want to take an action at the conventional level that could reasonably 
be expected to escalate the conflict and incur a devastating cost at the strategic nuclear 
level. Thus, nuclear weapons may moderate the types or intensity of action between states 
at the conventional level. But, conversely, if an adversary reasonably expects that an action 
at the conventional level will not escalate the conflict—precisely because of that 
devastating cost at the strategic nuclear level—then strategic nuclear stability has little 
conventional deterrence benefit and may instead incite certain forms of conventional 
aggression that serve brinksmanship strategies. That is the stability–instability paradox: 
nuclear weapons always factor in via a “whole war” perspective, but how they factor in 
may be perverse.  
3. Extended Deterrence 
A critical component of adapting deterrence from the Cold War era to today’s 
environment was the construction of the alliance system after World War II that gave 
strength and enhanced power projection to the United States and its Western allies and 
partners. As the Soviet Union sought to erode or threaten the alliance, the strategy of 
extended deterrence, “the ability of U.S. military forces, particularly nuclear forces, to deter 
attack on U.S. allies and thereby reassure them,” was born out of necessity.211 The United 
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States extended nuclear deterrence to U.S. allies during the Cold War to enhance collective 
security against the Soviet Union. Nuclear extended deterrence created a stabilizing effect 
in the broader U.S. alliance system by inserting the severe consequences of nuclear use 
into the decision-making calculus of the Soviets for engagement or interference with U.S. 
allies.212 After the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States 
allowed the emphasis on deterrence to wane as the it prioritized terrorism over great power 
competition.  
Today, as the strategic environment shifts from the post–Cold War era, new threats 
to the United States emerge on multiple levels of conflict, causing the need for a 
strengthened and tailored deterrence strategy extending down to the lowest levels of 
conflict. Since U.S. extended deterrence is a security guarantee of the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella to allies such as NATO member states, Japan, and South Korea, the principles of 
classic deterrence apply with the caveat that the credibility of the nuclear threat is more 
strained. The idea that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend the 
homeland against an existential threat is easily credible. However, the notion that the 
United States would use strategic nuclear weapons to defend another state and risk 
retaliation on the U.S. homeland for anything other than nuclear use is a harder threat to 
make credible. This issue of credibility has been exaggerated even further with Russia’s 
use of gray zone tactics that fall below the level of armed conflict and conventional war. 
These strategies rely on operating at a level below the threshold for conventional military 
response, therefore reducing the credibility of a retaliatory threat by the United States.  
Among the subject matter experts interviewed for this research, opinions on 
whether Russian gray zone conflict threatened U.S. extended deterrence were mixed. One 
set of interviewees was more optimistic and expressed that Russian gray zone operations 
are not undermining U.S. extended deterrence because they exist above the sub-
conventional level of the gray zone. These experts referenced actions that the United States 
and NATO have taken since Russia began increasing its gray zone activities that have 
bolstered extended deterrence. Experts such as Douglas Lute cite NATO force structure 
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revisions and the bolstering of deterrence credibility through the communication of 
capabilities and resolve by inviting Russian observers to exercises in the region.213 Brad 
Roberts described how Russian gray zone conflict has bolstered U.S. extended deterrence 
by congealing the will of NATO allies around collective defense against Russia’s 
continued attempts to undermine NATO member states’ interests.214  
A second group of interviewees were less optimistic and expressed concern that 
Russian gray zone operations are potentially eroding the credibility of the will of the United 
States to fulfill its extended deterrence commitments. David Holloway argues that U.S. 
extended deterrence relies on the credibility of the U.S. and European response to Russian 
actions, positing that the responses taken thus far might embolden Russia to push the limit 
to see just how far outside the gray zone it can operate before inciting a U.S. response.215 
This is not to suggest a full-fledged conventional attack; however, it does suggest that 
Russia is attempting to push the boundaries of what is considered gray zone operations, 
and U.S. responses to these actions will serve to define their limits. David Petraeus, former 
CIA director, emphasizes that although Russian gray zone operations might undermine 
U.S. extended deterrence, the conventional view of extended deterrence still exists at the 
conventional and nuclear level where Russia and the United States are relatively stable.216 
Although there is cause for concern that Russian gray zone actions might erode the 
credibility of U.S. extended deterrence through attempts to fracture the U.S.–NATO 
relationship or the NATO alliance itself, the general sense among the subject matter experts 
is that the threat of collective retaliation is seen as credible by Russia and that the U.S. 
extended deterrence guarantee remains firmly in place with respect to the United States 
and NATO member states.217  
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F. ADAPTING DETERRENCE TO NEW DEMANDS  
As discussed in the previous section, classic zero-tolerance nuclear deterrence fails 
at the sub-conventional level due to a lack of credibility in threatening nuclear retaliation 
for gray zone activity. This section first assesses the value of adapting conventional 
deterrence to apply to the sub-conventional level. The analysis suggests that conventional 
deterrence is promising and, in some regards, likely to be successful but ultimately 
insufficient as a sole approach to deter gray zone conflict. Additional means and 
mechanisms are then considered for supplementing the use of conventional deterrence for 
the gray zone. 
1. Conventional Deterrence as an Alternative to Classic Deterrence 
Although overarching theories and specific tenets of deterrence strategies are suited 
to the sub-conventional level, it is still unclear how best to deter such activity. Brodie’s 
overarching premise, that deterrence is “one state deterring another from doing something 
of a military or political nature which the former did not wish the latter to do,” can be 
applied to the gray zone.218 However, it is fundamentally harder to deter actions at the sub-
conventional level when gray zone actions offer a low cost and high reward. The use of a 
conventional retaliatory strike for such low-level conflict is not credible or could be highly 
escalatory. Credibility is even further eroded in the gray zone when compounded by the 
ambiguous and deniable nature of Russia’s actions; if Russia believes it can escape 
attribution for its actions, retaliatory threats will be less meaningful. It is difficult to gain 
support from a domestic or international audience for punishment or denial actions against 
Russia when it has done the preparatory work to shape or create the facts on the ground 
and an information campaign to control the narrative that skews the ability of any other 
nation to directly tie the Russian government to the event.  
Steven Pifer posits—referring to Russia’s denial of services attacks in Estonia in 
2007 and Georgia in 2008 and fait accompli annexation of Crimea in 2014—that nuclear 
(classic) deterrence has failed and that conventional deterrence could be suited to the gray 
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zone, although not perfectly.219 Pifer believes that conventional deterrence might be 
extended to the sub-conventional level (gray zone), and it is essential to assess the merit of 
that assumption. The following assessment relies on Michael Gerson’s structure of the 
three interrelated components on which conventional deterrence relies. To some extent, 
each of the three components can be adapted for use at the sub-conventional level; 
however, two components need adapting or supplementing to succeed in the gray zone. 
The first component establishes that “states contemplating conventional aggression 
typically seek relatively quick, inexpensive victories.”220 This is also true for states like 
Russia in the gray zone, which seek high reward and low-cost strategies. This first tenet of 
conventional deterrence adapts well to the sub-conventional level as it describes the nature 
of sub-conventional warfare where states can test tactics quickly as opportunities arise for 
limited cost, even if the tactic fails.  
The second component is that “conventional deterrence is primarily based on 
deterrence by denial, the ability to prevent an adversary from achieving its objectives 
through conflict.”221 In an interview conducted for this thesis, Douglas Lute expressed that 
deterrence of sub-conventional warfare must rely on both deterrence by denial and 
deterrence by punishment because of the ability for Russia’s autocratic regime to quickly 
take advantage of opportunities through expedient implementation of gray zone 
capabilities such as cyber, information warfare, or proxy forces in the geographic area.222 
These tactics can be employed well before the United States can defend or deny an action, 
thus relying on deterrence by punishment after the event. When deterrence by denial fails, 
it is imperative that a state is prepared to apply previously threatened punishment to give 
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the adversary pause in its decision calculus and sustain the credibility of deterrence by 
punishment concerning future similar events.  
The ability to accept that deterrence by denial may fail and respond in a timely 
manner with a proportionally scaled response gives credibility to the overall deterrence 
posture at each level of warfare. Even if the United States uses its strength of the allied 
system to preposition forces able to counter Russia’s ability to rapidly employ gray zone 
tactics and deny the benefits of its actions, there still must be a related threat of punishment. 
Furthermore, if the United States or its allies do not have prepositioned forces or 
capabilities in an area to deny Russian gray zone actions, deterrence would rely on an 
effective threat of punishment of the action after the fact. This need for both deterrence by 
denial and deterrence by punishment translates to this tenet being partially transposable to 
the sub-conventional space, but only with the addition of a denial-by-punishment strategy 
to accompany it. 
The third component is that “the ‘local’ balance of military power—the balance 
between the conventional forces of the attacker and those of a defender in the area of 
conflict—often plays a critical role in conventional deterrence, since it is local forces that 
will impact an aggressor’s calculations regarding a quick victory.”223 The third component 
of conventional deterrence is directly transposable to sub-conventional deterrence, albeit 
with a few caveats and modifications based on the level of gray zone action that the United 
States seeks to deter. The local balance of power in Russia’s near abroad plays a critical 
role in the overall deterrence relationship between the United States and Russia because 
Russia has the local balance-of-power advantage. However, an emphasis on the local 
balance of power is much more suited to higher levels of sub-conventional warfare such as 
proxy forces, clandestine operations, and cyberattacks that create physical conditions.  
Russia knows that it can conduct operations in the region faster than the United 
States or NATO can respond, and it uses the unreliability of the threat of response to its 
advantage. Russia’s ability to move forces and capabilities to regions in its near abroad or 
homeland territory greatly exceeds that of the United States or NATO to move forces or 
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capabilities into the area due to the tyranny of distance and Russia’s anti-access and area 
denial (A2AD) defensive systems. These systems would need contending with in a 
conventional setting. Although, as Michael Kofman points out, the capabilities of Russia’s 
A2AD systems have been overinflated, the inflamed discourse and hype around this 
capability could affect NATO’s decision calculus and prevent or delay a response to 
Russian actions in the near abroad.224 NATO and U.S. decisions to respond to Russian 
aggression take time given the required consensus of stakeholders, and this gives Russia 
the advantage under a conventional deterrence model. 
The local balance of military power in Russia’s near abroad has a dramatic effect 
on gray zone deterrence due to Russia’s ability to influence its near-abroad neighbors with 
propaganda, proxy forces, cyber, and economic manipulation, which are supported by the 
looming threat of conventional aggression and coercion from a powerful and 
geographically close neighbor. States in the region have the choice of balancing against 
Russia by joining NATO (if they are invited) or allying with Western powers without 
NATO membership, as Ukraine did. However, these states are still regionally located near 
Russia and know that the United States and NATO would have to decide, first, to come to 
their aid and, second, to cross the tyranny of distance required to deliver that aid and 
support. A state such as Russia can do a great deal of damage in either the sub-conventional 
or the conventional realm in the amount of time that it would take for Western powers to 
infill support. The second option for these states is to bandwagon with Russia, which would 
require them to align with an oppressive regime, losing some of their sovereignty in 
exchange for relief from Russian aggression. 
At first glance, a conventional deterrence strategy seems to fit the bill for deterring 
gray zone activity. Conventional deterrence has certainly been bolstered by recent U.S. and 
NATO actions; however, it is still an incomplete strategy for deterring gray zone activity 
at the sub-conventional level. A conventional deterrence strategy has some theoretical and 
practical challenges when it is transposed to the sub-conventional level, particularly threat 
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credibility, and Russia’s ability to quickly employ gray zone strategies when the 
opportunity arises without intelligence warning or the ability to deny the outcome. Russia 
has the balance-of-power advantage in the region, conducts swift fait accompli operations, 
and uses proxy and surrogate forces to avoid attribution that the United States could use to 
justify retaliation and bolster the credibility of its threats.  
2. Applying Deterrence in the Context of Russian Behavior 
This section builds on the previous assessments and explores the application of 
deterrence theory at the sub-conventional level in the specific context of Russia as a state 
actor and its use of a gray zone strategy. It considers the value of tailoring a deterrent 
strategy against Russian gray zone conflict by supplementing conventional deterrence with 
“cumulative deterrence.” Recall that any deterrence strategy relies on sufficient 
capabilities, solid resolve, and strong communication of a threat, which in turn create 
credibility.225 Cumulative deterrence, elaborated in the following paragraphs, introduces 
the idea that credibility can be sustained across multiple encounters even if deterrence fails 
in certain instances, vis-à-vis classic zero-tolerance nuclear deterrence. 
Regarding tailoring deterrence, Bunn writes, “If deterrence is about influencing the 
perceptions—and ultimately, the decisions and actions—of another party, it is logical that 
the requirements for deterrence will differ with each party that we might try to deter and 
may well differ in each circumstance or scenario.”226 Adapting deterrence to the sub-
conventional level requires an understanding of the unique relationship between the states 
to identify the relative stability and instability that can inform deterrence strategy.  
The stability–instability paradox applies to the nuclear and conventional level, and 
indeed, Russia’s effort to avoid conventional-level warfare with the United States 
strengthens stability between the states at the conventional level similar to the strategic 
nuclear level. While U.S.–Russian nuclear stability is based on parity, conventional 
stability in this relationship is more complex. As shown in Chapter II, Russia has a strong 
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aversion to conflict with the United States and NATO at the conventional level. Russia 
would be outmatched in military superiority after two to three weeks of conflict and beyond 
its near abroad and, thus, prefers to operate at the sub-conventional level below the 
threshold of armed conflict.227 In effect, Russia’s strategy of avoiding any actions that 
might trigger conventional conflict aims to bolster a sort of “firewall” between 
conventional warfare and gray zone conflict. NATO, up to now, has effectively obliged 
this Russian strategy by not brandishing threats of conventional escalation in response to 
Russian gray zone aggression, let alone undertaking conventional responses. As much as 
Russia seeks to avoid escalation to conventional warfare it could not win, it is also learning 
how averse NATO is to threaten such escalation. This aversion is ironic insofar as Cold 
War–era extended deterrence relied on NATO’s threat of escalatory nuclear responses to 
conventional attacks. 
These respective Russian and NATO postures enhance conventional stability, but 
at the cost of fueling instability at the gray zone level, reflecting a form of the stability–
instability paradox familiar in nuclear strategies. This tailored application of the stability–
instability paradox to the specific Russian context yields a tiered relationship of stability 
between the United States and Russia at each level of warfare, as depicted in Figure 1, and 
helps explain why the United States and Russia are the most unstable at the sub-
conventional level, on which this research focuses.  
 
227 Kofman, interview with author, October 23, 2019.  
70 
 
Figure 1. U.S.–Russian Stability Relationship228 
Cumulative deterrence may be an option to address the issues created when 
adapting conventional deterrence to the sub-conventional level including the credibility 
and communication of the threat. Cumulative deterrence has not been a standard element 
of U.S. deterrence strategy in the past, and there is limited academic literature and strategic 
thought about its use in areas outside of cyber and terrorism. However, this new security 
environment characterized by great power competition at levels below open conflict 
requires a new way of looking at the deterrence landscape at the sub-conventional level. 
Subject matter experts for this research confirm that a zero-tolerance deterrence mindset 
will not work at the sub-conventional level and that the United States might have to choose 
what portions of the gray zone it wants to deter because it may be difficult to deter 
everything.229 
There is a precedent for applying a cumulative model and mindset of deterrence to 
limit and shape the sub-conventional level of conflict, and this suggests it may also be 
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applied to the current U.S. need to deter Russia’s gray zone conflict. According to Thomas 
Rid, cumulative deterrence “consists of a series of acts of force to create—and maintain—
general norms of behavior for many political actors over an extended period. Using force, 
consequently, does not represent a principal failure of deterrence but its maintenance 
through swift, certain, but measured responses.”230 Cumulative deterrence has been a key 
part of Israel’s strategy for decades and was developed in the conventional and sub-
conventional level focusing on limiting and shaping ongoing conflicts against both state 
and non-state actors at the conventional and sub-conventional level.231 In addition, 
cumulative deterrence has recently been considered for use in deterring terrorism and 
cyberattacks, as it is designed for long-term sustained conflict, such as competition in the 
gray zone.232  
Doron Almong describes cumulative deterrence as functioning on two levels: the 
macro, which creates an image of overwhelming military superiority, and the micro, which 
relies on responses to adversarial actions.233 Almong also explains that cumulative 
deterrence has three key features.  
First, its effectiveness is measured in terms of the number of victories accumulated 
over the duration of the conflict, which might be envisioned as “assets in a victory bank.” 
Second, over time, these victories produce increasingly moderate behavior on the part of 
the adversary and a shift in its strategic, operational, and tactical goals until there is a near-
absence of direct conflict. Third, this moderation may eventually result in political 
negotiations and perhaps even a peace agreement.234  
Almong is describing cumulative deterrence as applied to the conventional level of 
warfare; however, in the context of Russia, the construct can be transposed to the sub-
conventional level. At the sub-conventional level, U.S. responses over time to Russian gray 
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zone aggression could moderate Russian behavior, causing a shift in Russia’s decision 
calculus and strategic goals, thereby diminishing the conflict.  
The advantage of layering a strong conventional deterrence strategy with 
cumulative deterrence is that it allows the restoration of deterrence over time if 
conventional threats fail to deter at the sub-conventional level. Over time, cumulative 
deterrence responses to gray zone actions bolster the credibility of the United States and 
alter Russia’s decision calculus at the sub-conventional level, therefore strengthening 
deterrence overall. Successful deterrence at the sub-conventional level requires a 
reorientation in how the U.S. views deterrence, moving from a zero-tolerance strategy to 
the long-term attrition of gray zone conflict. This renewed mindset allows for tailored 
punitive strategies that over time limit the bounds of the gray zone through the reiteration 
of unacceptable behavior through punishment. Regardless of the level at which a state 
wishes to conduct warfare, all deterrence strategies rely on three aspects that must work in 
concert: sufficient capabilities, solid credibility, and strong communication of a threat.235 
As Rid explains, confrontations should be “seen as necessary evils that should be kept on 
as low a level as possible, but that could not be pushed down to zero.”236 This argument 
assumes escalation control, which is to say that the United States can control escalation at 
the sub-conventional level on its own terms.  
Many authors challenge the notion of escalation control, claiming that it is risky 
and nearly impossible. Scholars claim that avoiding escalation requires deterring the action 
and that a policy to deter one action could in fact risk escalation to another. Additionally, 
scholars claim, “Escalation control or management is an inherently imperfect business. It 
can be done well or poorly, but it is extremely rare for any set of policies to eliminate the 
risk of significant escalation altogether.”237 These same scholars agree that the risk of 
inadvertent escalation can be reduced, but they are concerned that policy makers are 
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incorrectly assuming it can be eliminated altogether.238 The concerns over escalation 
control are valid; however, it is possible to control escalation and use the threat of 
escalation to bolster deterrence. Mazarr explains that the gray zone puts the defender in the 
position to escalate, which is part of the challenge of deterrence.239 Both escalation control 
and deterrence fundamentally rely on communication and a thorough understanding of the 
adversary. Proper communication of the capability and the resolve to use the capability to 
deny or punish an action are just as crucial to escalation control as they are to deterrence. 
The same scholars who express concerns over escalation control also admit there is a way 
to control the risk: “Escalation depends heavily on an astute understanding of how the 
adversary will perceive and interpret events that have not yet occurred—not only in a 
general sense, but also under the specific and often difficult-to-predict conditions that will 
shape the opponent’s perceptions and responses when a particular event occurs.”240 The 
United States can both mitigate escalation and contribute to deterrence by adding an 
element of ambiguity to its deterrence threats that leave something to chance but also allow 
a response that limits or controls the escalatory response of the adversary.  
When the United States responds with an instrument of state power in any DIME 
category, such as the expulsion of 60 Russian diplomats in response to the Russian nerve 
agent attack on a British citizen in 2018, it can strengthen cumulative deterrence credibility. 
Some of the literature on cumulative deterrence suggests that deterrence works by banking 
“wins” by responding to events with military power. However, when adapted to the gray 
zone, it seems critical that all elements of state power must be utilized, not just the military. 
The military is sometimes—not always—an appropriate response to an action in the gray 
zone, so threatening military retaliation for every tactic in the gray zone is not credible; 
however, a state must still have the ability to impose costs on an adversary for an action to 
make cumulative deterrence successful.  
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3. Conventional and Cumulative Deterrence in the Gray Zone 
After recent Russian gray zone aggression, from Ukraine to U.S. election meddling, 
the addition of troops and capabilities in NATO states and in the Baltics bolstered 
conventional deterrence efforts while the U.S. political and economic response to Russian 
actions in Ukraine contributed to cumulative deterrence efforts. The United States 
condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine and deepened cooperation with Ukraine, while 
Ukraine reinstated its strategic national goal of becoming a NATO member.241 
Economically, the United States invested heavily in the region, with the European 
Deterrence Initiative reaching $6.5 billion in fiscal year 2019 and $5.9 billion in 2020.242 
Additionally, Washington pledged to give Russia “no relief” from sanctions imposed until 
“Russia return [ed] control of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine.”243 The response from 
the United States and NATO goes toward cumulative deterrence by showing Russia that 
acts like this will not be tolerated in the future and that the United States and NATO will 
respond. The successful application of cumulative deterrence affects Russia’s decision 
calculus and reduces the chance that it will repeat the same act in the future for fear of 
reprisal, which it knows will be the same as or worse than what it received for Crimea. In 
theory, over time, it becomes easier to modify Russia’s actions in the gray zone because it 
has fewer options that benefit Russia without suffering the cost of bolstered conventional 
capabilities or the credible threat of punishment based on previous U.S. retaliation. 
A recent case study illustrates how communication through diplomatic and military 
means might successfully control escalation and bolster cumulative deterrence. On 
February 7, 2018, the U.S.-led coalition established to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) in Syria came under attack by approximately 500 pro-Syrian government 
forces and Russian mercenaries, most likely part of the Wagner Group, which was loyal to 
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the Kremlin.244 Before the attack, the Russian and U.S. commanders communicated 
through deconfliction phone lines and stayed on opposite sides of the Euphrates River 
adjacent to Iraq, backing separate offensive forces against ISIL’s oil-rich Deir al-Zour 
Province.245 As described by a report by the New York Times, after the attack, “‘the 
Russian high command in Syria assured us [the U.S. forces] it was not their people,’ 
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis told senators in testimony last month. He said he directed 
Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘for the force, then, 
to be annihilated.’ ‘And it was.’”246 
In total, anywhere from 200 to 300 pro-Syrian and Russian mercenaries were killed 
while zero Americans were injured or killed.247 The tactic of Russia’s maintaining 
plausible deniability for the attack provided the United States with an opportunity to use 
Syria as a communication channel to draw a deterrent red line even when Russia shrouded 
the action in ambiguity. Its claim of not being involved allowed the United States the same 
plausible deniability when it launched a military attack on the suspected Russian 
mercenaries. Essentially, the United States called Russia’s bluff—that its thin veil of 
plausible deniability would prevent the United States from responding. Russia was then 
unable to take action or retaliate because, according to its own claims, the individuals killed 
in the strikes were not Russian, thus controlling the escalation on terms favorable to the 
United States. The United States was also able to create uncertainty in Russia’s mind about 
future similar actions, further deterring and controlling the level of actions acceptable in 
the gray zone.  
The tactic of using proxy or surrogate forces to carry out attacks and maintain 
plausible deniability as Russia did in Syria is a common tactic of gray zone conflict. The 
inability of the United States to deter such an attack yet its ability to follow with a swift 
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and devastating response bolsters the credibility of U.S. conventional deterrence and puts 
a victory in the bank of cumulative deterrence. The United States failed to deter the initial 
strike because Russia had calculated that the U.S. capability or will to respond was 
insufficient. Russia was wrong. The act of attacking U.S. service members through proxy 
forces gave the United States enough interest and incentive to respond decisively with 
multiple conventional airstrikes, thus demonstrating the U.S. will and capability to deliver 
the exact conventional response it had threatened. Cumulative deterrence is bolstered when 
Russia changes its strategic risk calculus about conducting similar events in the future. The 
credibility of the deterrent threat for any action like the attack in Syria was underscored as 
reliable, allowing the United States to deter similar activities in the future and reducing the 
gray zone options available to Russia in the conflict. 
The credibility of a deterrent threat relies on having suitable and sufficient 
capabilities to respond to the level of action the adversary is conducting. Additionally, the 
credibility of the deterrent threat relies on the defender’s reputation and the asymmetry of 
stakes between the two actors. The message that the United States and NATO are sending 
aligns with NATO’s Article 5, stating that severe consequences come with aggression 
against the United States or any NATO member. This is a credible threat, but it draws an 
apparent red line of attributable Russian aggression against a NATO member and leaves 
open anything below that line, which is where Russia is operating, and conventional 
deterrence alone is failing. The United States and NATO have begun to correct this 
conventional disparity, and they can continue to bolster deterrence at the lowest levels with 
the addition of capabilities, cumulative deterrence strategy, the bolstering of partner 
nations, and enhanced presence in the region.  
After the actions in Crimea in 2014, President Obama, while in the Estonian capital 
of Tallinn, was reported as saying “not only that NATO will guarantee the independence 
and territorial integrity of every single Ally, but also that the Alliance must update its Rapid 
Response Force to deter potential threats.”248 Update they did. Shortly thereafter, the 
NATO Response Force, which provides a collective defense and rapid military response to 
 
248 Halas, “Proving a Negative,” 436.  
77 
emerging crises, was enhanced to 40,000 troops. These troops include the Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which includes a multinational land brigade as well as 
air, maritime, and SOF components, and can be ready to deploy within two days.249 Also 
included are two multinational brigades that make up the Initial Follow-on Forces Group, 
which can quickly deploy following the VJTF. In addition, the United States and NATO 
committed to joint exercises and a more significant presence in the Baltic region.250 This 
addition of troops in conjunction with the increased presence of NATO in the Black Sea 
and increased maritime cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia shows a rejuvenated interest 
in the area, places the U.S. and NATO personnel on the front lines investing both at the 
outset of any hostilities, and brings conventional military assets closer to the Russian 
border—allowing for swifter response and more efficient support to U.S. allies and partners 
in the region, thus strengthening conventional deterrence of gray zone conflict.  
To continue to bolster deterrence, the United States and NATO should work jointly 
to limit the number and effects of deterrence failures by learning from the previous 
shortcomings of conventional and strategic deterrence against Russian aggression. These 
failures provide insight into the risk calculus, appropriate U.S. response, deterrence 
weaknesses, and opportunities for the United States to bolster its deterrent posture at the 
conventional and sub-conventional level. Almong explains that the “implementation of 
cumulative deterrence at the sub-conventional level together with a better conventional 
strategy…might significantly strengthen the overall deterrence posture for the Alliance in 
the end.”251  
By denying Russian objectives and influencing its decision calculus with 
cumulative retaliatory responses for aggressive actions in the gray zone, the United States 
can successfully lower Russian gray zone activities through deterrence. It is crucial to 
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kept on as low a level as possible, but that could not be pushed down to zero.”252 Sub-
conventional gray zone deterrence is not quixotic; it is possible with the right deterrence 
strategy. However, the U.S. view on deterrence success must shift from zero tolerance to 
the notion that deterrence failures provide an opportunity for response and the ability to 
deter similar threats more easily in the future. 
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IV. DETERRING THE GRAY ZONE 
The gray zone is the equivalent of playing three-dimensional chess, where 
you can see the board, but you can’t count the number of other players, and 
you don’t have any rules. 
 —Anthony Cordesman253 
Both Russian and U.S. strategy documents alike recognize that the state of relations 
between the countries has shifted and is characterized by competition. Given this shift, it 
is critical to recognize the need for a changing character of deterrence at the sub-
conventional level. This chapter provides an analysis supporting a proposed strategy for 
the United States to apply in the current security environment to effectively deter Russian 
gray zone conflict, backed by conventional and nuclear forces. The analysis is divided into 
two sections. The first section proposes establishing the conditions necessary for successful 
deterrence, including shifting away from the persistent zero-tolerance deterrent mindset 
and re-establishing communication and diplomacy with Russia. The second section 
explores specific components of deterrence strategy that can be used to counter Russia’s 
gray zone conflict, including deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment, and restoring 
deterrence through escalation to conventional forces. The strategy is based on interviews 
with subject matter experts and supported by current literature.  
The individual components of the strategy include deterrence by denial through 
strengthening alliances, bolstering alliance capacity, collaborating between private and 
government entities, developing state resilience, and increasing U.S. information 
operations. The deterrence-by-punishment portion of the strategy includes all aspects of 
DIME in response to unacceptable gray zone activities, such as physical infiltration of a 
sovereign nation, interference in the democratic process, the use of proxy forces that 
endangers U.S. interests or service members, and any action inconsistent with the 
international norms of responsible state behavior, such as the use of chemical weapons in 
an assassination attempt on European soil. The components of the strategy are best used in 
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conjunction with one another; however, improvement in any of the areas goes toward 
bolstering sub-conventional deterrence of Russian gray zone conflict.  
Although this chapter focuses specifically on a deterrence strategy applied to 
Russia’s gray zone activity, any deterrent strategy must nest within a broader strategic 
national security effort toward Russia. As discussed in the preceding chapter, deterrence 
relationships at different levels of potential conflict can interact with each other in complex 
ways. In some instances, the best gray zone deterrent strategy could be detrimental to the 
overarching policy and national security objectives of the United States. In other instances, 
maintaining strategic stability may make gray zone deterrence harder. Michael Mazarr 
states, “There is a role for deterrence to play in a larger strategy, but it has to be one of the 
number of pieces that must be put into play. There is not an independent deterrent policy 
standing alone that can achieve that goal.”254 To this end, any deterrent strategy presented 
in this research should be analyzed in context with the most current geo-political 
environment and national security objectives before implementation. 
A. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR A DETERRENT STRATEGY  
A necessary condition for deterrent success that is specific to the sub-conventional 
level and the current security environment is a shift in the deterrence mindset away from 
zero tolerance of deterrence failure toward a cumulative deterrence posture that focuses on 
maintaining overarching credibility via tailored responses to targeted gray zone activities 
when deterrence and denial fail. Additionally, for any deterrent strategy to be applied, the 
foundational conditions of deterrence must be in place, including communication and 
diplomacy to provide assurances and alternate options to an adversary. Leon Panetta 
asserts, “Communication with adversaries is imperative to have. It serves to forward human 
relationships that are critical in the ability to create dialogue and keep open lines of 
communication.”255 Since the end of the Cold War, these conditions have deteriorated 
between the United States and Russia, and restoring them is essential.  
 
254 Mazarr, interview with author, December 17, 2019.  
255 Leon Panetta (former secretary of defense, White House chief of staff, and director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency), interview with author, December 16, 2019. 
81 
1. Shifting the Deterrent Mindset 
When applying deterrence to the sub-conventional level, a zero-tolerance approach 
is not appropriate; it is crucial that intermittent failures of deterrence by denial be accepted 
to plan for the punitive strategy that follows. Simply relying on a classic deterrent mindset 
of zero tolerance for failure limits the U.S. ability to respond when deterrence does fail at 
the sub-conventional level. Panetta explains, “The worst thing that the U.S. could do in the 
face of the gray zone is to pretend that because we developed a Cold War approach to 
dealing with the former Soviet Union, somehow that is enough to deal with Russia in the 
21st century.”256  
Punitive measures levied against actions in the gray zone restore deterrence, 
imposing a cost for an action that the United States deems unacceptable and 
communicating the cost to Russia for any similar actions in the future. When the subject 
matter experts were asked what the worst strategy the United States could adopt to deter 
Russian gray zone conflict was, every interviewee responded the same way: “Do 
nothing.”257 Inaction is what a sub-conventional deterrent strategy based on deterrence by 
denial alone would appear to be. Failing to counter Russian gray zone activity when denial 
fails effectively generates the opposite reputational impact of cumulative deterrence, and 
so is detrimental to deterrence and risks escalation. Belinda Bragg explains,  
Inaction in the face of low-level gray actions can, over time, create a “new 
reality” that threatens U.S. interests and security. At that point, reversion to 
the status quo ante will likely require much greater, and more costly actions, 
and may not be possible without the use of military force. Part of the reason 
Russia is choosing to operate in the gray zone is its perception that the U.S. 
will not respond to lower level actions for fear of triggering escalation. U.S. 
failure to develop early, effective response options reinforces this 
perception. An enduring, proactive presence and consistent messaging 
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across all USG [U.S. government] agencies is a significantly superior 
approach to taking select actions in response to Russian aggression.258 
This is not to say that the U.S. should punish every gray zone action that Russia 
pursues; however, by determining what actions it cannot tolerate and being prepared in 
those instances with a reasonable and proportionate punitive response that includes all 
aspects of its state power, Washington can deter certain gray zone actions. Panetta explains, 
“To find a basis on which to deal with Russia, the U.S. must do it from a position of 
strength, which requires making very clear to Russia where the lines are. The U.S. must 
clearly communicate that it will not tolerate the violation of state sovereignty, nor will it 
tolerate Russia interfering in democratic institutions.”259 Mazarr agrees and believes the 
United States can improve its strategy by recognizing what gray zone actions it will not 
tolerate and improving communications with Russia regarding the boundaries of those 
actions.260 
2. Communication 
Communication between the United States and Russia is at an all-time low since 
the end of the Cold War, yet it is a critical element in the framework of deterrence, 
especially at the sub-conventional level, where the cost of action is low and attribution is 
difficult. An effective deterrence strategy relies on Washington’s re-establishing consistent 
communication avenues with Moscow. These avenues must include both strategic and 
sustained communication, each of which has formal and informal components. Effective 
communication allows the United States to employ a dual-pronged deterrent strategy 
utilizing deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment through focusing its punitive 
efforts on key gray zone actions while reserving resources for denial efforts, such as 
resiliency and information operations. Douglas Lute explains, “It’s not enough for the U.S. 
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to have these threats and believe them; in fact, that has no deterrent effect. The critical 
thing is to communicate them in a clear, unambiguous, and consistent way with Russia.”261 
U.S. threats will not be credible if they promise an escalation that Russia is not likely to 
believe.262 Identifying gray zone activities that the United States will not tolerate and 
communicating these limits to Russia bolster the credibility of the punitive threat assigned 
to those actions.  
Michael Kofman explains, “In this area of great power competition, the U.S. needs 
a robust mechanism for signaling its deterrent threats and assurances to Russia.”263 
Kofman goes on to explain that it is also imperative for the United States to communicate 
as a unitary actor with a disciplined public policy establishment that considers what and to 
whom it should be communicated.264 In an era of rapid technological growth that allows 
anyone, including government figures, to publish instantaneously on multiple 
communication formats, such as social media, there is a risk of undisciplined 
communication with adversaries if the individuals in the establishment are not disciplined. 
Additionally, Kofman explains that the United States “must develop channels of signaling 
across multiple levels with Russia to ensure that the deterrent strategy, threat, assurance, 
and diplomatic alternatives are communicated and received correctly.”265 Re-establishing 
a persistent and institutionalized form of communication with Russia will enable the states 
to build a modicum of trust that the diplomatic alternative routes being provided are 
legitimate and will be honored.  
Not only does the United States need to re-establish communication with Russia, 
but it also needs to improve communication internally. Panetta explains, “A crucial aspect 
to deterrence is political leadership that recognizes the threat that Russia represents, speaks 
to that threat, encourages discourse, and defines the areas of conflict in order to mobilize 
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the efforts needed to deter the gray zone activity.”266 Internal communication among 
policy makers and political leadership is essential to a coherent message to U.S. 
adversaries. Communication with the American public is crucial to counter the 
disinformation that Russia is propagating, and communication with U.S. allies is required 
to form a united front working toward diplomatic solutions to Russia’s gray zone actions.  
a. Options for Strategic Communication 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, NATO, and Russia have had 
established lines of strategic communication. As detailed in Chapter II, today, only a 
limited few remain, and of those, most are not being used to signal to Russia a coherent 
and consistent message. Strategic communication, such as published policy, speeches, 
public statements, and social media, can indicate U.S. red lines and security assurance in 
the gray zone. Declaratory policy, such as the U.S. National Security Strategy, National 
Defense Strategy, and the Nuclear Posture Review, has an important role; however, these 
documents serve only as a snapshot into U.S. decision-making and policy and do not get 
to the heart of altering Russia’s decision calculus at the sub-conventional level.  
The gray zone, by design, operates below the level of warfare that many of these 
documents address. To improve the effectiveness of these documents in addressing gray 
zone conflict, Guillaume Lasconjarias of the NATO Defense College suggests “review 
[ing], moderniz [ing] and updat [ing] planning documents, in order to take stock of new 
threats and start exercising them accordingly with a view to showing our resilience.”267 
The United States could add a section to its policy documents dedicated to sub-
conventional conflict in which it signals its resolve in using punitive measures for any 
adversary willing to cross those lines. The statements could convey clear red lines or 
maintain a level of vagueness and ambiguity to leave something to chance in the 
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adversary’s decision calculus, depending on whether specificity or ambiguity would be a 
more effective deterrence posture given the circumstances.  
A less formal avenue of declaratory policy that can be used to communicate 
comprises speeches and published articles by political leadership. NATO, for example, has 
used this communication avenue to establish a deterrent against cyberattacks by 
highlighting efforts to increase alliance cyber resilience and threatening the punitive 
enactment of Article 5. In May 2018, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg gave a 
speech at the Cyber Defence Pledge Conference in which he stated, “NATO leaders agreed 
that a cyber-attack could trigger Article 5 of our founding treaty.”268 Stoltenberg went on 
to proclaim, 
Being strong in cyberspace is as important for our deterrence as our 
conventional forces have always been. By making cyber a domain, 
encouraging Allies to develop their own cyber capabilities, and agreeing 
that a cyber-attack can trigger an Article 5 response, we can make the 
potential cost of action by an aggressor high. And, in that way, strengthen 
our deterrence, defence and resilience in cyberspace.269  
The use of public speeches allows the United States and its allies to communicate 
relevant policies, deterrence threats, and denial initiatives without the formal process of 
publishing an official policy document, which takes an abundance of time and resources 
and generates fewer flexible postures. Speeches and published articles also allow for 
collaboration between the United States and its partners, such as NATO, to present a 
stronger deterrent to Russia with a united collective message. This, however, requires 
coordination and concurrence, which is not always seen in U.S. policy communication with 
Russia.  
Another communication avenue comprises public statements by political officials 
in response to punctuating and troubling events. In October 2019, Russia carried out a 
cyberattack on Georgia in which it disrupted operations of websites and major television 
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stations. In response, the United States, along with its allies and partners, released a press 
statement condemning Russia’s actions. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attributed the attack 
to Russia, condemned its behavior as being inconsistent with a “responsible actor,” and called 
on Russia to cease the behavior. Moreover Pompeo pledged “support to Georgia and its people 
in enhancing their cybersecurity and countering malicious cyber actors . . . [and] offered 
additional capacity building and technical assistance to help strengthen Georgia’s public 
institutions and improve its ability to protect itself from these kinds of activities.”270 The 
statement served to communicate to Russia the reinforcement of red lines, such as violating 
U.S. or NATO state sovereignty, but it also served to publicly attribute the attack to Russia. An 
issue for deterrence in the gray zone is that Russia aims to hide behind the ambiguity it creates 
to avoid reprisal for its actions. During a recent workshop at Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, experts reiterated the point made by recent literature: since the Russian NotPetya 
cyberattack, the United States has gotten more comfortable attributing cyber actions, which 
in turn makes it easier to deter or punish such actions in the gray zone.271  
A less formal, although increasingly popular, form of public statement is through 
social media. President Trump uses social media to make statements on U.S. policy, which 
if tied into an overarching deterrent policy or strategy toward Russia, could be used to 
forward a coherent message to Russia. The expedient nature of posting on social media can 
fill a void to address urgent and emerging issues that the United States should address but 
that cannot wait for the publication cycle of an official policy or the process of producing 
and scheduling an official statement.  
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b. Options for Sustained Communication 
Effective deterrence requires sustainable communication avenues beyond 
declaratory policy and statements, which give Washington and Moscow an avenue to 
normalize communication through repetitive interactions on a predictable schedule. Before 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, diplomatic, military, and crisis communication was 
common practice; now, it is “no business as usual” between the United States and Russia, 
which is detrimental to deterrence.  
One option for re-establishing diplomatic communication is to utilize the existing 
framework for communication. Lute suggests reinvigorating the use of the U.S. 
ambassador to Russia, utilizing the NATO–Russia Council (NRC), encouraging a 
discussion between Russia and NATO about reinstating a Russian ambassador to NATO, 
and re-establishing the Russian liaison at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE). As detailed in Chapter II these positions were suspended and their personnel 
restricted after the invasion of Crimea as a message that the international norm of 
respecting a state sovereignty must be upheld. It is imperative to both deterrence of future 
similar events and the integrity of state sovereignty in the international system that this 
norm be upheld; however, without communication avenues with adversaries, these issues 
cannot be addressed. The re-establishment of ambassador-level discourse does not 
endanger the norm; to the contrary, it allows the United States and NATO to communicate 
its importance. 
The suggestions detailed by Douglas Lute are very feasible and could be 
implemented quickly as an immediate bolstering effect to U.S. deterrence. The 
implementation or re-establishment of ambassadors and liaisons is simply personnel and 
access management. The positions remain. Russia currently has two ambassadors located 
near NATO headquarters in Brussels, one to the European Union and one to Belgium. Lute 
suggests that one of the ambassadors could be dual-hatted as the NATO ambassador.272 
This would aid not only in communication with the United States and NATO but also in 
the solidarity of the communication between the United States and Europe through the EU.  
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In NATO, the NRC still meets on a somewhat regular basis, four out of five 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) are in attendance, and the 
allied member nations take the forum seriously. The meetings are not without tension due 
to the tentative nature of the relationship between Russia and the alliance; however, it 
serves as a forum to bring together nuclear and non-nuclear allies to engage in a broader 
dialogue with Russia that they could not have on their own. The approach of strength in 
numbers can be leveraged in the NRC to address issues with Russian gray zone operations 
on a united front with a coherent allied message, which will aid in denying Russia’s end 
goal of fracturing the U.S.–NATO alliance. The NRC also allows the United States to make 
steps in communication with Russia that it could not do on its own because of the limited 
political communication avenues remaining. In using the established NRC forum, 
Washington and Moscow can bypass the issues related to convening a bi-lateral summit, 
such as the public perception of diplomacy with an adversary that has been demonized 
among the American public, the will of either state leadership to meet, or simply the 
logistics of coordinating a physical meeting. 
Despite the plummeting political relations between the United States and Russia, 
military communication has remained, even if in a limited fashion. Military contact has 
served as a mainstay of communication between the states since 2014 and the expulsion of 
many Russian diplomats. At the top levels of military leadership, the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army General Mark Milley, and the Russian chief of the General 
Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, continue a limited but regular dialogue. Ulrich Kühn 
argues, “NATO should aim to re-establish . . . communications channels with the Russian 
General Staff at the working level.”273 The top-level interaction is a positive foothold in 
U.S.–Russian communication; however, more frequent communication is needed. 
Recently, the interaction between the top levels has increased, including a physical meeting 
in Switzerland “aimed at increasing communication between their nations to reduce risks 
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in conflict areas.”274 Efforts are in place to improve military communication and could be 
enhanced through the replacement of the Russian liaison at SHAPE and by acting on 
Kühn’s suggestion of re-establishing working-level military communication. These 
improvements to military communication could set the framework of positive relations 
between the states to usher in future consistent diplomatic communication, which is crucial 
for deterrence.  
In addition to diplomatic and military communication, communication during a 
crisis is critical in the maintenance of a deterrent posture. Just after the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a 1963 memorandum of 
understanding that established a direct link between the two states. The “hotline,” as it was 
called, was “a quick communication link between heads of states . . . designed to reduce 
the danger of an accident, miscalculation or a surprise attack.”275 The hotline was used 
multiple times throughout history and has since been transitioned to the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Center, where its role has been expanded to include providing an 
communication between the United States and Russia for “the exchange of notifications 
under treaties, goodwill notifications, and for emergency communication during a major 
fire in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.”276 Although the hotline was established to prevent 
crisis and escalation to nuclear war, it has proven an effective means of communication 
during both crisis and stability between Washington and Moscow. Robert Gates, former 
CIA director and defense secretary, stated that the hotline is a critical tool “as long as these 
two sides have submarines roaming the oceans and missiles pointed at each other.”277  
In today’s context, where most of the conflict between great powers is conducted 
below the level of conflict for which the hotline was created, the hotline’s utility can be 
expanded as a tool to re-establish communication and broaden communication to include 
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immediate gray zone issues. Considering the increased risk of miscalculation based on the 
current lack of communication and the ability for gray zone operations to escalate, a crisis 
hotline is a rational and effective communication avenue that is already established and can 
be immediately utilized to kick-start communication. The communication can even start 
within the parameters of the existing framework of the NRC to encourage discourse and 
submit proposals or grievances over the extension of New START.  
3. Diplomacy  
Through diplomacy, it is possible for the United States and Russia to build lasting 
cooperation through formal agreements, mutual interests, and established codes of conduct. 
This section explores both formal and informal diplomacy followed by a discussion of U.S. 
and Russian common interests detailing specific categories in which diplomacy could be 
renewed. However, diplomacy must be a first-line option supported by credible threats of 
denial and punishment. Anthony Cordesman explains, “The one thing that you cannot do 
is use diplomacy as a substitute for countermeasures.”278 It is critical to recognize that 
every effort spent toward diplomacy can help stabilize U.S.–Russian relations at the 
nuclear and conventional level. Improved stability at these levels can alleviate tension and 
reveal where instability is still present at the sub-conventional level.  
Washington must operate from a place of strength to affect Putin’s cost–benefit 
analysis through deterrence by denial, supported by punishment, while also giving him a 
diplomatic alternative. Brad Roberts explains that during his time with the Obama 
administration, it was clear that “President Putin concluded that there was a fundamental 
conflict of interest with the United States, that it was a zero-sum game. The U.S. was 
pursuing interests against Russia that were simply unacceptable to President Putin, and as 
such, he reconceived a relationship of enduring conflict.”279 As described in earlier 
chapters, the United States attempted to demonstrate that Putin had taken too dark a view 
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of American interests and through diplomatic opportunities sought to pursue mutual 
interests and pragmatic cooperation in various areas; however, the efforts failed. Roberts 
explains that this conflictual relationship does not have to be inevitable: “It is a matter of 
political calculus emanating from a particular person at a particular time.”280 This would 
suggest that to restore diplomatic cooperation with Russia, Putin’s decision calculus must 
be influenced to convince him that it is in his best interest.  
Cordesman illustrates that “the U.S. tends to deal with Russia in terms of the sticks 
and often does not have a well-defined set of carrots.”281 Cordesman goes on to explain 
that a necessary addition is “offering a well-defined alternative in terms of cooperation 
where the U.S. and Russia both benefit.”282 Operating a deterrent strategy solely on 
punishment threats is dangerous because, although it is imperative to signal to Russia that 
there are penalties for misbehavior, the United States must also signal assurance for 
compliance. With established communication, diplomacy will facilitate not only that 
acceptable alternative but also aspire to build formal and informal agreements that bound 
sub-conventional conflict, decrease the risk or escalation, and provide insight toward an 
adversary’s intent.  
a. Formal Diplomacy 
Formal diplomacy between the United States and the Soviet Union, and now 
Russia, has been a stabilizing force in the bilateral relationship since the Cold War and, 
furthermore, has contributed to the safety and security of the international security 
environment. Treaties and confidence-building measures that modify behavior set the 
standard for how states conduct business, and develop trust. The Open Skies Treaty, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and arms control have been staples of the U.S.–Russian 
relationship. While some diplomatic measures are still in place, or followed even if they 
have not been ratified, the erosion of formal diplomacy in recent years has reduced the trust 
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and communication between the United States and Russia, causing a destabilizing effect 
on deterrence, specifically in the sub-conventional level.  
To deter Russian gray zone aggression, many subject matter experts suggest 
reinvigorating efforts to extend New START. The treaty between the United States and 
Russia, which entered into force in February 2011, sets “measures for the further reduction 
and limitation of strategic offensive arms.”283 The treaty also provides confidence-
building measures that encourage transparency such as on-site inspections, data exchanges, 
notifications, and the exchange of predicted yearly numbers of ballistic missiles (both sea 
and land based).284 Panetta suggests, “The U.S. should not only reignite interest in 
extending the New START treaty, but also in developing an improved agreement for the 
future, one that possibly includes the cyber domain and future weapons.”285 Since the 
dissolution of the INF in 2019, the bilateral New START is the last remaining formal arms 
control measure between the United States and Russia and is key in keeping formal 
diplomatic relations afloat.  
Even if New START is not extended, discussions over the treaty’s contents could 
be used to spur discussion on a new arms control treaty or, at the very least, a broader 
discussion and effort toward multilateral arms control. Kühn explains that discussions 
about arms control are “particularly important since the strategic nuclear dialogue between 
Washington and Moscow effectively petered out after the New START entered into force 
in 2011.”286 Kühn suggests, “Reconvening NATO–Russian talks about military strategy 
and nuclear doctrine, which had been ongoing prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 
could help dispel misperceptions and thus avoid inadvertent escalation.”287 As the time-
tested formula for risk reduction is deterrence plus diplomacy, Kühn’s suggestion to 
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reconvene NATO–Russian communication, combined with U.S.–Russian efforts toward 
New START or a similar treaty, would likely bolster deterrence of the gray zone. 
These efforts to reinstate formal diplomacy would emphasize the U.S. resolve 
toward diplomacy and simultaneously signal to Russia that the use or threat of tactical 
nuclear weapons is not in its interest as a state.288 By addressing the unacceptable use of 
tactical nuclear weapons in the context of arms control, Washington has a forum to address 
the issue while it reaffirms the nuclear taboo and communicates to Moscow that any use of 
a nuclear weapon will be met with grave U.S. and international consequences. This 
reaffirmation of non-use drives the U.S.–Russian conflict back to the sub-conventional 
level, allowing the United States to focus resources and diplomacy efforts on the gray zone. 
In a situation where the United States and Russia do not extend New START, 
formal diplomacy could be achieved through a unilateral approach. To show commitment 
and a willingness for diplomacy, the United States could make a public commitment to 
data exchanges and inspections in line with what would have occurred if New START had 
been extended. The United States could also make a public commitment to maintaining the 
limited number of weapons designated by New START. These commitments would foster 
an environment ripe for continued formal negotiations of a future arms agreement between 
the United States and Russia as well as open the path to informal diplomacy between the 
states. 
Overall, formal diplomacy should parallel the efforts suggested for communication 
including the use of the existing diplomatic framework such as the NATO–Russia Council, 
the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, and ambassador and liaison positions to NATO, the 
EU, and SHAPE. These established avenues are the fastest and most acceptable way to 
reinvigorate desperately needed diplomacy between the United States and Russia. In the 
beginning of the rebuilding, the topic of diplomacy is less important than the act of 
reinvigorating it. The United States and even NATO need to take a hard look at where they 
can afford to relax the approach to ostracize Russia from diplomatic lanes while 
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maintaining their position of strength and staunch protest of egregious Russian behavior 
that is inconsistent with responsible state behavior.  
b. Informal Diplomacy 
Without the robust structure of formal treaties between the United States and 
Russia, many experts believe that a normative approach to confidence-building measures 
and diplomacy could fill the void, reassert a modicum of trust between the states, and help 
bolster deterrence. This section first discusses the nature of informal diplomacy and follows 
with specific examples of how it can be applied. A norms-based approach lends better to 
multilateralism and requires less time and fewer resources to gain support and traction in a 
wide variety of states and communities. In the current security environment filled with 
tension and distrust, formal diplomacy is limited at best. Starting with a norms-based 
approach that establishes touchpoints and “easy wins” for the United States, Russia, and 
the international community could pave the way for more formal diplomacy in the future.  
Informal diplomacy is not new; it is a time-tested approach that has gone hand-in-
hand with formal diplomacy for centuries. One of the most influential informal confidence-
building measures is the Vienna Document, which was adopted in 1990.289 The document 
requires that participating states of the OSCE, of which the United States and Russia are 
part, to exchange information on a host of different topics. Topics include such items as 
the exchange of military information, defense planning, prior notification of military 
activities, and agreement to inspections and visits. Recently, with its gray zone activities, 
Russia has begun to erode the sanctity of this agreement. Informal diplomacy has also taken 
the form of codes of conduct. Twenty-five years ago, the Stimson Center issued a code of 
conduct for space, and the EU drafted a similar code of conduct during the Obama 
administration. Although the EU code of conduct was not well received, it did stimulate 
dialogue over the issue; such a normative approach today would be an improvement to the 
current situation.  
 
289 Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened 
in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, November 17, 1990, https://www.osce.org/fsc/
41245?download=true. 
95 
History has also shown that when patterns of behavior are established before a 
crisis, the behavior has held during the crisis. A good example is the 1988 agreement on 
ballistic missile launches between the Washington and Moscow. The confidence-building 
measures in place before then had covered some but not all launches. In 1988, both states 
signed an agreement to provide advance notification for all ballistic missile launches, 
including from submarines.290 Additionally, even when the established behaviors do not 
hold, they provide a signal of adversarial intent that can serve as an early warning or proof 
of malicious behavior. For example, before the invasion of Crimea, Russia ceased to 
comply with the Vienna Document by failing to provide notification of troop maneuvers. 
Such an indication of non-compliance with normative behavior gives the Washington time 
to communicate red lines, a deterrent threat, and negative security assurances for 
compliance, therefore strengthening the chances of deterrence success.  
Examples of how informal diplomacy can be applied in today’s environment 
include standards of conduct regarding sovereignty, mutually moderating gray zone 
activity, and reinvigorated informal agreements. Since the Helsinki Final Act of 1945, the 
international norm of respecting a state’s sovereignty has been upheld. Russia openly 
challenged this norm through its illegal annexation of Crimea, cyberattack on Georgia, and 
information campaigns to spread disinformation and sow unrest to disrupts borders. One 
of the high-end issues of the gray zone that the United States would want to deter in the 
future is the violation of state sovereignty. The re-establishment of the norm for respecting 
state sovereignty could aid in deterring gray zone actions such as proxy forces and “little 
green men.”  
The issue, as Kofman explains it, is that Russia and the United States have 
fundamental differences in their normative outlooks on international politics and 
sovereignty.291 Kofman elaborates that Russia believes that state sovereignty is hierarchal, 
that countries have a spectrum of sovereignty, and that the only countries with true 
 
290 Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, 
U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 31, 1988, T.I.A.S., https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/187150.htm. 
291 Kofman, interview with author, October 23, 2019. 
96 
sovereignty are great powers. All other countries below great powers, Russia believes, have 
less sovereignty—small or weak states have the least sovereignty—so smaller or weaker 
states must abide by what the great power states tell them to do.292 Russia treats states such 
as Georgia and Ukraine as weaker states having less sovereignty and makes efforts to 
regulate these states’ behavior, such as forbidding them from joining NATO. If 
Washington wants to deter Moscow from violating other states’ sovereignty in the future, 
it is critical that it recognizes this fundamental difference in viewpoint and addresses it 
accordingly. To that end, David Holloway highlights a vital point to the success of 
diplomacy between the United States and Russia: “The U.S. cannot pretend that Russia is 
not a great power. . . . For cultural and historical reasons, Russia should have some say in 
what goes on in its region.”293 To ignore Russia’s status as a great power, and to deny it a 
modicum of influence in the region, is in danger of being provocative.294 It is essential that 
the United States balances preserving the norm of state sovereignty with recognizing 
Russia as a great power. To do this, the United States must be willing to include Russia in 
diplomatic affairs that affect its geographical region. This is not to say that the Washington 
should allow Moscow to dictate the fate of every state and issue in the region; however, it 
is to highlight that Russia should be a player in the decision-making process.  
To strike this delicate balance, the United States must act from a position of strength 
derived from the willingness to punish Russian actions that violate state sovereignty 
combined with a diplomatic solution that Russia sees as advantageous. The United States 
has recently made progress on the ability and willingness to respond to Russian aggression 
in the gray zone through punishment by publicly attributing cyber actions to Russia and 
taking punitive action in response, as previously mentioned. Continued deterrence by 
punishment accompanied by diplomacy is the best way for the United States to deter future 
Russian sovereignty violations. Kofman suggests, “If the U.S. and Russia could set standards 
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of conduct regarding sovereignty, it would go a long way toward granting Russia the 
legitimacy as a great power in the international system that it so desires.”295  
Specifically related to the deterrence of the gray zone, Mazarr believes that there is 
an opportunity to establish an implicit agreement between the United States and Russia to 
moderate gray zone activities.296 As shown in earlier chapters, Russia is concerned about 
the United States’ influencing Russian populations and inciting color revolutions. This 
threat perception gives Washington a bargaining tool toward an agreement with Moscow 
to moderate its behavior. The United States could offer to stop promoting democratic 
activities in Russia, such as support for pro-democratic, non-profit agencies in Russia, in 
exchange for Russia’s agreeing to cease all information campaigns and interference in 
democratic processes in the United States and allied nations. This agreement would require 
verification and monitoring by the United States, which could be achieved through 
partnership with private organizations capable of identifying disinformation and cyber 
meddling, as well as an in increase in U.S. government intelligence resources. The 
agreement is feasible because it gives Russia something that it values in exchange for 
something that it can agree to stop doing. The code of conduct agreement would not deter 
all gray zone activities, but it would aid in denying one of Russia’s ends by limiting its 
ability to degrade U.S. democratic institutions. The United States could further apply 
deterrence by denial if Russia violates the agreement because a violation would give further 
credit to the U.S. resolve to use its deterrence-by-punishment threats and could affect 
Russia’s decision calculus toward the action.  
There is also an opportunity to reinvigorate already established informal 
agreements such as the Vienna Document. Kühn states, “Modernizing the OSCE’s Vienna 
Document . . . might be achievable even in the current environment.”297 Lute comments 
that the Vienna Document “sets up rules of the road for security arrangements in Europe, 
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and established elements of stability at the conventional level.”298 In an environment of 
great power competition where Russia feels that the security environment is not structured 
fairly, it has violated this agreement repeatedly. Lute suggests opening diplomatic talks 
with Russia and simply asking whether it has suggestions to make the agreement better. 
What does it suggest?299 Although the security environment is tense—recall from Chapter 
II that one of Russia’s strategic goals is to be seen as a great power—the support and 
reinvigoration of the Vienna Document, with Russia as a supporter, would go a long way 
toward that goal. The United States could easily allow Russia to take the lead on the effort 
and show its support for the initiative, giving legitimacy to Russian actions as a great power 
while simultaneously confirming that great powers adhere to a code of conduct, such as 
the Vienna Document, which restricts higher-end gray zone activity such as proxy forces, 
little green men, and ambiguous nefarious behavior.  
c. Common Interests 
Significant cooperation requires that Washington and Moscow have common 
interests that are advantageous in some way to both states. In the current adversarial 
relationship between the states, it might seem those interests are limited; however, there 
are many more obvious interests at first glance. The 2019 Strategic Multilayer Assessment 
of Russian strategic intentions found that the United States and Russia do share common 
interests whereby deeper diplomacy could be rebuilt. These common interests include the 
Middle East; the fight against terrorism and jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIL; 
and nuclear counterproliferation.300  
The assessment points out that “unlike the Soviet Union which often sought to 
undermine Middle Eastern governments allied to the US, Putin’s Russia basically supports 
them all.”301 The assessment continues, saying that there is space for cooperation between 
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the United States and Russia in the Middle East; however, even though “Moscow genuinely 
fears Sunni jihadists, it seems much less interested in combating them (either by itself or 
with the US) than in buck-passing.”302 Russia might not want to spend its finite resources 
on fighting terrorism; however, Chapter II showed that it sees terrorist groups moving into 
Russia as a threat to the state and might be willing to engage in diplomatic cooperation 
with the United States on those terms.303 
Common interests also exist in establishing codes of conduct. Kühn suggests, 
“Initial talks about avoiding accidental escalation should aim at commonly agreed-upon 
and adhered-to rules for preventing accidents in the busy civilian and military airspace over 
the Baltic Sea.”304 Kühn continues, saying that “more ambitiously, Washington and 
Moscow should make continuous use of the readily available bilateral U.S.–Russian 
Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities.”305 By utilizing already 
established informal agreements, the United States and Russia can take advantage of these 
shared interests to rebuild the diplomatic avenues necessary for deterrence. Other areas 
such as space and cyber space were suggested by multiple subject matter experts, including 
David Holloway and Leon Panetta, as a potential arena for diplomatic cooperation to 
develop an agreed-upon code of conduct.306 Similar products have been developed by 
private industry leaders such as Microsoft and could be used as a starting point for a 
multilateral informal agreement. NATO is an ideal format for the United States to gain 
leverage for such a proposal and then approach Russia with the suggestion at the NRC.  
Other identified areas of mutual interest that could lead to productive diplomacy 
and cooperation are arms control, non-proliferation, safety and security of nuclear 
weapons, the desire for transparency, cyber space, future weapons, trade exchanges, 
terrorism, normative behavior, and the energy sector. In the arms control sector, the United 
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States and Russia could establish a formal or informal system to constrain intermediate 
range systems. The framework could allow both states to verify whether systems have 
nuclear or non-nuclear warheads, thus improving transparency and trust between the states. 
Each of these topics has an aspect that interests both the United States and Russia and could 
be used to open dialogue and further positive relations. But the effort from the United States 
and the willingness to receive the effort from Russia must be there, which requires 
communication and consistency.  
B. SUB-CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE  
A deterrent strategy toward Russia’s gray zone aggression requires an approach 
that crosses all elements of U.S. state power, focuses on shaping the adversary’s cost–
benefit decision calculus, and induces restraint in the long-term use of sub-conventional 
aggression. Roberts explains, “We need an approach to deterrence suited to the landscape 
in front of us, not the one we inherited from the 25-year period after the Cold War.”307 
Steven Pifer concurs: “The U.S. does a good job deterring Russia at the nuclear and 
conventional level. In state-on-state fighting, the U.S. has both doctrine and visible forces 
presented in a way that Russia understands. At the sub-conventional level, it is imperative 
that the U.S. build a parallel structure to compete in this area.”308  
The current landscape of great power competition is wrought with sub-conventional 
conflict, and the National Defense Strategy recognizes that countering this type of 
aggression requires all instruments of national power.309 Focusing on Russia’s ends 
enables the United States to employ a proactive deterrence-by-denial strategy, which is 
then supported and strengthened by punishment when deterrence by denial fails. U.S. 
attempts to apply a deterrent strategy to the ways and means employed by Russia risks 
operating a purely reactive strategy unable to keep pace with Russia’s ability to take 
advantage of emerging opportunities. Bragg explains, “Rather than focus on specific means 
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(which will continue to change), U.S. capabilities should focus on ends such as containing 
Russian influence and maintaining an international system consistent with U.S. 
interests.”310 A focus on ends, rather than ways and means, is another sharp break from 
strategic nuclear deterrence frameworks and is consistent with a shift from a zero-tolerance 
standard to a “cumulative deterrence” approach.  
Recall from Chapter II that Russia’s strategic ends include protecting the regime 
and state, gaining geopolitical dominance, being recognized as a great power, renegotiating 
the European security architecture, and weakening the cohesion of NATO and U.S. 
involvement.311 A U.S. strategy of deterrence against Russian gray zone conflict need only 
deter two of these four strategic ends: renegotiating the European security order and 
weakening the cohesion of NATO and U.S. involvement. This research has shown most of 
the literature and subject matter experts agree that although Russia is now much weaker 
than the United States as a state, it is still a great power. Recognizing this fact is something 
that the United States could use to leverage compliance with desired actions by Russia in 
the gray zone. If Russia is recognized as a great power on the international stage, it suggests 
that Russia accepts the norms of responsible state behavior and justified consequences by 
the international community when they are not followed. The following subsections 
describe in detail how both deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment can be 
established at the sub-conventional level.  
1. Sub-conventional Deterrence by Denial 
Success of deterrence by denial relies on focusing U.S. instruments of power on 
deterring Russia’s end goals rather than the means it uses to achieve them.312 A deterrence-
by-denial strategy applied to the sub-conventional level against Russia includes 
reinvigorating alliances, strengthening ally capacity, fostering collaboration between the 
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U.S. government and the private sector, developing societal and infrastructure resilience, 
and reforming U.S. information operations.  
a. Alliances  
Through the nurturing of alliances, the United States can amplify its strengths, 
further its power projection, and increase its influence far beyond what Russia can counter. 
Throughout the research and the interviews, it was clear that a unilateral approach to the 
United States’ deterring Russian gray zone aggression was not the most effective strategy, 
and it might not be successful. Mazarr explains, “The U.S. cannot deter Russia’s gray zone 
by itself; it needs allies and partners because, in most cases, the U.S. is not the target of the 
gray zone actions—our partners are. If the targets of the aggression are not on board with 
the deterrent strategy, then it is not sustainable.”313 Panetta explains, “The U.S. and NATO 
must operate from a position of allied strength, with a unity of mission, and consistently 
meet to discuss a cohesive strategy against the gray zone and hybrid warfare. The gray 
zone needs to be a priority for the U.S. and NATO.”314  
Many of the subject matter experts believe that the key to a successful deterrent 
strategy against Russian gray zone conflict is political solidarity and cohesion. Holloway 
explains that the disarray of NATO and the instability of NATO states are the greatest 
threat to deterrence of Russian aggression.315 Holloway recalls that during the Cold War, 
the Marshall Plan was created on the basis of sustaining economic growth in Western 
European countries, and that was the best deterrent to the Soviet Union.316 Today, a 
deterrence strategy of Russia’s gray zone aggression that focuses on Russia’s end goals 
would prioritize denying the fracturing of the NATO alliance and U.S.–NATO cohesion. 
A unified NATO and strong U.S. alliance are necessary for a deterrence-by-denial strategy 
of this Russian strategic end.  
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To do this, NATO, including the United States, must discuss on a regular basis the 
threat that Russia poses, come to a consensus on what it will not tolerate in the gray zone, 
and plan appropriate responses to such actions. Recently, NATO and the United States 
have begun such efforts through the NATO secretary’s announcement that NATO could 
consider a cyberattack an armed attack and enact Article 5 and the recent increased 
attention that NATO has given to “hybrid warfare” in its doctrine and speeches. These 
efforts show that NATO and the United States are taking sub-conventional threats 
seriously; however, more work needs to be done to ensure member states are in consensus 
and have the solidarity, commitment, and political ties necessary to deny Russia’s desire 
to fracture the alliance. To achieve these goals, Lute recommends “fostering the 
cohesiveness of NATO, signing the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, where 12 
democracies collaborate on a free trade arrangement, and improving trade relations with 
the EU, which together with the U.S. represents 50 percent of the world GDP.”317  
Deterrence by denial of Russia’s end goal also relies on European and Western 
cohesion. NATO and the EU share 22 member states, intertwining the organizations and 
providing an avenue for strengthening the two European institutions. Lute explains that a 
significant amount of responsibility for the avenues used to resist sub-conventional 
aggression, such as cyber resilience, national resilience, protection of borders, and energy 
diversification, falls on the EU.318 This fact makes the synchronization and collaboration 
of NATO and the EU crucial to the deterrence-by-denial strategy. For example, when the 
EU develops cyber standards for its member states, those same standards should reflect in 
NATO as well.  
b. Strengthening Ally Capacity and Resilience 
Strengthening the capacity of U.S. allies promotes the deterrence of multiple 
Russian gray zone actions including military proxy forces, meddling in democratic 
processes, and disinformation campaigns to sow unrest. Roman Pyatkov asserts that to 
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counter Russian proxy forces, “the United States can increase the capabilities of allies and 
partners through training and equipment as being done now in Ukraine.”319 Training and 
equipping allied partners to improve their ability to defend their own borders bolster 
deterrence through the credibility of physically denying an objective; however, physical 
denial is only a small piece of the strategy. The United States can also increase its allies’ 
capacity through technical assistance and funding that can be leveraged to build or improve 
their ability to detect and counter Russian disinformation. A state’s aim should be to 
produce a counternarrative to the propaganda, highlighting the facts and identifying the 
propaganda. Through information sharing between allied governments and civilian 
organizations, the United States and NATO can assist in educating the public about the 
influence Russia is attempting to gain, which bolsters credibility for host nation 
governments and strengthens democratic institutions.  
In the same spirit, identifying Russian propaganda can reduce the risk of domestic 
unrest and deny Russia’s end of fracturing the NATO alliance. Much Russian 
disinformation and propaganda target minority populations, and a risk to the NATO 
alliance would be this type of tactic directed at NATO member states such as Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. As Kühn explains,  
Civilian resilience measures are better tools for dealing with most of 
Russia’s NGW [new-generation warfare] tactics. In particular, increasing 
the resilience of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states to Russian propaganda 
should become a key feature of NATO policy. The example of Ukraine, 
though very different compared to the three Baltic states, shows that 
existing ethnopolitical tensions can serve as a gateway for Russian 
intervention.320  
This type of attack would challenge the NATO alliance’s fortitude in heeding the call of a 
member state that asks for help against a threat that does not meet the Article 5 standard. 
However, NATO must prepare its member states beyond military resilience by improving 
 
319 Roman Pyatkov, “Potential Global Actions to Counter Provocative Russian Activities,” in Russian 
Strategic Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) White Paper, ed. Nicole Peterson 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 2019), 93, https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016b-
a5a1-d241-adff-fdf908e00001. 
320 Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics, 60. 
105 
their capabilities to detect and attribute disinformation. To do this, NATO must make state 
resilience a priority. Kühn provides another similar suggestion for NATO: to “closely 
monitor the state of integration, rights, and treatment of Russian minorities in the Baltics, 
and to intervene, perhaps through a special civilian monitoring and advisory mission, in 
cases of concern.”321 This type of organization could communicate NATO’s resolve to 
identify and deter these types of actions.  
The United States can also strengthen its allies’ capability and resilience through 
economic means, particularly, by reducing their reliance on Russian energy sources. A 
2019 report suggests that “by collaborating with the European Union (EU), it [the United 
States] should finalize a bilateral trade agreement that not only bolsters the economies of 
its allies but also weakens Russia’s capacity for economic coercion.”322 Trade agreements 
with the EU bolster the economic independence of NATO and U.S. allies while reducing 
Russia’s economic growth potential. The report also suggests that these trade agreements 
would only be strengthened with economic assistance to former Soviet bloc states to 
diminish their dependence on Russian assistance.  
Pyatkov explains, “Russia presents a challenge in the unique way it uses its state-
owned hydrocarbon companies to pursue political objectives.”323 Currently, some 
European states are vulnerable to coercion and even harassment from Russia due to their 
energy independence. Jason Werchan, strategy program manager for the Russia Strategic 
Initiative, elaborates:  
Thirteen Eastern European countries rely on Russia to provide 75% or more 
of total natural gas imports, and many of these countries have no domestic 
natural gas production. Russia also provides Europe with roughly 32% of 
its total energy imports, with five countries (Belarus, Bulgaria, Finland, 
Lithuania, and Poland) reliant on Russia for more than 70% of their total 
imports. Russia has used this dependence as a tool to affect U.S. partner and 
ally decision-making, or as a punitive response to decisions made by nations 
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not aligned with Russian interests. Russian presence, market share, and 
ownership in European energy sectors are often followed by illicit activities, 
bribery, and corruption.324 
Providing U.S. allies in Europe with an alternative to Russian energy removes the leverage 
and influence Russia has over those states. This is not a cheap or fast strategy; however, by 
diversifying energy sources or investing in alternative energy for European allies, the 
United States and NATO can arrest Russian influence and bolster European cohesion 
through a shared interest of energy independence in the long term. This avenue would be 
a costly but worthy undertaking toward the deterrence of Russian sub-conventional 
aggression against smaller NATO allies. This tactic does not suggest denying Russia the 
status of a great power or regional sway; it is only to reinforce deterrence toward Russia 
vis-à-vis NATO states in the region. Werchan suggests increasing authorities and resources 
for the United States that would “prioritize securing shipping lanes and commerce globally 
to allow for the free flow of crude oil, liquid fuels, coal, and greater quantities of liquid 
natural gas.”325 
There is proof that these alliances can deter Russian gray zone conflict. Ariel Cohen 
indicates that in Georgia, “in 2008, the Russians intended to remove the Saakashvili regime 
and take Tbilisi. They failed to do so, because the leaders of Poland, the Baltic states, and 
Ukraine gathered in Tbilisi, and because the Europeans and United States pushed Moscow 
to stop the aggression.”326 Holloway asserts, “The U.S. has a lot of potential influence and 
power, but it is not using it in the best way.”327 Holloway stresses that, ultimately, to deter 
Russian gray zone conflict, “the U.S. needs a well-thought-out, consistent policy toward 
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the gray zone that deploys punishment and diplomacy but also includes alliances and shows 
the credibility of commitment to NATO.”328 
c. Government–Civilian Collaboration  
Deterring Russia’s continuing use of expedient and increasingly hard-to-detect gray 
zone tactics in the information space requires that the United States partner with private 
organizations to fill the gaps in its technological capacity and personnel. The 2017 National 
Security Strategy recognizes that U.S. “diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic 
agencies have not kept pace with the changes in the character of competition.”329 In 
addition, “to meet these challenges we must also upgrade our political and economic 
instruments to operate across these environments. . . . By aligning our public and private 
sector efforts we can field a Joint Force that is unmatched.”330 By partnering with private 
companies and non-governmental organizations, the United States can improve its ability 
to detect, attribute, and counter or deny Russian disinformation and interference in 
democratic processes. Panetta explains that the United States is behind in identifying and 
responding to threats in the information space. Panetta states, “Part of the issue is that 
sometimes the U.S. takes for granted its strength, which causes it to be lax in developing 
the innovative and creative approaches that it needs.”331  
To address the capability gap, a team of analysts from RAND encourage 
Washington to “fund academia to develop better tools for identifying and attributing 
disinformation on social media.”332 Whether they be private companies, nongovernmental 
organizations, or academia, the U.S. government needs to partner with outside entities to 
increase its ability in the information space. Stacie Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser of RAND 
suggest, “Civil organizations . . . might be best positioned to counter most Russian gray 
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zone tactics.”333 They elaborate, saying that this battle is “primarily a social, political, and 
economic fight—not a military one, . . . better waged by civilian agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations, whose core competencies lie in these domains.”334  
Panetta recognizes that “the relationship between the Defense Department, 
intelligence agencies, and private industry is not as good as it should be” and recommends 
two routes for improvement: one in the near term and one that will take longer to 
develop.335 In the near term, Panetta suggests developing a gray zone task force composed 
of the CIA, NSA, Department of Defense, Department of State, and possibly other 
interested organizations to coordinate a centralized effort to address gray zone conflict.336 
For a longer-term approach, Panetta suggests establishing a government entity similar to 
but beyond the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency that would form an 
innovative partnership with the public and private sectors to mobilize the best American 
efforts toward gray zone conflict—the Manhattan Project of today if you will.337 Werchan 
agrees: “Once defined, a federal agency dedicated to gray zone activities may be required 
in order to implement a true whole-of-government approach to combatting Russian 
influence activities abroad.”338 By identifying disinformation being propagated to the 
American people and having a mechanism to counter it, the United States can deny 
Russia’s end goal of sowing discord and unrest among the American public to divide the 
population and arrest progress in Washington. 
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d. Developing Infrastructure and Social Resilience  
Developing resilience in the societies and infrastructure of the United States and 
NATO could be one of the most crucial factors in deterring Russian gray zone aggression, 
as it inherently denies Russia’s ends by reducing the effectiveness of its strategies. 
Bolstering a strategy of deterrence by denial through resilience incorporates all aspects of 
a state’s system including its infrastructure and society, which requires education, 
comprehensive integration, and societal cohesion and healing. As Pettyjohn and Wasser 
explain,  
Russia’s gray zone tactics will persist and should be countered by hardening 
Western societies against propaganda and attempts to undermine 
democracy. However, overreaction only serves Moscow’s purposes. Strong 
civil societies and robust democratic institutions, rather than panic at 
“losing” or attempts to fight Russia blow-by-blow, are the West’s best 
defenses against Russia’s gray zone tactics. Russia’s gray zone tactics 
signify its weakness, and the West’s stronger political, cultural, and social 
systems will prevail over them if given the chance.339 
Russia seeks to reduce U.S. influence and involvement in Europe through information 
campaigns, disinformation, and cyberattacks to interfere in democratic processes and arrest 
the progress of Washington. Jeffrey Larsen explains, “When facing non-linear threats that 
target the whole-of-society, one’s response has to be broad and comprehensive.”340  
Resilience is defined as the “ability of the community, services, area or 
infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to withstand, handle and recover from 
disruptive challenges.”341 Resilience encompasses not only the physical infrastructure of 
a state but also its services and ability to work together with its society to continue to 
function under strain or recover from a loss of service or attack. Resilience, therefore, “aims 
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at being prepared”—that is, having “the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover 
from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events.”342 
Achieving resilience in each of these areas at a level that would dissuade Russia 
from utilizing gray zone aggression requires a fundamental shift in priority and attention 
to the issue, which has started to occur but needs rapid development. Larsen demonstrates 
that during the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, “heads of state and government committed 
themselves to enhance resilience as the basis for credible deterrence.”343 The members of 
the summit pledged to “continue to enhance . . . resilience against the full spectrum of 
threats, including hybrid threats, from any direction. Resilience is an essential basis for 
credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks.”344 
Reducing U.S. and NATO vulnerabilities limits Russia’s ability to achieve its end 
objective, limits the possibility of an attack, and reinforces deterrence.  
While partnerships with private industry are critical to fill the gaps in cyber 
capabilities and expedient innovation, relying on private entities for many of the services 
and infrastructure of the state could create a national security vulnerability. The 
infrastructure and systems of states are becoming increasingly reliant on private entities for 
critical support in everything from military transportation to information technology 
systems. This integration has left the United States and NATO at risk of an attack that 
would not require armed conflict. Lasconjarias shows that “typically, in large [NATO] 
operations, around 90% of military transport is accomplished using civilian assets 
chartered from the private sector. Over 50% of communications for military purposes are 
transmitted through civilian satellites, and roughly 75% of host nation support to NATO 
forces is sourced from local commercial infrastructure and services.”345  
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If Russia observes that a cyberattack on U.S. or NATO commercial infrastructure 
and systems can render its military less effective or delay reinforcements from the VJTF 
into the Baltics, the established conventional stability is at risk. The likelihood of a large-
scale attack of this magnitude by Russia is unlikely considering the likely overwhelming 
response from the United States and NATO. However, Russia is likely capable and willing 
to conduct multiple smaller attacks on commercial entities to frustrate and degrade state 
infrastructure. To deter such attacks, the United States and NATO need to invest in robust 
countermeasures, security, and redundancy in their infrastructure and systems. To achieve 
this, state governments will need to partner with the civilian sector to make each actor in 
the chain aware of the threat, invested in the solution, and educated on how to implement 
it. This will also require government funding or incentives for competitive, for-profit 
companies to comply.  
Democratic institutional processes must also be protected, defended, and bolstered. 
Lute recalls that “with regard to the Russian attack on the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, 
the election system was not robust enough, was not secure enough, was not resilient enough 
for Russia to calculate that it was not worth trying.”346 Russia was able to successfully 
sow doubt among the American public. Investing in societal education and providing 
information at every level of the population is necessary to develop comprehensive state 
resilience. It has been said that NATO’s aim to strengthen “civil preparedness” to deter 
against attack is “a question not only of retaining the confidence of one’s population, but 
also of sticking to the core values on which the Alliance is built—where the social contract 
demands that the government care for its people.”347 The best way for the United States 
and NATO to deter this kind of sub-conventional aggression is to use their strength as 
democratic nations to deny Russian ends through educating their public, students, 
diplomats, and military leaders.  
NATO member state Latvia and partner Sweden demonstrate current education and 
integration initiatives that the United States and the rest of NATO could adapt and 
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implement. These initiatives aim to transform the perceived vulnerabilities of the United 
States and NATO states into strengths and assets in the deterrence of Russian gray zone 
aggression by educating societies on the importance of their role and equipping them with 
the skills to identify disinformation, effect change in their communities, instill confidence 
in their national governments, and continue to function during crises.  
Currently, Latvia has a national defense curriculum for public education. The 
Latvian Comprehensive National Defence document explains that “respect for Latvia’s 
statehood, inhabitants and national security should be taught from the first years of primary 
education. Education should promote critical thinking and patriotism.”348 The document 
declares that “teachers should be trained on how to deliver those skills to children. National 
defence school courses are a first step towards a more coordinated and integrated way of 
promoting the sense of duty.”349 The program’s curriculum is directed toward high school 
students, and full implementation should be complete by 2025 when it will include all 
schools. The program includes topics related to national security and related skills 
including situational awareness (ability to act appropriately in critical situations), 
understanding the role of citizens in defense, basic military and defense skills (including 
physical training, discipline, and communications), civic engagement, leadership, and 
teamwork.350  
Latvia’s high school education program is only a small piece of the education 
needed for comprehensive societal resilience; however, it is an outstanding example of how 
to prepare a society through education of its future leaders and citizens. Latvia’s teenagers 
are developing skills and knowledge that prepare them to be active participants in the 
state’s deterrence posture and strategy through understanding society’s role, remaining 
calm and confident in the state’s ability during crises, and aiding in organizing their 
community in support of the overarching deterrence policy.  
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Another potential avenue for societal education to bolster resilience is the military. 
The U.S. military and many other NATO nations’ forces have professional development 
for both their officers and non-commissioned corps. This existing framework is ripe for the 
integration of civil resilience education. Lasconjarias highlights that the military’s “unique 
ability to change the syllabus on a regular basis to cope with an evolving security 
environment not only provides a model but sets some standards and blueprints.”351 A 
military setting with officers and non-commissioned officers who are familiar with national 
security and attuned to the need for resilience is ideal for developing and refining these 
education initiatives. Once the curriculum is polished, it can be disseminated for civil 
government, academia, and public use to enlighten and inform society.  
Sweden—a NATO partner but not a member state—has an innovative approach to 
transforming its society from a vulnerability to a deterrent asset. In 2020, Sweden is 
conducting a total defense exercise aimed at “reinforcing its national defense capacity as 
part of the efforts to strengthen defense by protecting vital society functions and the civilian 
population.”352 The exercise focuses on the 2017 Russian NotPetya virus, which 
significantly disrupted global shipping and major international companies.353 Participants 
in the exercise hail from all levels of society, from across each municipality, and include 
civilian, military, and national authorities to spearhead efforts in linking resources for 
national defense and deterrence. As part of the exercise, participants will gain knowledge 
of how essential services and functions continue to run during a crisis or attack. Participants 
will also gain skills in civil–military communication, chain of command, and coordination 
from the regional to the state level. Lastly, the exercise includes elements designed to 
“coordinate communication to the civilian population and to identify enemy information 
operations.”354 Providing local-level agencies the ability to identify disinformation enables 
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them to share the burden of countering Russian information operations that target civil 
populations. Local governments are often able to communicate more effectively and 
expediently with their constituents than strategic state-level organizations can, thereby 
reducing the impact of disinformation on society.  
In addition to the exercise, Sweden distributed a booklet to all households detailing 
what to do in case of crisis or war. Braw explains, “Providing easy-to-understand 
information about how to act in a crisis contributed to the combined deterrent and defense 
shield of Sweden.”355 She continues: “The brochure was a clever strategic communication 
move, signaling to aggressors that the Swedish government is serious about tapping into 
the public’s potential.”356 This exercise and brochure serve to educate, inform, and 
integrate the whole of society in Sweden so that the state is better prepared for a crisis and 
able to detect and counter Russian disinformation, thus bolstering resilience and deterrence 
overall.  
State and societal resilience is a fundamental aspect of a deterrent policy against 
sub-conventional warfare; however, it requires that societies be cohesive, at least in the 
sense of believing in a common defense. Jeremy Lamoreaux of Brigham Young University 
highlights an important prerequisite for such initiatives: “The U.S. needs to encourage 
societal healing.”357 Lamoreaux goes on to explain that “many states across Eastern 
Europe suffer from tensions between different ethnic/religious/linguistic groups. The 
Baltic States, especially Estonia and Latvia, are experiencing this tension between ethnic 
Baltics and ethnic Russians.”358 This ethnic tension leaves these NATO nations 
susceptible to Russia’s compatriot strategy, as described in Chapter II. Lamoreaux 
suggests, “If Russians were finally afforded equal rights, the ethno-linguistic Russian 
population would have considerably less incentive to believe Russia’s propaganda about 
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having a moral high ground. Instead, being treated equally could undermine Russia’s 
arguments in this regard.”359 In not only the Baltic states but also in the United States and 
NATO, the unification of societies and equal treatment of citizens will diminish Russia’s 
influence significantly and contribute to overall deterrence and resilience.  
The described initiatives, education programs, and societal healing are defensive in 
nature and serve to affect Russia’s cost–benefit calculus that its action will not be worth 
the cost, or that it will not be capable of achieving its objective based on the comprehensive 
resilience of the state and society.  
e. U.S. Information Operations  
Leon Panetta highlights that “the U.S. has come a long way since the Voice of 
America in terms of how it deals with Russia; however, the U.S. has not developed ways 
to use information as effectively as Russia has in its approaches toward the U.S.”360 Unlike 
the United States, Russia makes regular use of social media and information campaigns to 
influence the opinion of the U.S. population and encourage disunity of the state. The United 
States primarily lacks gray zone capabilities in the information operations space.  
During the interviews for this research, the subject matter experts were asked 
whether they believed the United States did enough to inject information operations into 
its policy. The answers were a unanimous and resounding “no.” Roberts explains that how 
the U.S. and its allies engage in the gray zone requires that they “become effective at using 
the gray zone proactively to accomplish high-level foreign policy and national security 
objectives of their own.”361 Deterring Russian gray zone aggression requires that the 
United States improve its information operations capabilities through countering Russian 
disinformation, capitalizing on Russian behavior, exposing corruption, and learning from 
past and present actions. Pyatkov explains, “The most effective antidote to propaganda 
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[today] is free press, backed up by resilient democratic institutions.”362 Combined with 
this chapter’s earlier recommendation to bolster and secure democratic institutions and 
processes, the U.S. ability to preserve the freedom of the press and provide factual 
information to the American public is a key component in denying the success of Russian 
information operations. Unfortunately, as Petraeus explains, “The United States 
information operations capabilities and doctrine have always been inadequate.”363 
Bolstering those capabilities is crucial to a successful deterrent strategy of sub-
conventional warfare against Russia, where information operations are a bulk of the 
behavior.  
Anthony Cordesman explains the breakdown in U.S. capabilities: “The U.S. has a 
problem where it confuses spin and public relations with information operations, and far 
too often what it does is provide public relations support for operations rather than use 
information strategically.”364 To remedy this problem, the United States must develop 
information operation capabilities both within the government and in partnership with 
private entities, as recommended in the previous sections. This partnership will allow the 
United States to fill gaps in its capabilities and identify Russian propaganda and 
disinformation campaigns earlier in the cycle, giving the U.S. government an opportunity 
to counter the propaganda with factual information.  
Steven Pifer suggests going as far as outsourcing the task to entities such as 
Bellingcat, a team of global online investigators who identify disinformation and publish 
articles, stories, videos, and posts exposing the propaganda and providing the facts about 
an incident or story.365 This organization and others like it are at the tip of the spear in 
denying the effects of Russian disinformation. Pifer explains the importance of these types 
of non-governmental organizations is the speed at which they can identify and counter the 
Russian narrative. Pifer highlights, “To do this through the official channels of the state, 
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the intelligence community would have to verify every piece of information, and the 
bureaucracy would need to approve each submission, which would slow the process and 
negate the effort.”366 Through partnerships with outside organizations such as Bellingcat, 
the United States could moderate activity under a set of ground rules that would remove 
the constraints of time while adhering to the standards and values of freedom of the press 
and providing the American people with factual information. Pifer reiterates, “To the extent 
that you want to counter Russian propaganda, you have to do it within hours—you cannot 
wait days or weeks.”367  
In addition to countering Russian propaganda, multiple subject matter experts 
expressed that the United States must monitor and fact-check Russian media outlets such 
as Russia Today and Sputnix. These outlets are aired on many television networks in 
Europe and boast a large viewership. The United States must monitor the credibility of 
these media outlets and interject when disinformation is broadcast either by undermining 
their credibility or by exposing the propaganda. As analysts from RAND explain, 
“Ambiguity is a defining characteristic of the gray zone.”368 U.S. exposure of Russian 
disinformation and propaganda can dissolve the advantage that ambiguity provides and 
allow the United States to address the issues directly, in the public eye of the international 
community.  
Another avenue for exposing Russian propaganda is through social media. Pyatkov 
explains that social media can be used as an asset for the U.S. information operations 
strategy instead of being a vulnerability that Russia can exploit. Pyatkov suggests,  
The U.S. government can expose Russian propaganda efforts to the U.S. 
and allied publics to educate their societies on specific Russian provocative 
actions. The advantage for the United States is that American companies 
such as Google, Twitter, and Facebook are at the forefront of social media 
while at the same time are subject to U.S. oversight. This means that the 
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United States can use legislative actions to expose Russian actors spreading 
propaganda on those platforms.369 
In 1947, in an article for Foreign Affairs, George Kennan described his containment 
strategy for the Soviet Union: “The main element of any United States policy toward the 
Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of 
Russian expansive tendencies.”370 Kennan’s original premise was that containing the 
Soviet Union forced the state to deal with its own internal strife. He had argued that the 
Soviet Union had an expansionist strategy as a way of ignoring its own contradictions, and 
containment was a way to force the Soviet Union to look inward and address them. Today, 
Kennan’s idea of containment is applicable to a U.S. gray zone strategy that exposes 
Russian contradictions as a kleptocracy wrought with corruption, a stagnated economy, 
and a dissatisfied public.371 Exposing Russian behavior forces the state to answer to its 
public and the international community. Recall from Chapter II that one of Russia’s 
strategic goals is to be recognized as a great power. The United States can use this end to 
amend some of Russia’s behavior that runs counter to that goal.  
U.S. information operations can aid in damaging Russia’s reputation by exposing 
its actions that run counter to the acceptable behavior of a great power. Joseph Siegle 
explains, “Russia’s propping up of unpopular regimes that are resistant to power sharing 
(such as in Algeria, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe) should be publicized for both 
African and international audiences.”372 Siegle expresses that these regimes, supported by 
Russian military and finances, use coercion to silence their populations and remain in 
power. These regimes bring deplorable living conditions, overreaching governments, and 
rampant corruption to their populations because of Russian support. Siegle denotes that 
“the Russian link to instability and exclusionary regimes needs to be conveyed to African 
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citizens—through multiple channels, including trusted media, civil society, and social 
media networks. This awareness-raising will create additional pressure on complicit 
national leaders while establishing a reputational cost for Russia.”373  
This disposition is also evident in Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Holloway 
explains, “These actions have helped to create anti-Russian feelings among Ukrainians and 
even its own population.”374 The director of the Levada Center, Lev Gudkov, explains that 
“the ‘Crimea effect,’ particularly popular approval of Russia’s foreign policy as a 
reemerging great power, was waning in part because Russians increasingly believe that the 
Kremlin’s pursuit of its geopolitical goals comes ‘at the [social and economic] expense of 
the population.’”375 Gray zone activities can create backlash and unintended consequences 
for Russia. Washington needs to capitalize on these actions by highlighting to the 
international community the aggressive nature of Russia’s regime and its actions.  
Michael Mazarr maintains, “The U.S. needs to incorporate a coherent strategy for 
being a megaphone to constantly (through multiple avenues including social media, 
broadcasting, and sponsoring investigative reporting) expose the evidence of Russian 
actions that further undermine its [Russia’s] position.”376 Because Russia desires 
international legitimacy and recognition as a great power, a strategy that highlights its 
actions and enables states to see its malevolence could change Russia’s decision calculus 
for parts of its gray zone actions by increasing the cost. A recent example of this is 
Secretary Pompeo’s press release condemning Russia’s cyberattack on Georgia. Pompeo 
stated, “This action contradicts Russia’s attempts to claim it is a responsible actor in 
cyberspace and demonstrates a continuing pattern of reckless Russian GRU [military foreign-
intelligence service] cyber operations against a number of countries. These operations aim to 
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sow division, create insecurity, and undermine democratic institutions.”377 Importantly, a 
campaign to shame bad Russian behavior also strengthens the offer to credit good Russian 
behavior that is at the heart of the strategy, outlined earlier in this section, to combine sub-
conventional deterrence with assurance by recognizing Russia as a great power on the 
international stage so long as its behavior exhibits the norms of responsible state behavior. 
f. Learning from Past and Present Actions 
Washington does not have to develop information operations from scratch; there 
are multiple examples of successful historical cases and current initiatives to emulate or 
adapt. During the interviews, multiple subject matter experts referenced a time during the 
Cold War that the United States employed a robust and successful information operations 
campaign. Cordesman recalls that “the U.S. did a much better job utilizing information 
operations during the Cold War. It employed deception and information operations (both 
black and white) and was willing to use foreign media, foreign reporters, third parties, and 
proxies with a great deal of focus. The U.S. utilized its communications assets in ways that 
have almost been forgotten.”378 Not only did the United States employ information 
operations more effectively in the Cold War; NATO did as well. Lasconjarias shows that 
“the Alliance and member states actually practiced counter-propaganda, used information 
campaigns to sway opinion away from communist infiltration of Western states’ 
intellectual domain, and engaged in aggressive counter-espionage and similar 
activities.”379 Today’s security environment is more multifaceted and makes information 
operations more difficult; however, it is worthwhile for U.S. policymakers and strategists 
to review the covert actions and information operations of the Cold War to help develop 
today’s strategy.  
A current exemplar of information operations is found in Lithuania, with a program 
that starts with civilian volunteers. Lasconjarias describes how “in 2016, a number of 
Lithuanians began fighting back against the extensive disinformation about their country 
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disseminated by Russian trolls by scouring social media and reporting such content to 
relevant platforms.”380 These volunteers, who called themselves “the Elves,” joined forces 
with global and local companies such as Google and Delfi to intercept Russian 
disinformation using a website called Demaskuok.381 Reports show that the Elves can 
detect and intercept approximately “90% of disinformation spread on the internet, in as 
little as two hours.”382 The speed and accuracy in which these volunteers can detect and 
intercept propaganda dramatically reduce the effectiveness of Russia’s propaganda. 
Reducing the number of consumers of the disinformation denies nearly all potential effects 
of the information campaign. Lasconjarias explains, “The power of disinformation rests on 
its first-mover advantage: while debunking is a worthy effort, the damage has often already 
been done.”383 Proactively searching for and dismantling Russian propaganda adds 
immense value to any state’s deterrence-by-denial strategy by diminishing Russia’s cost–
benefit analysis. 
2. Sub-conventional Deterrence by Punishment  
Deterrence by denial is a fundamental building block in a successful deterrent 
strategy toward Russia’s gray zone. However, as the members of the Multinational 
Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) put it, to “effectively enforce the rules of the 
game and change Russia’s behavior will require a renewed focus on deterrence by 
punishment below the threshold of war.”384 The addition of punishment through a 
deterrence-by-denial strategy serves to impose restrictions on the sub-conventional level 
by altering Russia’s decision calculus that it can operate with impunity. Petraeus explains, 
“To stop aggressive Russian behavior, the U.S. must take action that is firm but not 
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provocative.”385 U.S. punitive strategy must walk the fine line of being decisive in action 
without escalating out of proportion. Most of the subject matter experts expressed that 
deterrence by punishment should be aimed at some of the most aggressive or severe gray 
zone actions that the United States can credibly signal it is not willing to accept. Examples 
include the physical infiltration of a sovereign nation, interference in the democratic 
process, the use of proxy forces that endangers U.S. interests or service members, and any 
action inconsistent with the international norms of responsible state behavior, such as the 
use of chemical weapons in an assassination attempt on European soil. 
These punitive actions can and should utilize all aspects of state power including 
diplomatic, information, military, and economic. However, punitive deterrence relies on 
attributing the aggressive actions to Russia. Attribution in the gray zone is difficult but not 
impossible, and it is easier if the action is at a higher level or more aggressive. Members 
of the MCDC explain, “Recent examples—such as interference in U.S. and French 
elections, or the ‘Bundestag hack’ in 2016—show that it was possible to trace and attribute 
responsibility.”386 In a report from RAND, analysts lay out three levels of the gray zone, 
two of which are designated as “usually attributable.”387 A chart by RAND, reproduced in 
Table 1, gives a clear representation of the types of gray zone actions on which Washington 
can focus its deterrence-by-punishment efforts.  
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Table 1. Levels of Gray Zone Activities388 
 
 
When actions in the gray zone fall under the category of attributable—either 
because the United States and NATO have done the work to attribute the actions or because 
the actions are inherently attributable (such as political claims to territory)—states tend to 
hide behind the legal, moral, or political justification of an action. Russia uses this tactic 
when it seizes territory and uses the justification of defending ethnic Russians through 
expensive information campaigns. McCarthy, Moyer, and Venable assert, “These tactics 
complicate the task of generating a local response, as well as enforcing punishments.”389 
To make a credible deterrent threat, the United States must address this type of political 
and legal justification for illicit gray zone behavior through diplomatic channels and 
solidarity with its allies.  
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Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the United States and NATO have 
enforced diplomatic punitive measures against Russia by expelling almost all Russian 
diplomats from U.S. and NATO diplomatic positions, suspending cooperation, and 
indicting suspected Russian spies and agents. Diplomacy as a punitive measure shows U.S. 
resolve to its red lines, without the risk of escalating the conflict, making it an ideal first 
step in punitive measures. However, as Cordesman reminds us, “The one thing the U.S. 
cannot do is use diplomacy as a substitute for countermeasures.”390 Diplomacy as a 
punishment often must be used in conjunction with other forms of state power to affect 
Putin’s cost–benefit analysis.  
Punishment for gray zone aggression in the information realm looks a lot like 
deterrence by denial in the information space. The key factor is detecting, denying, and 
publicizing the disinformation to the international community and targeted audience. The 
one difference in the punishment strategy is that the United States can also use offensive 
information operations to target and expose Russian vulnerabilities as well as inform the 
Russian population of its government’s nefarious behavior. By funding and supporting 
sections of the U.S. government already established to conduct these operations, in 
cooperation with private industry, the U.S. could begin work immediately and expand as 
needed. The U.S. State Department has the legal authority and capacity to conduct 
propaganda at home and abroad, and the CIA, through covert action, has the authority to 
conduct propaganda in support of overt U.S. policy goals.391 In support of U.S. deterrent 
strategy, Washington can deliver a clear and concise message of U.S. red lines and resolve 
by setting boundaries, denouncing any Russian actions that fall outside those boundaries, 
and conducting retaliatory information operations that will serve as both immediate 
punishment and as credibility enhancement for future deterrence.  
Just as diplomacy and information operations need to be nested within a larger 
strategy of deterrence by punishment, so does the military. As Roberts explains, “It should 
 
390 Cordesman, interview with author, November 7, 2019. 
391 Smith-Mundt Modernization Act, H. Res. 5736, 112th Cong. (2012), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/112th-congress/house-bill/5736/text. 
125 
be possible to significantly influence the adversary risk calculus to [the U.S.] advantage. 
But it requires the ability to coordinate U.S. and allied military actions in all of the 
operational domains and all of the dimensions of combat.”392 Scholars from the Strategic 
Studies Institute suggest that the United States and NATO should improve their 
warfighting capabilities in Europe.393 They also claim that the “U.S. military hegemony 
and the threat of U.S. military action remain powerful tools in the international arena. The 
United States must continue to leverage its superior military capability in combination with 
the other instruments of national power to deter Russia in the gray zone while avoiding 
escalation into major conflict.”394 Recent actions such as the formation of NATO’s VJTF 
and military forces stationed in the Baltics and U.S.–NATO military exercises give 
credibility to U.S. and NATO resolve to enforce their deterrent threats against higher-level 
gray zone actions. Military forces at the sub-conventional level serve as a punitive threat 
but also as a deterrence-by-denial asset. Physical forces are capable of physical 
punishment; however, they also balance the asymmetry of stakes in areas closer to Russia’s 
near abroad by signaling U.S. and NATO’s commitment to the region and acting as a trip 
wire for physical incursion.  
Ultimately, the threat of punitive use of military forces in response to sub-
conventional Russian aggression carries an inherent risk of escalation. Avoiding that risk 
is an understandable objective of U.S. and NATO policy, as conveyed in the quotation 
above. But, as the discussion of the stability–instability paradox in Chapter II showed, overt 
reluctance to escalate undercuts the potency of the threat of military punishment to deter 
Russian gray zone aggression. For the United States, leveraging “its superior military 
capability . . . while avoiding escalation” is, therefore, a tricky proposition entailing 
inevitable tradeoffs.395 Effective deterrence requires skill and precision in matching 
specific punishment threats to specific Russian objectives and requires accepting a certain 
measure of risk of military conflict in the event of deterrence failure.  
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Economic punishment, in the form of sanctions, is one of the most frequently used 
forms of punishment by the United States. Authors from the Strategic Studies Institute 
claim, “The United States must explore the full gamut of economic options to target 
Russia’s wealth and prosperity.”396 This means that Washington must expand its economic 
punishment efforts beyond sanctions. The consensus among the subject matter experts is 
that although U.S. sanctions against Russia have a nominal effect, they are also potentially 
detrimental to deterrence.397 If Russia views the sanctions as broad and unyielding, even 
if they do comply with U.S. demands, then there is no prospect of the sanctions eliciting 
improved behavior because there is no perceived security assurance. Most of the sanctions 
on Russia were enacted after the annexation of Crimea and are specifically tied to Russian 
actions. However, according Mazarr, Russia might not perceive it that way and could see 
the sanctions as just another tactic of containment.398 For sanctions to be an effective tool 
in affecting Russia’s decision calculus, the United States must re-establish communication 
and diplomacy to tie that punishment to its assurances.  
Another approach toward sanctions comes in the form of punitive diplomacy. 
Participants of the MCDC suggest that the United States could pursue diplomatic measures 
much like the Magnitsky Act, which was “put to the table in the bilateral presidential 
meeting in Helsinki in July 2018.”399 The Magnitsky Act, passed in 2012 and expanded in 
2016 to the Global Magnitsky Act, “allows the [U.S.] executive branch to impose visa bans 
and targeted sanctions on individuals anywhere in the world responsible for committing 
human rights violations or acts of significant corruption.”400 The act, which originally 
targeted Russia, demonstrates the U.S. and international communities’ commitment to 
protecting human rights through economic and diplomatic punishment. The act bolsters 
deterrence by changing the calculus of foreign officials, requiring them to consider U.S. 
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repercussions for their corrupt actions. As Human Rights Watch explains, the act “also 
provides incentives to foreign governments to improve their own accountability 
mechanisms,” which contribute to the deterrence of the actions through international public 
disapproval and political backlash that runs counter to Russia’s ends.401 
Other options for economic punishment include exploiting Russia’s own weak 
economic system. Pifer maintains,  
The stagnation of the Russian economy is in part self-inflicted. To open the 
economy in ways that would increase growth would require that the state 
release some of the control over its economy. The ‘crony capitalism’ model 
that President Putin has developed is connected to his authoritarian 
leadership, which traps him, leading to the continual stagnation of Russia’s 
economy.402  
One approach to exploiting this weak system is to isolate Russia economically. Cordesman 
suggests that Washington pursue changes that reduce or discontinue aid to any state that 
partners with or aids Moscow in its nefarious behavior or increase aid to states whose 
objectives run counter to Russia’s.403 Because of Russia’s stagnated economic growth, 
corruption, and closed economic system, it is vulnerable to isolation.  
In multiple interviews, participants recommended a U.S. information operations 
strategy to affect Russia’s decision calculus by exposing, or threatening to expose, the 
corruption within Putin’s own circle of political elites. Lute states, “To deter gray zone 
actions, you have to identify what Putin values and hold it at risk, so that the pain or 
political consequences that the U.S. is threatening get his attention.”404 Lute suggests that 
signaling to Putin Washington’s willingness to expose his finances or those of his political 
elites to his economically deprived population, which would be detrimental to his political 
hold on power, could serve as a deterrent measure.405  
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It is speculated that President Putin utilizes his finances and close relationships with 
Russian oligarchs to stay in power, and any signal from the United States that it is willing 
to disrupt that system could have significant weight as a deterrent threat.406 Pifer agrees, 
but he suggests that exposing the corruption of Russian oligarchs closest to Putin rather 
than Putin himself would signal to the president a U.S. deterrent threat.407 Exposing 
corruption in the Kremlin could be done in a covert action, giving the U.S. plausible 
deniability and reducing the risk of escalation. However, it is worth noting that although 
such a strategy could be effective, it could also be provocative. Exposing details of 
corruption in top Russian leadership could affect Putin’s ability to remain in power and be 
perceived as an existential threat.  
C. CONVENTIONAL ESCALATION TO RESTORE DETERRENCE 
Any given instance in which violence in the gray zone rises and little green men or 
armed mercenaries are introduced by Russia decreases ambiguity but increases the 
likelihood of armed conflict. When Russian aggression breaches the gray zone and enters 
into armed conflict, it is necessary for the United States to escalate to conventional-level 
strategies both to defend threatened interests directly and to restore deterrence at the sub-
conventional level.  
The United States demonstrated this strategy in February 2014 when Russian 
mercenaries from the Wagner Group along with Syrian soldiers attacked a U.S. position in 
Syria. Russian leadership denied any involvement, and U.S. armed forces responded to the 
attack with an air strike killing approximately 500 pro-Syrian fighters including Russian 
mercenaries.408 Through military punishment at the conventional level, the United States 
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clearly signaled to Russia that it had crossed a red line that the United States was not willing 
to tolerate. The conventional strike re-established the conflict boundaries by showing 
Russia that the United States is willing to escalate to conventional conflict, a level at which 
Russia does not want to operate. Russia may have expected that by maintaining ambiguity 
in its actions through the use of mercenaries instead of armed Russian forces, the United 
States would not respond with conventional force. In thwarting those expectations, the 
United States changed Russia’s decision calculus and constrained the bounds of the gray 
zone to the sub-conventional level below armed conflict. Panetta explains, “In today’s 
environment, the constraints of the treaties that were developed between the U.S. and 
Russia in the Cold War are no longer there. Russia is doing everything it can to test the 
waters and develop superiority where they can, and the U.S. must make it clear to Russia 
what it will not tolerate.”409 
In summary, deterrence in the gray zone is possible but not perfect. The United 
States can effectively deter some but not all of Russia’s gray zone actions. Washington 
must understand that deterrence in the gray zone cannot be accomplished using a zero-
tolerance standard, which entails choosing what to deter at the sub-conventional level and 
what it is willing to accept. A successful deterrent strategy will require a whole-of-
government approach in conjunction with private-sector partnerships. Success is 
predicated on cooperation with U.S. allies, the re-establishment of communication with 
Russia, and diplomacy. The application of the strategy will center on deterrence by denial, 
supported by punishment when denial fails due to the low cost of action at the sub-
conventional level. Finally, sub-conventional deterrence can be re-established through the 
escalation and the use of conventional forces; however, such escalation is not without risk 
and must be done in a calculated, proportional way. The advantage of layering a deterrence-
by-denial strategy with all aspects of deterrence by punishment is that much like 
cumulative deterrence, over time, it bolsters the credibility of the United States and alters 
Russia’s decision calculus at the sub-conventional level, thereby strengthening deterrence 
overall and bounding the conflict to the gray zone.  
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The gray zone needs to be a priority for the U.S. and NATO. 
 —Leon Panetta410 
Elisabeth Braw states, “It is no secret that what is now urgently needed is a new 
form of deterrence, one that will make perpetrators of disinformation, cyber-attacks and 
other non-kinetic forms of aggression reconsider the benefits of attacking.”411 The 
interviews of subject matter experts combined with current literature have given this thesis 
the advantage of gathering the most current, consolidated, and tailored data to answer the 
question of how the United States can deter Russian gray zone conflict. This thesis 
discovered that it is possible, albeit difficult, to deter Russian gray zone aggression at the 
sub-conventional level. Specifically, this thesis has shown that deterrence at the sub-
conventional is made possible through a shift in the deterrence mindset, coupled with the 
re-establishment of fundamental deterrence basics, and partnership with private industry 
and U.S. allies.  
Ultimately, the layering analysis in each chapter of this thesis forms a holistic view 
of how the United States can deter Russian gray zone conflict. The analysis integrated a 
detailed understanding of Russia as a state actor, the U.S.–Russian relationship, the gray 
zone in context with Russia’s use, deterrence theory from the strategic to sub-conventional 
level, and finally, a recommended deterrence strategy. Although this thesis provides a 
recommended deterrent strategy, it recognizes that any deterrent strategy should nest 
within a broader strategic national security effort toward Russia. To that end, any deterrent 
strategy presented in this research needs to be analyzed in context with the most current 
geopolitical environment and national security objectives before implementation. 
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A. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
Chapter I provided the background necessary to understand the security 
environment and current landscape in which this thesis was situated. Chapter I also 
established a clear and bounded definition of the gray zone by synthesizing the interviews 
of subject matter experts and the existing literature. This research defined the gray zone as 
follows: 
Any actions above the level of normal statecraft that remain below the 
threshold of state-sponsored armed conflict, focus on gaining strategic 
leverage, and are characterized by ambiguity, intense political, economic, 
and informational competition that could involve aggression, the use of 
ambiguous force, or the incitement of violence. 
This definition was significant as it clarified what is and, more importantly, what is not 
considered gray zone conflict. This research found a previous gap in the literature 
concerning an agreed-upon definition by the national security community, yielding a 
tendency not to bound the scope of gray zone activities to a point that effective policy or 
strategy could be applied. 
Chapter II provided an extensive strategic assessment of Russia as a state actor, a 
holistic view of the relationship between the United States and Russia, an explanation of 
the sources of Russian antagonism, and an exploration of Russia’s gray zone use. 
Chapter II assessed that Russia is an opportunistic revisionist state in slow decline, with 
distrust and antagonism toward the West. This antagonism stems from multiple sources but 
Russia most prominently blames it on the expansion of NATO. Russia is risk-averse to 
open conflict with the United States and NATO because it understands that outside of the 
initial period of war (three weeks) or outside its near abroad, it will lose a conventional 
conflict. However, Russia is risk-acceptant at lower levels of conflict, such as actions in 
the gray zone, if it forwards Russian national objectives and so long as the prospect of 
triggering outright conventional conflict is minimal. Russia’s use of the gray zone is the 
strategy of a weaker nation with limited economic potential—and few options to forward 
its objectives. However, Russia is efficient and effective at these tactics and is advanced 
beyond the United States in its use of the information domain. Lastly, Russia’s main 
strategic objectives include the protection of the regime and state, gaining geopolitical 
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dominance of its region, renegotiating the European security architecture to include gaining 
recognition as a great power, and weakening the cohesion of the NATO alliance to diminish 
U.S. involvement and gain leverage in Europe. Understanding Russia’s emphases and 
priorities among these objectives is key to successful gray zone deterrence. 
Chapter III assessed deterrence strategies from classic deterrence at the strategic 
level, to conventional deterrence, to cumulative deterrence, and the chapter analyzes the 
potential for each deterrence form to be transposed or adapted to the sub-conventional 
level. Chapter III also examined the stability–instability paradox and its application to the 
relationship between the conventional and sub-conventional levels in the specific 
deterrence dynamics between the United States and Russia. Chapter III found that in 
additional to the familiar sources of strategic nuclear stability, Russia’s desire to avoid open 
conflict with the United States and NATO—combined with NATO’s clearly signaled 
reticence to risk conventional conflict despite a superior position—strengthens the stability 
relationship at the conventional level. This stability foments instability at the sub-
conventional level, giving rise to the use of gray zone tactics by a conventionally weaker 
Russia. This finding bears particularly on the deterrence strategy recommended in Chapter 
IV as it considers the adversarial view of warfare.  
Chapter III also proved that some parts of different deterrence strategies—below 
classic strategic deterrence—can be effectively used at the sub-conventional level. 
However, all strategies need adaptation and are shaped by the stability in the U.S.–Russian 
relationship that strategic nuclear weapons provide. The application of these approaches at 
the sub-conventional level, however, requires a shift in the U.S. policymaker’s mindset, 
from zero tolerance of failure to a “cumulative deterrence” notion—that occasional low-
level deterrence failure provides an opportunity for response, which in turn enhances the 
ability to more easily deter similar threats in the future. As discussed in Chapter III, 
cumulative deterrence aims to impose general expectations for adversarial restraint—
expectations that are strengthened by appropriate responses to specific adversarial 
breaches. Chapter III shows that by adapting portions of a conventional deterrence strategy 
and layering it with cumulative deterrence the U.S. can sustain credibility across multiple 
encounters even if deterrence fails in certain instances, vis-à-vis classic zero-tolerance 
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nuclear deterrence. Over time, U.S. responses to Russian gray zone aggression could 
moderate Russian behavior, causing a shift in Russia’s decision calculus and strategic 
goals, thereby bounding or diminishing the conflict.  
Ultimately, Chapter III showed that the waning deterrence credibility and 
capability, as highlighted in Russian rhetoric and academic literature, are not as dire as this 
adversary wants to project. The U.S. deterrence posture is stable in its current state at the 
nuclear and conventional levels. It is also bolstered by recent U.S. capability developments 
and NATO efforts to strengthen its conventional capabilities and posture, such as through 
the VJTF. However, the U.S. deterrent strategy at the sub-conventional level is lacking and 
requires immediate attention if the United States wishes to compete in the gray zone. 
Chapter IV detailed the components of a successful deterrent strategy against 
Russian gray zone conflict based on the assessments of the previous chapters. This strategy 
included diplomacy through established architecture and common interest, communication 
at the strategic and working level, and a shift in the deterrent mindset. This thesis has 
revealed that a strategy of deterrence by denial, supported by punitive action when denial 
fails at the sub-conventional level, has the highest chance of success against deterring 
Russian strategic ends pursued through gray zone tactics.  
In particular, this research has demonstrated that to avoid executing a purely 
reactionary strategy, it is crucial for the United States to focus on deterring Russia’s 
strategic end goals versus deterring the ways and means that Russia uses to achieve those 
goals. To do this, the United States must prioritize what it wishes to deter in the gray zone 
and focus punitive efforts on those activities. Examples of Russian activities that could be 
objects of gray zone deterrence include interference in democratic processes of the United 
States and its allies, the use of chemical weapons for assassination, violations of state 
sovereignty, and cyberattacks that cause physical damage or interference in global trade 
and economics.  
The necessary components of a successful strategy include the re-establishment of 
communication and diplomacy with Russia, a shift in the deterrent mindset away from zero 
tolerance of failure, and a commitment to deterrence by denial. Deterrence by denial can 
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be achieved through measures such as reinvigorating alliances, strengthening ally capacity, 
fostering collaboration between the U.S. government and the private sector, developing 
societal and infrastructure resilience, and reforming U.S. information operations. It is 
imperative for the United States to understand that a deterrent strategy against gray zone 
conflict is a whole-of-government approach in combination with allies and private industry 
partners; it will be a long-term solution that requires a shift in the mindset of the public and 
government leaders. 
Finally, Chapter IV demonstrated that sub-conventional deterrence will sometimes 
require punitive actions across the full spectrum of U.S. state power in every category of 
DIME when high-priority deterrence fails. Deterrence can be re-established through 
selective escalation to the use of conventional force, as exemplified by the 2018 U.S. 
military airstrike in Syria against pro-Syrian troops and Russian mercenaries after an attack 
on an American outpost in which Russia denied involvement.412 Selective use of 
conventional force helps re-establish deterrence in two ways: by signaling the credibility 
of threats to use such force in response to certain actions and by diminishing the stability–
instability paradox by which Russian confidence in U.S. and NATO reticence to use force 
fuels sub-conventional adventurism. 
Not all actions in the gray zone can or should be deterred. Russia’s authoritarian 
regime and opportunistic approach give Russia the ability to quickly execute gray zone 
tactics before the United States can gather intelligence on the action, emplace a deterrent 
posture, or mobilize counteraction. In some cases, the United States may choose not to 
deter a gray zone action because the cost of deterrence resources is not worth the benefit 
of deterring the action. But not seeking or not achieving deterrence in harder situations will 
not undermine a cumulative gray zone deterrence posture supported by whole-of-
government denial capabilities and selective punitive responses to Russian actions against 
high-priority interests. 
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B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Policy implications based on the findings of this research center around assessing 
strategic priorities, allocating resources, and improving alliance relationships. To 
successfully implement the deterrence strategy detailed in Chapter IV, the United States 
must decide whether deterring Russian gray zone aggression is a strategic priority and, if 
so, what specific gray zone actions it wishes to deter. To effectively implement a deterrence 
policy, the United States must first decide that the gray zone is a strategic priority and 
signal that to its adversaries. Successful deterrence depends on a credible threat derived 
from strategic interest, as well as credible denial capabilities. To make the deterrent threat 
to adversaries at the sub-conventional level credible, Washington must show its interest 
and commitment to deterring that level of warfare. 
If the United States decides that deterring sub-conventional conflict is a strategic 
priority and signals that to its adversaries, it must allocate the resources and personnel to 
do so. As detailed in Chapter IV, a deterrence-by-denial strategy supported by deterrence 
by punishment is recommended to deter Russian gray zone aggression. This strategy is a 
long-term solution that requires a whole-of-government approach, population resilience 
and contribution, and partnership with private industry and allied states. The strategy 
utilizes every instrument of state power and, as such, will require considerable resources, 
time, and dedicated effort to implement it. Public policies of civic and military education, 
government–civilian collaboration, infrastructure reform, and societal healing and 
resilience need bipartisan support and robust funding on a long-term basis to succeed. 
Additionally, the United States must decide which gray zone actions it wishes to 
deter and allocate the resources to do so. Many actions in the gray zone come at little cost 
and low risk, which make it difficult to deter an adversary from utilizing the strategy 
completely. This inability to completely deter gray zone actions necessitates that the United 
States determine which actions it is not willing to accept and focus its deterrence-by-
punishment efforts there. This research assesses in detail how the United States can deter 
Russian gray zone conflict; however, it is up to U.S. policymakers and leaders to decide 
whether sub-conventional deterrence is a strategic priority and allocate the resources 
necessary to execute the strategy.  
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Another necessity for a successful deterrent strategy is the strengthening of U.S. 
alliances. In Chapter IV, Michael Mazarr explains, “The U.S. cannot deter Russia’s gray 
zone by itself; it needs allies and partners because, in most cases, the U.S. is not the target 
of the gray zone actions—our partners are. If the targets of the aggression are not on board 
with the deterrent strategy, then it is not sustainable.”413 Through the strengthening and 
bolstering of U.S. alliances, it can further its denial capabilities, bolster its deterrent threats 
and credibility, extend its influence, and amplify its capacity to deny or counter Russian 
aggression. An effective deterrence strategy relies on the United States and its allies to 
operate from a cohesive position of allied strength so that Russia cannot sow discord and 
fracture the alliance. The increased support and cohesion of the United States and its allies 
fundamentally deny Russia one of its strategic ends. To ensure the strength of the NATO 
alliance, the United States could bolster individual alliance states through measures 
including increased aid, defense training, intelligence sharing, trade agreements, energy 
independence measures, and other policies that increase their capacity and resilience.  
C. LIMITATIONS AND OBSTACLES 
Limitations to this research included restricting interviews of subject matter experts 
to U.S. citizens, using unclassified and open-source data exclusively, adhering to the 
general categorization of the levels of warfare, and scoping the research to exclude the 
assessment of the necessary capabilities or “means” to implement a deterrent strategy at 
the sub-conventional level.  
The subject matter experts interviewed for this thesis provided a wealth of 
knowledge, experience, and expertise on topics including but not limited to NATO 
operations, Russian decision-making, and foreign perspectives, which ensured that the 
research was well rounded and complete. However, the limited time in which this thesis 
was produced prohibited the use of foreign nationals as interview subjects. The process for 
approval would have exceeded the length of time available for research, thus restricting the 
scope to interviews only with U.S. citizens. 
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This thesis utilized only unclassified and open-source information, including the 
interviews, as the dataset for the research to ensure that the results were available to the 
broadest audience possible and that the research had an opportunity to promote positive 
change in the national security space. The addition of classified information might alter the 
perspective of how Russia would perceive the proposed deterrent strategy and change the 
assumptions of escalation control that this thesis utilized.  
This research necessitated the use of the general categorization of the levels of 
warfare as well as weapons and theories that exist at those levels. This thesis utilized the 
categories of the strategic level with nuclear weapons, conventional level with 
conventional-type weapons, and sub-conventional level with gray zone tactics and 
weapons below armed attack. This categorization was necessary for the analysis of 
deterrence theory within these categories and the ability to transpose or adapt each 
approach to the sub-conventional level. However, in practice, more nuanced levels and 
cross-cutting exceptions to these general categories exist. For example, tactical or low-
yield nuclear weapons seen as offensive or “usable” fall somewhere between the strategic 
level, which is regulated by the norm of non-use, and the conventional level. Similarly, 
information warfare and cyberattacks might by scale and effect, even absent human 
violence or physical destruction, rise to the level of strategic or existential impact. These 
kinds of capabilities complicate the development of a posture for non-escalatory deterrence 
of gray zone provocations.  
Lastly, this research was scoped to exclude an analysis of the capabilities and 
weapons systems needed to implement the proposed deterrent strategy at the sub-
conventional level. The ends and ways of the deterrent strategy were assessed and 
described; however, the specific means necessary require further research. For example, 
the thesis identified that the United States must increase resilience and security in its 
democratic systems and infrastructure, but it did not list the specific type of cyber or 
military capabilities that will be necessary to ensure their proper resilience and defense. 
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D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
An identified gap in this research is the lack of foreign national interviews. As this 
research has shown, a U.S. deterrent strategy against Russia’s gray zone conflict cannot be 
executed in a unilateral manner; it requires collaboration with allies and partners, including 
the EU and NATO. Further research from the perspective of NATO in pursuing deterrence 
of the sub-conventional level would greatly complement this thesis. Suggested research 
would include interviews of subject matter experts from NATO, the EU, and U.S. partner 
nations’ personnel, from all sources including academia, government, military, private 
industry leaders, and citizens. A comparison of the results from this thesis and the proposed 
research could overlap to provide a complete alliance view of deterrence that would 
underscore alliance-based requirements to deploy a coherent and fully supported deterrent 
strategy. 
This thesis and its recommendations assume that escalation control is feasible, 
particularly in certain situations of selective U.S. and NATO conventional force response. 
There is an opportunity for further research that explores how sub-conventional deterrence 
would function in the event of an adversary or U.S. and NATO miscalculation or 
misperception, causing conflict to escalate out of the gray zone. Escalation out of the gray 
zone could be intentional or unintentional as future gray zone actions at the sub-
conventional level could have strategic effects. Examples include Russian information 
warfare or a cyber campaign that is not intended to but results in physical damage or loss 
of life. How would the United States and NATO treat such an attack? Would the United 
States and NATO consider a non-conventional attack as an act of war if the results were 
grave or strategic enough? Specifics such as the level, quantity, and type of conventional 
force necessary to restore deterrence and control escalation could be explored. 
Additionally, further research into escalation control at the sub-conventional level beyond 
the U.S.–Russian relationship is warranted to support an overarching theoretical 
understanding of sub-conventional deterrence that would greatly enhance the U.S. ability 
to execute a successful sub-conventional deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Russia as well as in 
other contexts. 
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This thesis recognizes that the deterrence of Russia’s gray zone cannot be done in 
a unilateral fashion and has focused on deterrence from the U.S. perspective while keeping 
the needs and concerns of its allies and partners in mind. This research has shown that 
many of Russia’s gray zone tactics are directed at NATO alliance members to sow discord 
in the alliance and arrest U.S. influence. Chapter IV explained that to implement a 
successful deterrent strategy, the United States must strengthen its alliances and bolster 
NATO’s member states. This finding and recommendation assumes that a deterrence 
strategy in an alliance such as NATO can be agreed upon and executed effectively. Future 
research into the dynamics of deterrence among alliances at the sub-conventional and 
conventional level would amplify the ability of the United States, or any state in an alliance, 
to more effectively develop and implement a deterrent strategy such as the one 
recommended in this thesis. An example of alliance case studies for future research include 
the U.S.–South Korean alliance and the NATO alliance. Future research could include how 
states coordinate policy with an ally that depends heavily on deterrence and how that 
dependence affects alliance politics. Additionally, a ripe opportunity exists for future 
research in lessons learned from case studies. One example includes the 1980 deployment 
of Pershing and cruise missiles as a form of extended deterrence in the context of public 
outcry.  
This thesis categorized deterrence theory into four levels or concepts, including 
classic deterrence at the strategic nuclear level, conventional deterrence, cumulative 
deterrence, and sub-conventional deterrence, specifically in relation to the gray zone. 
However, the levels of warfare or execution of strategy are not always as clear cut. Space 
exists between the strategic nuclear level and the conventional level for tactical nuclear 
weapons considered offensive weapons that are potentially “usable” in a conflict vis-à-vis 
strategic nuclear weapons seen as defensive that fall within the norm of non-use. In light 
of this chasm, scholarly assessments based on Russian doctrine have stated that “Russian 
escalation is sometimes envisioned as a tactical strike on NATO conventional forces in the 
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Baltic states or a demonstration strike that results in few or no direct casualties.”414 
Moreover, “Russia might even employ a demonstration strike early in a Baltic conflict, 
before it begins suffering conventional reverses, to intimidate NATO governments and 
consolidate its gains.”415 By threatening the use of tactical nuclear weapons at the outset 
of a conflict, Russia could be attempting to subvert conventional conflict with NATO and 
nullify NATO’s conventional force strength.  
Given this prospect of early Russian tactical nuclear weapons use, it would be 
prudent for future research to explore how tactical or low-yield nuclear weapons interact 
with sub-conventional deterrence and escalation management. Research would examine 
how the zero tolerance for failure associated with strategic nuclear weapons may or may 
not shift when considering tactical or low-yield nuclear weapons. The results of the 
research could be applied to analyze whether this category of weapon requires a different 
strategy of deterrence when viewed in the context of sub-conventional escalation or limited 
use. An example would be if Russia utilizes a tactical nuclear weapon as an area-denial 
mechanism after a conflict has escalated out of the gray zone. Arbatov et al. point to 
entanglement and doctrinal developments by Russia and the United States as “giving rise 
to the risk that a non-nuclear conflict—even a local one—might escalate rapidly and 
unintentionally into a global nuclear war.”416 Further research to address these issues could 
help answer some of the following questions: Do the “tactical” or “low-yield” 
characteristics of these nuclear weapons erode the norm of non-use associated with 
strategic nuclear weapons? If so, how does that affect sub-conventional deterrence and 
escalation management strategies at the sub-conventional level?  
This thesis provided a thorough assessment of sub-conventional deterrence in the 
context of the U.S.–Russian relationship. Future research could consider other specific 
contexts or case studies. Research that applies and analyzes the findings of this thesis to 
 
414 Paul K. Davis et al., Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian 
Threats to the Baltic States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 46, https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2781/RAND_RR2781.pdf. 
415 Davis et al., 46. 
416 Arbatov et al. Entanglement, 1. 
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use of the gray zone by other states, such as China, would be of great value to the U.S. 
national security community. China utilizes the gray zone very differently from Russia. 
Examining the deterrent strategy applied to the same level of warfare but with different 
strategic ends, means, and ways would provide an assessment of how the utility of the 
strategy depends on how it is tailored to particular adversaries. Suggested research 
questions include the following: How much adaptation and tailoring is required to 
transpose the strategy to other great power adversaries? What components of the strategy 
are portable, and what elements are too specific to Russia to be applicable to other 
adversaries? In what ways does stability at the conventional level in the relationship affect 
the success of the sub-conventional deterrence strategy? 
This thesis provides a thorough analysis of the concepts considered; however future 
research at the classified level could compliment the analysis and findings of this research. 
Classified information could provide additional communication avenues, diplomatic 
measures, and options for deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment that the 
United States could exercise through covert or clandestine actions or programs. 
Additionally, future research at the classified level could provide policy makers with 
additional options for deterrence by punishment through other forms of state power 
including covert actions, clandestine operations, or military special forces. Other research 
could include the role military special forces and covert action play in deterring or 
countering gray zone provocations, not just from Russia but from other adversaries as well. 
This research could provide policymakers and government leaders with denial or 
punishment options that support overt U.S. policy and strengthen the overall deterrent 
posture at the sub-conventional level.  
The 2017 National Security Strategy states that “deterrence today is significantly 
more complex to achieve than during the Cold War.”417 It goes on to explain, 
Adversaries and competitors became adept at operating below the threshold 
of open military conflict and at the edges of international law. Repressive, 
closed states and organizations, although brittle in many ways, are often 
more agile and faster at integrating economic, military, and especially 
 
417 Trump, National Security Strategy, 27.  
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informational means to achieve their goals . . . making it harder for the 
United States and our allies to respond.418  
The National Security Strategy calls for the United States to prepare for these types of 
conflicts and recognize that it is in a state of continual competition in today’s strategic 
environment. It is time for the United States and its allies to reinvigorate their efforts and 
capabilities to compete and operate at the sub-conventional level utilizing all elements of 
state power. From military innovation to societal and policy transformation, history has 
shown that the United States can meet the challenges of new environments by adapting and 
relying on its values and strength through the alliance system. The challenge of gray zone 
aggression in this renewed environment of great power competition is simply another 
opportunity for the United States to innovate and gain strength in partnership with its allies. 
This thesis provides a road map for how to do that successfully in the context of deterring 
Russian gray zone conflict and should be considered with the utmost care when developing 
and implementing policy in the future.  
  
 
418 Trump, 27–8.  
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APPENDIX A.  INTERVIEWEES  
Name Title Organization Interview Date Consent to be Identified  
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Director at the Center for Global 
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deputy assistant secretary of 
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defense policy 
Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory 18-Oct-19 Yes 
Michael Kofman Director of the Russia Studies Program 
CNA Analysis and 
Solutions 23-Oct-19 Yes 
Steven Pifer 
Nonresident senior fellow in the 
Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation Initiative and the 
Center on the United States and 
Europe 
Brookings Institution 25-Oct-19 Yes 
David Petraeus 
Retired United States Army 
general, former director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency 
KKR Global Institute 31-Oct-19 Yes 
Anthony 
Cordesman 
Arleigh A. Burke chair in 
strategy CSIS 7-Nov-19 Yes 
Dr. Michael 
Mazarr 
Senior political scientist, former 
senior defense aide on Capitol 
Hill and special assistant to the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 
RAND Corporation 17-Dec-19 Yes 
Dr. David 
Holloway 
Senior fellow emeritus, faculty 
member at the Center for 
International Security and 
Cooperation; affiliated faculty at 
the Center on Democracy, 
Development, and the Rule of 








Retired United States Army 
lieutenant general, senior fellow 
for the Project on Europe and 
the Transatlantic Relationship, 
and former United States 
permanent representative to 
the North Atlantic Council for 
NATO 
Harvard University 
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former White House chief of 
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APPENDIX B.  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. What is your definition of Russian grey zone conflict?  
a. What is included?  
b. What is not included?  
c. Please provide examples.  
d. Please explain.  
2. Russia recognizes that multiple levels of conflict exist before reaching a threshold 
beyond which they are outmatched politically and militarily by the United States 
and NATO.  
a. Where do you believe that threshold is?  
b. Does it move? Based on what? When?  
i. Is there a general guideline of this threshold that policy 
makers/warfighters can plan from?  
c. How and when are they outmatched?  
3. Based on the Gerasimov doctrine where would you place grey zone activity on 
the spectrum of conflict?  
a. How do you feel that grey zone activity nests into the doctrine? Does it?  
b. What Russian strategies on the chart are included?  
i. See Chart.  
4. The consensus is growing that Russian strategic objectives include weakening the 
cohesion of the NATO alliance to diminish United States involvement and gain 
leverage in Europe. 
a. Do you agree?  
b. Do you believe there are other Russian strategic objectives that the United 
States should be concerned about?  
i. What are they? Please explain.  
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5. Do you believe that the United States and Russia are currently in conflict?  
a. Please explain. 
6. Based on your answer to number four, do you believe that the United States can 
deter Russian grey zone activity in this context?  
a. Why or why not? 
b. How?  
c. Please explain. 
7. The United States and NATO have long held strategic and extended deterrence as 
an enduring national and treaty objective. Do you believe that Russia’s grey zone 
activity is undermining or diminishing the effectiveness of U.S. extended 
deterrence?  
a. How? 
b. Why?  
c. Where?  
d. Please explain.  
8. Do you believe that the U.S. does enough to inject information operations into its 
strategy to deter Russian grey zone conflict? 
a. Why or why not? 
b. Please explain. 
c. If you answered no to number three, do you think the increase of 
information operations will bolster the deterrence of Russian grey zone 
conflict.  
9. Based on your expertise, what is the United States’ best strategy for deterring 
Russian grey zone conflict?  
a. Why?  
10. Based on your expertise, what is the worst strategy that the United States could 
employ to deter Russian grey zone conflict?  
a. Why?  
b. How would this strategy weaken or worsen deterrence?  
c. How would it affect deterrence and extended deterrence elsewhere?  
149 
11. Do you believe that the recent changes made to the NATO force structure and 
policy in the Baltic region are sufficient to deter Russian grey zone activity?  
a. Why or why not?  
12. Do you believe that the U.S. and or NATO could have deterred Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea if a different strategy or posture was pursued prior?  
a. How and why?  
13. Do you believe that an increased U.S. presence in a region will deter Russian grey 
zone activity?  
a. Why or why not?  
14. Do you believe that the deterrence of Russian grey zone activity can be achieved 
by the United States alone?  
a. Why or why not?  
b. OR do you believe it must be achieved through the system of alliance and 
partners?  
i. Why or why not? 
ii. How would that strategy look?  
iii. What would be the U.S. role in a cooperative security strategy?  
iv. What would be the alliance/partner role in the strategy? 
v. What would be the NATO role in the strategy?  
15. Do you believe that the increased presence of host nation forces and defenses will 
deter Russian grey zone activity in an area without U.S. forces or NATO allies?  
a. Why or why not?   
b. Please explain.  
16. Considering that Russia aims to avoid direct conflict with the U.S./NATO, do you 
believe that they view grey zone activity as a separate strategy disconnected from 
their other warfighting strategies?  
a. How and why?  
i. Please explain.  
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b. Or, do you see Russia’s grey zone strategy as a part of their overall 
warfighting strategy?  
i. How and why?  
ii. Please explain.  
17. Do you believe that the U.S. should focus on deterring Russia’s grey zone activity 
based on the assumption that it could escalate to direct conflict between the two 
states?  
a. Or, do you believe that the United States should focus its deterrence 
efforts elsewhere based on the low threat that overall grey zone activity 
creates?  
i. Please explain your answer.  
18. What do you believe are Russia’s main strategic objectives and priorities?  
a. Do you believe that grey zone conflict can achieve these objectives alone?  
b. Do you believe that grey zone conflict significantly contributes to Russia’s 
obtaining those goals?  
19. Where do you see current United States deterrence strategy against Russian grey 
zone activity failing?  
a. Where do you see it succeeding?  
b. Where do you see future issues?  
c. Where do you see room for improvement?  
20. Where do you see weaknesses in Russia’s current grey zone strategy?  
21. What weaknesses or vulnerabilities do you see in Russia that could be exploited 
or used to leverage deterrence of grey zone activities.  
a. Please use the DIME (diplomatic, information, military, economic) 
framework for your answer.  
22. Do you believe that the traditional theory of deterrence can be applied to grey 
zone conflict strategies?  
a. Why or why not?  
b. Please explain.  
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23. Multiple recurring themes have emerged from the previous interviews. What are 
your thoughts on these themes?  
a. Do you agree or disagree?  
b. Please explain.  
24. Do you have any other thoughts or comments on this subject that were not 
previously asked or discussed?  
a. Please elaborate. 
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